diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0467b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Bryan Panic of ’96 +## Definition +The Bryan Panic of 1896 was a financial crisis characterized by significant volatility and manipulation in the markets, leading to widespread impact on traders, including those in bucket shops. +## Category +event diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0182fd --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive +## Definition +A bucket-shop drive refers to a situation where the prices of stocks are manipulated downwards in a coordinated effort to force clients who are long on those stocks to incur losses or be wiped out. +## Category +strategy diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..986b700 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Bucket Shop +## Definition +A bucket shop is a type of brokerage that allows speculative trading in stocks without actually buying shares. These shops often manipulate market prices to exploit their clients, leading to significant losses for traders. +## Category +market diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c326d81 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Bull Tips +## Definition +Bull tips are recommendations or information suggesting that a stock's price will rise, encouraging traders to buy. These were used strategically to influence market movements in the discussed scenario. +## Category +evidence_bearing_claim diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..515fc2b --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan +## Definition +The Cosmopolitan is identified as a bucket shop that engaged in manipulative practices, specifically targeting short positions in Sugar by artificially inflating stock prices. +## Category +institution diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..608a720 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation +## Definition +The practice of manipulating stock prices to extract profits from the market, often at the expense of average investors. +## Category +error +## Context +It underscores the dangers of participating in manipulative market practices without adequate knowledge. +## Source Evidence +"Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out." + +--- diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..564d4ea --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Entity Title: Market Drive +## Definition +A tactic employed to artificially inflate or deflate stock prices in a way that leads to trader losses and profits for others. +## Category +strategy +## Context +Refers to the strategy used by operators to manipulate stock prices causing losses for long holders. +## Source Evidence +"whenever there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive." + +--- diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4219d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Market Factor +## Definition +A market factor is an operator or trader who significantly influences trading conditions or stock prices within the market. In the text, a certain trader is identified as a market factor due to his previous successes in market manipulation. +## Category +trader diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11d05f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange +## Definition +The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a major stock exchange where trading of stocks occurs, serving as a venue for some of the trading activities mentioned in the context of market manipulation. +## Category +market diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65772d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Short Position +## Definition +A short position refers to the practice of selling stocks that a trader does not own, with the intention of buying them back at a lower price to profit from the decline. It was a significant factor in the losses suffered by the traders in the context. +## Category +strategy diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1afb8f --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity) +## Definition +Sugar refers to a specific commodity that is traded on the market, in this case, associated with the incident involving Tom and Henry Williams, where their positions were affected by market manipulation. +## Category +instrument diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3de5c8c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Entity Title: Sugar +## Definition +A specific stock that traders engage with, which is central to the narratives involving trading strategies and market manipulation. +## Category +instrument +## Context +Sugar is referenced in the context of a market manipulation scheme executed by bucket shops. +## Source Evidence +"Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand shares of Sugar." + +--- diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d366cc --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) +## Definition +Western Union is a stock that was frequently manipulated by traders due to its relative ease of movement within the market, making it a favored target for speculative trading schemes. +## Category +instrument diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed05dfb --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# Entity Title: Western Union +## Definition +A specific stock favored for trading due to its liquidity and ease of price manipulation. +## Category +instrument +## Context +Referencing a stock used strategically to execute manipulative trades benefiting the instigator. +## Source Evidence +"One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down." diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..410b336 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Entity Title: Quotation-Board Boy +## Definition +A role in a stock-brokerage office responsible for updating and displaying stock prices on a quotation board for customers. +## Category +trader + +# Entity Title: Tape +## Definition +A method of recording and displaying stock price fluctuations over time, used as a tool for traders to anticipate price movements based on historical behavior. +## Category +instrument + +# Entity Title: Stock Prices Behavior +## Definition +The patterns and tendencies that stock prices display during various market conditions, which can be observed and analyzed to anticipate future movements. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity Title: Observation Journal +## Definition +A personal record maintained by a trader, documenting stock price movements, anticipated fluctuations, and the accuracy of past observations. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity Title: Wall Street Speculation +## Definition +The practice of buying and selling stocks with the aim of profiting from changes in price, based on the belief that historical patterns will repeat. +## Category +strategy \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e9d626 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Summary of "I Part 1" + +## Narrator's Actions & Market Events +- Narrator begins working as a quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage at a young age, quickly engaged with mental arithmetic and the constant flux of stock prices. +- He focuses on the changing numbers, developing an interest in price behavior without understanding why they change. + +## Strategies, Instruments, Venues, Institutions +- Instruments: Stocks +- Venue: Stock market, brokerage office +- Strategy: The narrator observes historical price behaviors to anticipate future movements, creating a personal record of stock performance. + +## Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, Warnings +- The tape reflects the market's real-time state, offering crucial insights for trading decisions. +- Early lesson: "There is nothing new in Wall Street;" past patterns guide future predictions. +- Importance of observing and recording fluctuations to refine anticipation of price movements. + +## Evidence Phrases +- "seven out of ten cases" +- "I got a little book" for tracking observations +- Monitoring fluctuations, e.g., "behaving as it always did before it broke eight or ten points" + +## Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- Lack of detail on what specific stocks were being monitored. +- No clear time references for certain behaviors, potentially leading to confusion about the immediacy of events. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31836ad --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +# Entity Title: Burlington +## Definition +Burlington is a specific security mentioned in the context of trading, which the narrator's acquaintance believed would increase in value. +## Category +instrument + +--- + +# Entity Title: bucket shop +## Definition +A bucket shop is a trading venue where individuals bet on fluctuations in stock prices as indicated by the ticker tape, often with minimal capital. +## Category +market + +--- + +# Entity Title: trading on tips +## Definition +The practice of making trading decisions based on informal tips or advice from others, typically seen as a strategy employed by amateur traders. +## Category +strategy + +--- + +# Entity Title: speculative trading +## Definition +A method of trading where the focus is on making profit from price fluctuations rather than holding investments based on strong fundamentals or long-term growth prospects. +## Category +strategy + +--- + +# Entity Title: arithmetic trading +## Definition +A trading approach based on mathematical calculations and patterns observed in market behavior rather than on emotional or opinion-based decisions. +## Category +strategy + +--- + +# Entity Title: office-boy +## Definition +A term referring to a young individual employed in a brokerage office, in this context representing the narrator's initial role and perspective in the trading environment. +## Category +trader \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e760e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# I Part 2 Summary + +## Narrator's Actions and Market Events +- The narrator observes market fluctuations, particularly noting Hollow Tube's three-point drop amidst a market rally. +- He records data in a memorandum book to analyze stock behavior patterns, focusing on reading the tape. +- Encouraged by an older office boy, he engages in trading Burlington stocks at a bucket shop to test his analytical methods. + +## Named Strategies, Instruments, Venues, and Institutions +- **Trading Instruments**: Shares of Burlington. +- **Trading Venue**: Bucket shop. +- **Strategy**: Testing analytical accuracy through speculative trading based on observed patterns and tape behavior. + +## Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, or Warnings +- The narrator emphasizes the importance of testing hypotheses against real-world outcomes ("if my dope didn’t work in practice, there was nothing in the theory"). +- Encourages understanding market behavior through practice rather than mere speculation on favorites. + +## Evidence Phrases +- **Market Movements**: "Hollow Tube went down three points." +- **Trade Outcome**: "I made a profit of $3.12." +- **First Profit Milestone**: "I was fifteen when I had my first thousand." +- **Leniency in Experience**: "I had never bought or sold anything in my life." + +## Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- The term "bucket shop" may need clarification as the concept has evolved. +- The ambiguity of "old jiggers with oodles of dough" raises questions about the socio-economic context of the trading environment. +- The narrator’s age and level of experience in trading might be viewed with skepticism regarding the realism of earnings figures. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8b7376 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# Entity Title: Bucket Shops +## Definition +Bucket shops are facilities where individuals could trade stocks in small quantities, often with unscrupulous practices focused on exploiting customer behavior rather than genuine trading. +## Category +market + +# Entity Title: Larry Livingston +## Definition +Larry Livingston is a pseudonym used by the narrator, who became well-known for successfully trading and defeating bucket shops. +## Category +trader + +# Entity Title: Boy Plunger +## Definition +The nickname "Boy Plunger" was given to the narrator due to his aggressive trading style and ability to beat the bucket shops. +## Category +trader + +# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company +## Definition +The Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company is depicted as a large, reputable brokerage firm where the narrator eventually found a place to trade, known for its extensive business and numerous branches. +## Category +institution + +# Entity Title: Margin +## Definition +Margin refers to the funds required to open and maintain a trading position, influencing the level of risk associated with trades. In this context, it reflects the narrator's experience with different amounts of capital and the behavior of risk. +## Category +evidence_bearing_claim +## Source Evidence +"If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it, I am much braver than when I risk a million..." + +# Entity Title: Trading Strategy +## Definition +The narrator's approach involves starting with small positions in stocks and escalating his trades as he gains confidence, often using deception to outmaneuver brokers. +## Category +strategy \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c46b57a --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Summary of I Part 3 + +## Narrator's Actions and Market Events +- The narrator reflects on their experiences trading in stock markets, particularly in bucket shops. +- They started with a small amount of capital (e.g., fifteen dollars) and built a successful trading practice independently. +- Initially traded with various bucket shops, switching brokers frequently due to being labeled as a successful trader ("Boy Plunger"). +- Attempted to evade detection by adopting fictitious names while trading. +- Experienced a shutdown from a bucket shop after winning considerable amounts, prompting further attempts to trade at other branches. + +## Named Strategies, Instruments, Venues, and Institutions +- Strategies: Independent trading, switching brokers to avoid limits. +- Instruments: Stocks traded in bucket shops. +- Venues: Various bucket shops, Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company (the largest broker encountered). + +## Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, or Warnings +- Margin trading is risky; small fluctuations can wipe out investments. +- Avoid sharing trading strategies or business details to maintain an edge. +- Be mindful of reputations within trading venues; successful traders can be barred from conducting business. + +## Evidence Phrases +- "I made a good living out of the stock market." +- "Trim us out of $700!" (indicating substantial gain against the bucket shop). +- "Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company" (the largest brokerage). +- "A-1" rating of Cosmopolitan. + +## Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- The narrator’s psychological perspective on "bravery" in trading relative to their capital is subjective and should be examined critically. +- Dates and specific events leading to changes in broker acceptance are not well defined, necessitating further inquiry into context and timelines. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..755bed7 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# Entity: Cosmopolitan Bucket Shop +## Definition +A trading venue characterized as the richest bucket shop in New England, offering extensive trading options including stocks, commodities, and more. It served as a last resort for traders and implemented strict margin and premium requirements that affected trading capacity. +## Category +market +## Context +The Cosmopolitan bucket shop imposed a three-point margin and a premium on trades, limiting the trading capacity of its customers. It was notable for its comprehensive quotation board and handling of various instruments across multiple exchanges. +## Source Evidence +"It was the richest bucket shop in New England... they put no limit on a trade... it had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only man they were afraid of." + +--- + +# Entity: Trading Premium +## Definition +An additional cost imposed by a broker or trading venue that increases the entry price of a security, effectively raising the breakeven point for the trader and diminishing potential profits. +## Category +error +## Context +The requirement of a premium added to the price a trader paid for a stock exaggerated the losses even when the stock increased in value. +## Source Evidence +"It meant that if the price was 90 when I bought... instead of making my ticket: ' Bot Steel at 90⅛ ,' it read: ' Bot Steel at 91⅛ .'" + +--- + +# Entity: Margin Requirement +## Definition +A prerequisite where traders must deposit a certain percentage of the total trade value, reducing their capacity to trade by limiting the amount they can leverage on their balances. +## Category +error +## Context +The requirement of a three-point margin significantly reduced the trader's ability to maintain positions and limited the size of trades he could execute. +## Source Evidence +"they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daead12 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# Summary of Trading Literature - I Part 4 + +### Narrator's Actions and Market Events +- The narrator experienced restrictive trading conditions at the Cosmopolitan bucket shop, which imposed a three-point margin and increasing premiums on trades. +- The narrator navigated the challenges of trading under these terms, continuing to buy and sell shares despite the limitations. + +### Named Strategies, Instruments, Venues, and Institutions +- **Strategy:** Trading in bucket shops, specifically under unfavorable terms (three-point margin, increasing premium). +- **Instruments:** Stocks (e.g., Steel). +- **Venue:** Cosmopolitan bucket shop, the largest in New England. + +### Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, or Warnings +- Beware of high premiums and margin requirements that can significantly handicap trading capacity. +- Understand that bucket shops operate differently from traditional brokerage, often resulting in less favorable conditions for the trader. +- Note that rapid market movements can impact trades negatively, especially when margins are tight. + +### Evidence Phrases +- Mention of “Steel at 90⅛” and margins impacting ticket prices. +- "Three-point margin" and the introduction of "a half point, then a point, and finally, a point and a half" premiums. +- References to a “fine office” and the “largest and completest quotation board” at the Cosmopolitan. +- The narrator alludes to being potentially the “heaviest individual trader” at the Cosmopolitan. + +### Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- The terminology and practices of bucket shops may not be familiar or applicable in modern trading contexts, requiring a review for historical accuracy and relevance. +- Clarification needed on operational specifics of the "fine office" and how it distinguishes itself from other bucket shops. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2341cd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +# Entity: Sugar Market +## Definition +The Sugar Market refers to the trading environment where Sugar shares are bought and sold, particularly in the context of the trades and prices discussed. +## Category +market + +# Entity: Margin Trading +## Definition +Margin Trading is a practice where traders borrow funds from a broker to trade financial assets, allowing them to leverage their investments and amplify potential returns. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity: Emotional Uncertainty +## Definition +Emotional Uncertainty describes a psychological state where a trader feels discomfort and indecision about market conditions, leading to a withdrawal from trades despite the absence of concrete reasons. +## Category +psychological_pattern + +# Entity: The Cosmopolitan +## Definition +The Cosmopolitan is identified as a specific trading venue or bucket shop where informal trading of shares takes place, characterized by its unique ticketing and margin policies. +## Category +institution + +# Entity: Closing Trades +## Definition +Closing Trades refer to the action of finalizing a position in the trading market, in this context executed by submitting tickets to a clerk to sell shares at the prevailing market price. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity: Dave Wyman +## Definition +Dave Wyman is a fellow trader mentioned in the narrative who assists by calling out prices while a primary trader decides to exit a market position. +## Category +trader + +# Entity: Tommy Burnham +## Definition +Tommy Burnham is the clerk at the trading venue responsible for marking trade tickets, noted for his attentiveness to market signals during the trading discussion. +## Category +trader \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2ca9e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Summary of I Part 5 + +## Narrator's Actions and Market Events +- The narrator initially had 3,500 shares of Sugar, margining with big pink tickets (five hundred shares each). +- Market condition was soft; narrator observed price behavior and noted Sugar's decline. +- Feeling uncomfortable with Sugar's hesitating price, the narrator decided to exit the market. +- He delegated price calling to Dave Wyman and attempted to close his position before a potential price drop. + +## Named Strategies, Instruments, Venues, and Institutions +- **Instruments**: Sugar (commodity). +- **Venue**: Cosmopolitan bucket shop. +- **Strategies**: Tactics for margining and early exit from trades based on price behavior and discomfort in market conditions. + +## Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, or Warnings +- Trust your instincts when market conditions change; discomfort can signal the need to exit a trade. +- Observe market behavior closely and be aware of the psychological aspects of trading. +- Do not remain in a trade without a clear understanding of why, especially when feeling uncertain. + +## Evidence Phrases +- Margin amount: over **$10,000**. +- Shares traded: **3,500 shares** of Sugar. +- Price points: trade executed at **105¼**, sold at **103**. +- Notable market participant: **Henry Williams** (shorting **2,500 shares** of Sugar). +- Date and time not explicitly stated, but indicator of intra-day trading dynamics. + +## Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- Vague reference to "something crooked" occurring without explicit details. +- The term "bucket shop" might require contextual historical understanding for contemporary readers. +- No clear timestamp or date is given for the events, which may affect chronology in relation to overall market trends or specific historical occurrences. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8e972c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# Entity Title: Bucket Shop +## Definition +A bucket shop is a type of brokerage that allows speculative trading in stocks without actually buying shares. These shops often manipulate market prices to exploit their clients, leading to significant losses for traders. +## Category +market + +# Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity) +## Definition +Sugar refers to a specific commodity that is traded on the market, in this case, associated with the incident involving Tom and Henry Williams, where their positions were affected by market manipulation. +## Category +instrument + +# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan +## Definition +The Cosmopolitan is identified as a bucket shop that engaged in manipulative practices, specifically targeting short positions in Sugar by artificially inflating stock prices. +## Category +institution + +# Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) +## Definition +Western Union is a stock that was frequently manipulated by traders due to its relative ease of movement within the market, making it a favored target for speculative trading schemes. +## Category +instrument + +# Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive +## Definition +A bucket-shop drive refers to a situation where the prices of stocks are manipulated downwards in a coordinated effort to force clients who are long on those stocks to incur losses or be wiped out. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange +## Definition +The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a major stock exchange where trading of stocks occurs, serving as a venue for some of the trading activities mentioned in the context of market manipulation. +## Category +market + +# Entity Title: Market Factor +## Definition +A market factor is an operator or trader who significantly influences trading conditions or stock prices within the market. In the text, a certain trader is identified as a market factor due to his previous successes in market manipulation. +## Category +trader + +# Entity Title: Bryan Panic of ’96 +## Definition +The Bryan Panic of 1896 was a financial crisis characterized by significant volatility and manipulation in the markets, leading to widespread impact on traders, including those in bucket shops. +## Category +event + +# Entity Title: Short Position +## Definition +A short position refers to the practice of selling stocks that a trader does not own, with the intention of buying them back at a lower price to profit from the decline. It was a significant factor in the losses suffered by the traders in the context. +## Category +strategy + +# Entity Title: Bull Tips +## Definition +Bull tips are recommendations or information suggesting that a stock's price will rise, encouraging traders to buy. These were used strategically to influence market movements in the discussed scenario. +## Category +evidence_bearing_claim \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..685c4ea --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Summary of Trading-Literature Source: I Part 6 + +## Narrator's Actions and Market Reactions +- The narrator interacts with Tom, marking tickets “Closed at 103” for seven shares. +- The narrator reacts to market movements when Dave Wyman yells about Sugar reaching 108, indicating a run on the bucket shop. +- The narrator comments on the market manipulation by noting the price drop following the peak. + +## Named Strategies, Instruments, Venues, and Institutions +- **Strategies**: Market manipulation via bucket shop tactics and coordinated buying. +- **Instruments**: Shares of Sugar and Western Union stock. +- **Venues**: Bucket shops, New York Stock Exchange. +- **Institutions**: Cosmopolitan bucket shop; Tom (an employee of the shop); Dave Wyman (ticker announcer); an unnamed New York operator. + +## Explicit Lessons, Rules of Thumb, or Warnings +- A run on a bucket shop can be triggered by customer suspicion, similar to a bank run. +- Bucket shops often manipulate stock prices to eliminate losing positions of their customers. +- Unexplained sharp price drops followed by quick recoveries are indicative of bucket-shop drives. + +## Evidence Phrases +- “six thousand shares of Sugar” +- “$20,000 in Sugar margins” +- “doubled-cross me” and “seventy thousand dollars” (gain from the intermediary operator’s manipulation). +- Mention of "bought as much of a certain stock" and "sold at two points profit". +- Reference to “the Bryan panic of ’96” for context on market events. + +## Ambiguities or Anachronisms +- The identity of the unnamed New York operator and his specific techniques remains vague. +- The transition from the operator's profitable ploy to his eventual obscurity lacks clarity—why he fell into obscurity is ambiguous. +- The term "bucket-shop drive" may need explanation or may be outdated for contemporary readers. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/index.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/index.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d125cfb --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/index.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1570 @@ +artifacts: +- id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + provenance: + original_path: /mnt/c/Users/bernd.worsch/Downloads/LefevreEdwin-ReminiscencesOfAStockOperator.epub!OEBPS/7612516312020751654_60979-h-2.htm.xhtml + source_type: epub + digest: 2692a29f1fccaa88f06bc6276a83f4ef81acca0b33dfec69dd68322e4789c19d + chunk_id: chapter-01-part-001 + chunk_index: 0 + chunk_count: 6 + imported_at: '2026-05-18T22:49:19.671005+00:00' + extractor_version: generic-source-intake-v3 + section_role: body + spine_index: 3 + book_metadata: + title: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator + creator: Edwin Lefevre + language: en + rights: Public domain in the USA. + subjects: + - 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type: generated_from + target: source/chapter-01-part-001.md +- id: relation/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 2 Relations + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + stage_id: extract-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146159-0S6MdngBk4ql8VAVvJaV + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1286 + completion_tokens: 234 + total_tokens: 1520 + cost: 0.0003333 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0003333 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.0001929 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001404 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 5.373 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: source/chapter-01-part-002.md +- id: relation/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 3 Relations + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + stage_id: extract-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146166-mKErwtHghHPTuoaB0N2Q + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1291 + completion_tokens: 169 + total_tokens: 1460 + cost: 0.00029505 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00029505 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.00019365 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001014 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 5.125 + relationships: + - 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type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146197-P8dNeSpFHLjnH032KR33 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 423 + completion_tokens: 157 + total_tokens: 580 + cost: 0.00015765 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00015765 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.345e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.42e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.311 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-sugar.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146201-14eaLCtdwLrQRNtsl0P0 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 393 + completion_tokens: 139 + total_tokens: 532 + cost: 0.00014235 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014235 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 5.895e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.34e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.064 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-drive.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146205-YIVaxWEGh2A84PErKtKh + usage: + prompt_tokens: 447 + completion_tokens: 156 + total_tokens: 603 + cost: 0.00016065 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00016065 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.705e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.36e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.273 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146209-Rb1amtJliQTYh9XgfFfz + usage: + prompt_tokens: 446 + completion_tokens: 159 + total_tokens: 605 + cost: 0.0001623 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001623 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.69e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.54e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.164 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146215-Brv5ZbIzkc9wxy1jPq6Y + usage: + prompt_tokens: 408 + completion_tokens: 133 + total_tokens: 541 + cost: 0.000141 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.000141 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.12e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 7.98e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.303 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146219-BV94C3WtvtYONIkaTvv2 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 438 + completion_tokens: 139 + total_tokens: 577 + cost: 0.0001491 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001491 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.57e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.34e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.512 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-western-union.md +- id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity)' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + stage_id: split-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + source_bundle_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md + provider: openrouter + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + - type: split_from + target: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md +- id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + stage_id: split-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + source_bundle_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md + provider: openrouter + relationships: + - 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type: generated_from + target: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + - type: split_from + target: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md +- id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: entity + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996" + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + stage_id: split-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + source_bundle_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md + provider: openrouter + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + - type: split_from + target: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md +- id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + stage_id: split-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + source_bundle_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-entities.md + provider: openrouter + relationships: + - 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type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146227-qpEa5PX9NtsYDREgNRxU + usage: + prompt_tokens: 402 + completion_tokens: 128 + total_tokens: 530 + cost: 0.0001371 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001371 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.03e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 7.68e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.507 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146230-lIDRlb48UZxhQXnfHxET + usage: + prompt_tokens: 405 + completion_tokens: 178 + total_tokens: 583 + cost: 0.00016755 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00016755 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.075e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001068 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.512 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-factor.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146234-4sIcU9coqO6qAd4TZe9J + usage: + prompt_tokens: 406 + completion_tokens: 148 + total_tokens: 554 + cost: 0.0001497 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001497 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.09e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.88e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.937 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: generated + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996 Evaluation" + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146239-2MYOeqdsEBiVwamUt1OR + usage: + prompt_tokens: 409 + completion_tokens: 197 + total_tokens: 606 + cost: 0.00017955 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00017955 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.135e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001182 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.1 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-short-position.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146245-yKJ1Zq3dMjrqe8RaZpdL + usage: + prompt_tokens: 413 + completion_tokens: 143 + total_tokens: 556 + cost: 0.00014775 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014775 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.195e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.58e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.921 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-short-position.md +- id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bull-tips.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips Evaluation' + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + provider: openrouter + provider_metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146249-h4eDeyh9ejilKIZi7gR5 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 402 + completion_tokens: 168 + total_tokens: 570 + cost: 0.0001611 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001611 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.03e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001008 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.464 + relationships: + - type: generated_from + target: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md +- id: generated/generation-summary.md + path: reports/generation-summary.md + kind: generated + title: Generation Summary + provenance: + workflow_id: generic-source-generator + snapshot_id: 85a91ca0 + relationships: [] diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6c2554 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +## Subject +quotation-board boy + +## Predicate +operates in + +## Object +stock-brokerage office + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"I got a job as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office." + +--- + +## Subject +stock prices + +## Predicate +show + +## Object +certain habits + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt to show certain habits." + +--- + +## Subject +past performances + +## Predicate +guide + +## Object +anticipation of movements in prices + +## Relation Type +risk_mitigation + +## Evidence +"My only guide, as I say, was their past performances." + +--- + +## Subject +tape + +## Predicate +is + +## Object +telescope + +## Relation Type +lesson_evidence + +## Evidence +"A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope." + +--- + +## Subject +observations + +## Predicate +determine + +## Object +probable movements + +## Relation Type +lesson_evidence + +## Evidence +"I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed accurately; in other words, whether I was right." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44e910b --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +## Subject +Hollow Tube + +## Predicate +went down + +## Object +three points + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the market rallied sharply." + +--- + +## Subject +directors + +## Predicate +passed + +## Object +the dividend + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"On the following Monday you saw that the directors passed the dividend." + +--- + +## Subject +Burlington + +## Predicate +was acting as it usually did before it went up + +## Object +n/a + +## Relation Type +lesson_evidence + +## Evidence +"Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting as it usually did before it went up." + +--- + +## Subject +trader + +## Predicate +operates in + +## Object +bucket shops + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"it was the ideal way to operate in a bucket shop." + +--- + +## Subject +speculating + +## Predicate +produced + +## Object +profit + +## Relation Type +strategy_outcome + +## Evidence +"I made a profit of $3.12." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2f4bff --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## Subject +Larry Livingston + +## Predicate +operates in + +## Object +bucket shops + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"He began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling incognito." + +--- + +## Subject +bucket shops + +## Predicate +cause + +## Object +loss of customer funds + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"There were other ways of parting customers from their money, even when they guessed right." + +--- + +## Subject +Larry Livingston + +## Predicate +risked + +## Object +trading in the stock market + +## Relation Type +strategy_outcome + +## Evidence +"Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a40ea6e --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +## Subject +Cosmopolitan + +## Predicate +imposed + +## Object +three-point margin + +## Relation Type +risk_mitigation + +## Evidence +"They made me put up a three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point, then a point, and finally, a point and a half." + +--- + +## Subject +Cosmopolitan + +## Predicate +reduced + +## Object +trading capacity + +## Relation Type +risk_mitigation + +## Evidence +"they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds." + +--- + +## Subject +trader + +## Predicate +operates_in + +## Object +bucket shop + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"the only bucket shop that would take my business at all" + +--- + +## Subject +trader + +## Predicate +experienced + +## Object +ups and downs + +## Relation Type +strategy_outcome + +## Evidence +"Of course I had my ups and downs, but was a winner on balance." + +--- + +## Subject +Cosmopolitan + +## Predicate +attempted + +## Object +double-cross + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"They tried to double-cross me." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cc3b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +## Subject +Sugar + +## Predicate +was sold at + +## Object +103 + +## Relation Type +strategy_outcome + +## Evidence +"I slapped my tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, 'Close Sugar!' ... turned out to be 103 again." + +--- + +## Subject +Margin + +## Predicate +was accumulated by + +## Object +trader + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand dollars in cash." + +--- + +## Subject +thinner shoestring + +## Predicate +causes + +## Object +profit for bucket shops + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"The thinner the shoestring the better for them, for their profit lies in your being wiped." + +--- + +## Subject +risk of trading + +## Predicate +was mitigated by + +## Object +leaving the market + +## Relation Type +risk_mitigation + +## Evidence +"I thought I ought to get out of the market ... I couldn’t spot it exactly." + +--- + +## Subject +Cosmopolitan + +## Predicate +operated in + +## Object +bucket shop + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"the Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space on them where they could write down additional margin." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7db14e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +## Subject +Bucket shop practices + +## Predicate +cause + +## Object +Market manipulation + +## Relation Type +cause_effect + +## Evidence +"If one customer gets suspicious the others follow suit... a common practice to get some broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out all the customers that were long of it." + +--- + +## Subject +Cosmopolitan + +## Predicate +performed + +## Object +Market manipulation + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and the other Sugar shorts." + +--- + +## Subject +Agent operations + +## Predicate +produced + +## Object +Profit + +## Relation Type +strategy_outcome + +## Evidence +"A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides." + +--- + +## Subject +New York operator + +## Predicate +engaged in + +## Object +Market strategies + +## Relation Type +actor_venue + +## Evidence +"He made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic of ’96." \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61dbd1c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +I went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in the customers’ room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and called out the prices. They couldn’t come too fast for me. I have always remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M. to let me do much talking. I don’t care for it, anyhow, during business hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share. They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing. It was all I had to be interested in—the changes. Why did they change? I didn’t know. I didn’t care. I didn’t think about that. I simply saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures. I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances. I carried the “dope sheets” in my mind. I looked for stock prices to run on form. I had “clocked” them. You know what I mean. You can spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling. A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can’t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened before and will happen again. I’ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with the why and wherefore. It doesn’t go into explanations. I didn’t ask the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don’t ask it to-day, at forty. The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your business with the tape is now—not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you must act diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..549230e --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +instantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You’ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they were going to do, and even if they didn’t sell the stock themselves they at least didn’t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I’d jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour—learning to read the tape, although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys—he was older than I—came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet if I had any money. “Why do you want to know?” I said. “Well,” he said, “I’ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I’m going to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.” “How do you mean, play it?” I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips were the customers—old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds, even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. “That’s what I mean; play it!” he said. “How much you got?” “How much you need?” “Well, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.” “How are you going to play it?” “I’m going to buy all the Burlington the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,” he said. “It’s going up sure. It’s like picking up money. We’ll double ours in a jiffy.” “Hold on!” I said to him, and pulled out my little dope book. I wasn’t interested in doubling my money, but in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck me at once that if my dope didn’t work in practice there was nothing in the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I’d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell—it never made any difference to me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected, but they couldn’t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook. I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my mother—all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn’t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I didn’t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring was right. That’s all the fun there is—being right by using your head. If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b52ac10 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +all that having more margin meant to me—I was right more emphatically. More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it, I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market. I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They didn’t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money, even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When it was conducted legitimately—I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop went—the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn’t take much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also, no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn’t have any trade. I didn’t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn’t it? Prices either were going the way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn’t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I’ve got friends, of course, but my business has always been the same—a one-man affair. That is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn’t take long for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I’d walk in and plank down my margin, but they’d look at it without making a move to grab it. They’d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name. I’d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got suspicious, I’d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of course after a while they’d find me too expensive and they’d tell me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners’ dividends. Once, when the big concern I’d been trading with for months shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies, and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the manager told me that I said to him, “Tell him I am a short fat man with dark hair and a bushy beard!” But he described me instead, and then he listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. “What did they say to you?” I asked him politely. “They said, ‘You blankety-blank fool, didn’t we tell you to take no business from Larry Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!’” He didn’t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn’t any good in any of their offices. I couldn’t even go in to look at the quotations without some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn’t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest of all—the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as usual. They didn’t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns had. Oh, not because it wasn’t sportsmanship, but because they knew diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98dcc61 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +it would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn’t take a fellow’s business just because that fellow happened to make a little money. But they did the next worse thing—that is, they made me put up a three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point, then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy! Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally: “ Bot ten Steel at 90⅛. ” If you put up a point margin it meant that if it broke 89¼ you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: “ Bot Steel at 90⅛ ,” it read: “ Bot Steel at 91⅛ .” Why, that stock could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I’d still be losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still, that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn’t get me. I escaped because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort. It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had—that is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions, metals—everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape or the quotation board and took the price from there—the last one, of course. He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular broker’s report—that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went to the clerk—the same or another, it depended on the shop—and you told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the time on your ticket, O.K.’d it and gave it back to you, and then you went to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper. In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little as five shares, the tickets were little slips—different colors for buying and selling—and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20¼. You thus had only ¾, of a point’s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as much as they’d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac98933 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +thirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them, for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted to margin your trade still further they’d make out a new ticket, so they could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of ¾ of a point on each point’s decline, for they figured the selling commission also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You’d have thought that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares of Sugar at 105¼. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising. Then all of a sudden I didn’t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating. I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then it sold at 103—that was low for the day—but instead of feeling more confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I couldn’t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn’t know where from, I couldn’t be on my guard against it. That being the case I’d better be out of the market. You know, I don’t do things blindly. I don’t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself, and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn’t stand it. I called to a fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: “Dave, you take my place here. I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next price of Sugar, will you?” He said he would, and I got up and gave him my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn’t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn’t see them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman by the ticker, began: “Su—” and quick as a flash I slapped my tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, “Close Sugar!” before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103 again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine wasn’t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood. At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them, and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I yelled at him: “Hey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price on these tickets—103! Get a gait on!” Everybody in the room heard me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling, diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a71a304 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# I + +and a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and marked my tickets “Closed at 103” and shoved the seven of them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom’s place to the cashier’s cage wasn’t over eight feet. But I hadn’t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly: “Gosh! Sugar, 108!” But it was too late; so I just laughed and called over to Tom, “It didn’t work that time, did it, old boy?” Of course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry’s, and there may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars. This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic of ’96. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members. One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches. On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides. He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St. Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure. If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page of every New York paper. 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workflow_id: generic-source-relations + stage_id: extract-relations + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 6 + prompt_tokens: 7570 + completion_tokens: 1314 + total_tokens: 8884 + cost_usd_known: 0.001924 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 + - workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 7 + prompt_tokens: 3109 + completion_tokens: 1335 + total_tokens: 4444 + cost_usd_known: 0.001268 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 +- run_index: 2 + started_at: '2026-05-18T23:12:29.783882+00:00' + completed_at: '2026-05-18T23:17:35.315574+00:00' + duration_seconds: 315.207 + snapshot_id: 0edf2ef6f38d + workflows: + - run_id: c02bba00267b + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + status: completed + stage_count: 6 + - run_id: 7fbe533bf5c7 + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + status: completed + stage_count: 12 + - run_id: 48c9faaae70e + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + status: completed + stage_count: 6 + - run_id: f4732c7504fc + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + status: completed + stage_count: 14 + rollup: + total_calls: 32 + total_prompt_tokens: 28188 + total_completion_tokens: 7561 + total_tokens: 35749 + total_cost_usd_known: 0.008766 + total_cost_usd_estimated: null + per_bucket: + - workflow_id: generic-source-summary + stage_id: summarize-source + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 6 + prompt_tokens: 6778 + completion_tokens: 2081 + total_tokens: 8859 + cost_usd_known: 0.002265 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 + - workflow_id: generic-source-entities + stage_id: extract-entities + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 6 + prompt_tokens: 8044 + completion_tokens: 1987 + total_tokens: 10031 + cost_usd_known: 0.002399 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 + - workflow_id: generic-source-relations + stage_id: extract-relations + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 6 + prompt_tokens: 7570 + completion_tokens: 1368 + total_tokens: 8938 + cost_usd_known: 0.001956 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 + - workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + stage_id: evaluate-entity + provider: openrouter + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + calls: 14 + prompt_tokens: 5796 + completion_tokens: 2125 + total_tokens: 7921 + cost_usd_known: 0.002146 + cost_usd_estimated: null + cost_status: known + cost_estimated_for_calls: 0 diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecf9b19 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md +evaluator: trading-literature +evaluated_at: 2023-10-03 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 3 + historical_context: 5 + overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- **Groundedness (4)**: While the definition provides a historical context, there is some imprecision in the use of "manipulation" without specific examples. +- **Lesson Clarity (3)**: The lesson conveyed regarding the impact on traders could be clearer; it lacks a structured takeaway for future application. +- **Historical Context (5)**: The event is accurately placed in the 1890s financial landscape. +- **Overgeneralization Risk (4)**: The term "bucket shops" may imply broader applicability, but the scope remains mostly focused on the specific event. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5198440 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-10 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 5 + historical_context: 3 + overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- **Groundedness (4)**: The definition closely aligns with classic concepts but lacks citation of specific historical examples or sources. +- **Historical Context (3)**: The term "bucket shop" is rooted in early 20th-century trading practices, yet the definition does not specify a historical timeframe or context, which would enhance understanding. +- **Overgeneralization Risk (4)**: The definition appears specific to certain manipulative practices but could be misinterpreted without clarity on market scope or typical operators involved. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..085dd91 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-01 +scores: + groundedness: 5 + lesson_clarity: 4 + historical_context: 3 + overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- **Historical Context:** The definition does not specify the typical timeframe or setting for bucket shops, which were most prominent in the early 20th century. This lack of historical specificity impacted the score. +- **Lesson Clarity:** While the definition is clear, it could be made crisper to enhance reusability in later chapters. diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bull-tips.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bull-tips.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a51bcbc --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-bull-tips.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Review +evaluated_at: 2023-10-01 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 5 + historical_context: 4 + overgeneralization_risk: 3 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The definition of "Bull Tips" is clear and concise but relies on the vague term "discussed scenario" without specifying the context, which slightly lowers the score for groundedness. +- Historical context is well-preserved, but the term "Bull Tips" may need a clearer period reference to avoid confusion with modern trading practices. +- The potential for overgeneralization is present as the term could apply to various markets, although it remains somewhat restricted within the definition. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9893372 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-06 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 3 + historical_context: 4 + overgeneralization_risk: 2 +``` + +## Review Notes +- **Lesson Clarity**: The definition lacks crispness; it could be clearer in stating what the lesson regarding bucket shops is. +- **Overgeneralization Risk**: The phrase "engaged in manipulative practices" is vague and might suggest the behavior applies universally rather than being specific to the Cosmopolitan's context. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69a87b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Analyzer +evaluated_at: 2023-10-05 +scores: + - groundedness: 4 + - lesson_clarity: 5 + - historical_context: 3 + - overgeneralization_risk: 3 +``` + +## Review Notes +- Groundedness score is lower due to adventurous interpretation of the 'average investors'; more specific terms used in the source could enhance clarity. +- Historical context suffers from a lack of specificity regarding the exact time period that would anchor the practice accurately in historical terms. +- Overgeneralization risk is present; while the entity articulates a common error, it could imply that manipulation applies universally to all trading environments. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..493fbe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Analyst +evaluated_at: 2023-10-06 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 3 + historical_context: 4 + overgeneralization_risk: 2 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The phrase "artificially inflate or deflate stock prices" risks overgeneralization, as it implies applicability beyond the specific historical context of bucket shops. +- "Tactic employed to artificially inflate or deflate" lacks crisply stated operator-level lessons for practical reuse. +- Use of terminology like "manipulate stock prices" could be considered modern and not indicative of the specific practices in the historical context discussed. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-factor.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-factor.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6d88a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-market-factor.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +```markdown +--- +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md +evaluator: [Your Name] +evaluated_at: 2023-10-01 +scores: + groundedness: 5 + lesson_clarity: 4 + historical_context: 3 + overgeneralization_risk: 2 +--- + +# Review Notes + +- **Historical Context**: The definition lacks specificity regarding the time frame and trading venue that was referenced in the source. A more precise context would improve this score. +- **Overgeneralization Risk**: The term "market factor" could suggest applicability across different markets and eras, which may not align with the original source's intent. More specific language could reduce this risk. +``` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcd7deb --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md +evaluator: trading-literature +evaluated_at: 2023-10-01 +scores: + groundedness: 5 + lesson_clarity: 4 + historical_context: 5 + overgeneralization_risk: 3 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The definition is clear but could elaborate on the specific historical context of market manipulation related to the NYSE. +- There may be a slight risk of overgeneralization if not properly framed, as the reference to "trading activities" could imply broader applicability beyond the NYSE. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-short-position.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-short-position.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3dda1ef --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-short-position.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md +evaluator: Trading-Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-10 +scores: + - groundedness: 5 + - lesson_clarity: 4 + - historical_context: 3 + - overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The definition is clear but lacks a specific historical context which may lead to some ambiguity regarding the era and trading practices referenced. This affects the `historical_context` score. +- Although the lesson is stated crisply, it could be made more reusable for future chapters, slightly impacting the `lesson_clarity` score. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97d33ec --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +```markdown +--- +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-06 +scores: + - groundedness: 4 + - lesson_clarity: 3 + - historical_context: 4 + - overgeneralization_risk: 2 +--- + +# Review Notes +- **Lesson Clarity**: The definition lacks a crisp lesson that can be reused easily; it blends an example with the definition. +- **Overgeneralization Risk**: The phrase "specific commodity" may imply broader applicability, potentially risking vagueness regarding the commodity's context or usage. +``` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d271f24 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md +evaluator: trading-literature +evaluated_at: 2023-10-04 +scores: + groundedness: 5 + lesson_clarity: 3 + historical_context: 4 + overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The definition of "Sugar" is somewhat vague and could be clearer as it pertains to its role within the trading strategies. The score reflects this lack of specific clarity. +- While the historical context of the bucket shop scheme is present, it could be strengthened by explicitly mentioning the time period in which these schemes were prevalent. +- Overall, the content is mostly anchored to the source and does not generalize beyond its scope. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union-stock.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union-stock.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..907ce85 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union-stock.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-01 +scores: + groundedness: 4 + lesson_clarity: 3 + historical_context: 3 + overgeneralization_risk: 4 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The mention of "speculative trading schemes" in the definition may distance it slightly from being strictly grounded, as it implies a modern interpretation of trading practices without providing historical context. This affects both `historical_context` and `lesson_clarity` scores. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28cb453 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +```yaml +artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md +evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator +evaluated_at: 2023-10-02 +scores: + groundedness: 5 + lesson_clarity: 4 + historical_context: 3 + overgeneralization_risk: 2 +``` + +## Review Notes +- The definition is quite clear, but the term "manipulative trades" may overgeneralize the application of strategies to all traders without context regarding legality or ethics. +- The historical context score is lowered due to a lack of specific temporal and domain constraints, which makes it somewhat vague regarding the era of trading conditions. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/metrics/history.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/metrics/history.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0606409 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/metrics/history.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +- snapshot_id: 85a91ca0 + created_at: '2026-05-18T23:17:38.113669+00:00' + schema_name: generic-source + artifact_count: 52 + artifact_evaluations: + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + evaluator: trading-literature + evaluated_at: '2023-10-03T00:00:00' + overall_score: 4.0 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator + evaluated_at: '2023-10-10T00:00:00' + overall_score: 4.0 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator + evaluated_at: '2023-10-01T00:00:00' + overall_score: 4.0 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Review + evaluated_at: '2023-10-01T00:00:00' + overall_score: 4.0 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Evaluator + evaluated_at: '2023-10-06T00:00:00' + overall_score: 3.25 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 2.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Analyzer + evaluated_at: '2023-10-05T00:00:00' + overall_score: 3.75 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + evaluator: Trading Literature Analyst + evaluated_at: '2023-10-06T00:00:00' + overall_score: 3.25 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 2.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + evaluator: '[''Your Name'']' + evaluated_at: '2023-10-01T00:00:00' + overall_score: 3.5 + scores: + - name: groundedness + value: 5.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: lesson_clarity + value: 4.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: historical_context + value: 3.0 + max_value: 5.0 + - name: overgeneralization_risk + value: 2.0 + max_value: 5.0 + notes: [] + - 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I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: extract-relations + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144717-anTWFreGoEEdGgbDT4WL + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1267 + completion_tokens: 182 + total_tokens: 1449 + cost: 0.00029925 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00029925 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.00019005 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001092 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.095 +- stage_id: extract-relations + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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+ duration_seconds: 7.247 +- stage_id: extract-relations + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + output_artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144748-XWcvVwazF9g3wSgBIskT + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1178 + completion_tokens: 201 + total_tokens: 1379 + cost: 0.0002973 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0002973 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.0001767 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001206 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.754 +outputs: +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 1 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 2 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 3 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 4 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 5 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 6 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as\ + \ quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At\ + \ school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental\ + \ arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in\ + \ the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and\ + \ called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember\ + \ that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the\ + \ market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that\ + \ the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they\ + \ were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they\ + \ at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should\ + \ not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead\ + \ of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down\ + \ the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions\ + \ and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was\ + \ not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older\ + \ than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet\ + \ if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D\ + \ he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play\ + \ it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play\ + \ it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips were\ + \ the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for\ + \ five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer\ + \ gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and\ + \ marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over\ + \ toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place\ + \ to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got\ + \ to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T22:52:34.892992+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/48c9faaae70e.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/48c9faaae70e.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..761350c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/48c9faaae70e.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1085 @@ +run_id: 48c9faaae70e +workflow_id: generic-source-relations +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + slug: chapter-01-part-001 + content: "# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: extract-relations + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-001-relations.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146154-rHzyPK53thuJ1aYEaCAC + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1267 + completion_tokens: 240 + total_tokens: 1507 + cost: 0.00033405 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00033405 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.00019005 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.000144 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 5.035 +- stage_id: extract-relations + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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Part 1 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-002-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 2 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-003-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 3 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-004-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 4 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-005-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 5 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: extract-relations + artifact_id: relation/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md + path: artifacts/relations/chapter-01-part-006-relations.md + kind: relation + title: I Part 6 Relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as\ + \ quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At\ + \ school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental\ + \ arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in\ + \ the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and\ + \ called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember\ + \ that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the\ + \ market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that\ + \ the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they\ + \ were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they\ + \ at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should\ + \ not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead\ + \ of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down\ + \ the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions\ + \ and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was\ + \ not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older\ + \ than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet\ + \ if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D\ + \ he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play\ + \ it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play\ + \ it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips were\ + \ the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for\ + \ five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +- stage_id: extract-relations + workflow_id: generic-source-relations + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Relations\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\ + \nExtract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return\none\ + \ Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections\n`## Subject`,\ + \ `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add\n`## Evidence` whenever\ + \ the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase.\n\nUse exactly one of these\ + \ relation types per relation:\n\n- `cause_effect` \u2014 one entity drives a\ + \ measurable market or operator\n outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a\ + \ market event causing a\n policy change)\n- `lesson_evidence` \u2014 an `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ is supported (or\n undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source\n\ + - `risk_mitigation` \u2014 a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk\n-\ + \ `actor_venue` \u2014 a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit\n- `strategy_outcome`\ + \ \u2014 a named strategy is applied to a specific trade\n or campaign and produces\ + \ a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch)\n\nSubject and object values should\ + \ match entity titles you would (or did)\nextract in the entities stage. Skip\ + \ relations whose subject or object\nwould be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip\ + \ implicit moralising; prefer\nrelations the chunk actually evidences.\n\nSource\ + \ title: I Part 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer\ + \ gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and\ + \ marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over\ + \ toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place\ + \ to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got\ + \ to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/relations/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + kind: relation + artifact_id: relation/{{ input.slug }}-relations.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Relations' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T23:16:31.970284+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/7fbe533bf5c7.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/7fbe533bf5c7.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65949af --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/7fbe533bf5c7.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1565 @@ +run_id: 7fbe533bf5c7 +workflow_id: generic-source-entities +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + slug: chapter-01-part-001 + content: "# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: extract-entities + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-001-entities.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146014-LTx18Uo9g2I7MLfw5Q2a + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1346 + completion_tokens: 205 + total_tokens: 1551 + cost: 0.0003249 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0003249 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.0002019 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.000123 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.789 +- stage_id: extract-entities + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: entity + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996" + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity)' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: entity + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996" + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity)' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: entity + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996" + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as\ + \ quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At\ + \ school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental\ + \ arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in\ + \ the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and\ + \ called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember\ + \ that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the\ + \ market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that\ + \ the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they\ + \ were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they\ + \ at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should\ + \ not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead\ + \ of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down\ + \ the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions\ + \ and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was\ + \ not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older\ + \ than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet\ + \ if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D\ + \ he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play\ + \ it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play\ + \ it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips were\ + \ the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for\ + \ five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer\ + \ gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and\ + \ marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over\ + \ toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place\ + \ to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got\ + \ to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T23:15:51.015305+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/a25fbeed2ef7.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/a25fbeed2ef7.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06186b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/a25fbeed2ef7.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,600 @@ +run_id: a25fbeed2ef7 +workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + slug: entity-title-bucket-shop + content: "# Entity Title: Bucket Shop \n## Definition \nA type of brokerage that\ + \ allows customers to place bets on the price movements of stocks without actually\ + \ owning them, often engaging in manipulative practices to profit at the expense\ + \ of the bettors. \n## Category \nmarket \n## Context \nThe practice of manipulating\ + \ stock prices to wipe out long positions of customers. \n## Source Evidence\ + \ \n\"whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded with too many bulls on a certain\ + \ stock it was a common practice to get some broker to wash down the price of\ + \ that particular stock far enough to wipe out all the customers that were long\ + \ of it.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md + slug: entity-title-sugar + content: "# Entity Title: Sugar \n## Definition \nA specific stock that traders\ + \ engage with, which is central to the narratives involving trading strategies\ + \ and market manipulation. \n## Category \ninstrument \n## Context \nSugar\ + \ is referenced in the context of a market manipulation scheme executed by bucket\ + \ shops. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Henry Williams and I together were short six\ + \ thousand shares of Sugar.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + slug: entity-title-cosmopolitan + content: "# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan \n## Definition \nA particular bucket shop\ + \ involved in market manipulation strategies to profit off the misfortunes of\ + \ its clients. \n## Category \ninstitution \n## Context \nThe Cosmopolitan\ + \ employed market manipulation tactics that contributed to the losses of certain\ + \ traders. \n## Source Evidence \n\"That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get\ + \ me and Henry Williams and the other Sugar shorts.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md + slug: entity-title-market-drive + content: "# Entity Title: Market Drive \n## Definition \nA tactic employed to\ + \ artificially inflate or deflate stock prices in a way that leads to trader losses\ + \ and profits for others. \n## Category \nstrategy \n## Context \nRefers to\ + \ the strategy used by operators to manipulate stock prices causing losses for\ + \ long holders. \n## Source Evidence \n\"whenever there was an unexplained sharp\ + \ drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers in those days used\ + \ to call it a bucket-shop drive.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + slug: entity-title-dollar-manipulation + content: "# Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation \n## Definition \nThe practice of\ + \ manipulating stock prices to extract profits from the market, often at the expense\ + \ of average investors. \n## Category \nerror \n## Context \nIt underscores\ + \ the dangers of participating in manipulative market practices without adequate\ + \ knowledge. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Their brokers in New York ran up the price\ + \ to 108. Of course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped\ + \ out.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + slug: entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange + content: "# Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange \n## Definition \nA premier\ + \ stock exchange in the United States where stocks are bought and sold, often\ + \ used as a backdrop for trading strategies and manipulations. \n## Category\ + \ \nmarket \n## Context \nThe trading activities of the Cosmopolitan and other\ + \ manipulators influence prices on this exchange. \n## Source Evidence \n\"\ + They made thousands of dollars... to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock\ + \ Exchange and wipe us out.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md + slug: entity-title-western-union + content: "# Entity Title: Western Union \n## Definition \nA specific stock favored\ + \ for trading due to its liquidity and ease of price manipulation. \n## Category\ + \ \ninstrument \n## Context \nReferencing a stock used strategically to execute\ + \ manipulative trades benefiting the instigator. \n## Source Evidence \n\"One\ + \ of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive\ + \ stock like that a few points up or down.\"\n" +stages: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144756-F2bJ3ZaZ42YKYakYEJie + usage: + prompt_tokens: 474 + completion_tokens: 164 + total_tokens: 638 + cost: 0.0001695 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001695 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 7.11e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.84e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.926 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144760-wIcanekwnL9b2LgOQ42x + usage: + prompt_tokens: 423 + completion_tokens: 166 + total_tokens: 589 + cost: 0.00016305 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00016305 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.345e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.96e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.274 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144764-wYbhNJCoMZ5wVKnssriA + usage: + prompt_tokens: 431 + completion_tokens: 209 + total_tokens: 640 + cost: 0.00019005 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00019005 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.465e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001254 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.312 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-drive.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144769-4K7MOuMXn5mtFLbyvAG8 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 447 + completion_tokens: 200 + total_tokens: 647 + cost: 0.00018705 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00018705 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.705e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.00012 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 5.621 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144775-ViGFYJom73LDw5YHCwu6 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 446 + completion_tokens: 218 + total_tokens: 664 + cost: 0.0001977 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001977 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.69e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001308 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.039 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144780-vyDzUBQfmtnJvNOKHxdC + usage: + prompt_tokens: 450 + completion_tokens: 232 + total_tokens: 682 + cost: 0.0002067 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0002067 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.75e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001392 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.628 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144786-Yzt9LTYwAqYqcwflBeWW + usage: + prompt_tokens: 438 + completion_tokens: 146 + total_tokens: 584 + cost: 0.0001533 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001533 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.57e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.76e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.078 +outputs: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-drive.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Bucket Shop\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Bucket\ + \ Shop \n## Definition \nA type of brokerage that allows customers to place\ + \ bets on the price movements of stocks without actually owning them, often engaging\ + \ in manipulative practices to profit at the expense of the bettors. \n## Category\ + \ \nmarket \n## Context \nThe practice of manipulating stock prices to wipe\ + \ out long positions of customers. \n## Source Evidence \n\"whenever a bucket\ + \ shop found itself loaded with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common\ + \ practice to get some broker to wash down the price of that particular stock\ + \ far enough to wipe out all the customers that were long of it.\" \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-sugar.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Sugar\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Sugar \n##\ + \ Definition \nA specific stock that traders engage with, which is central to\ + \ the narratives involving trading strategies and market manipulation. \n## Category\ + \ \ninstrument \n## Context \nSugar is referenced in the context of a market\ + \ manipulation scheme executed by bucket shops. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Henry\ + \ Williams and I together were short six thousand shares of Sugar.\" \n\n---\n\ + \n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Cosmopolitan\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan\ + \ \n## Definition \nA particular bucket shop involved in market manipulation\ + \ strategies to profit off the misfortunes of its clients. \n## Category \n\ + institution \n## Context \nThe Cosmopolitan employed market manipulation tactics\ + \ that contributed to the losses of certain traders. \n## Source Evidence \n\ + \"That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and the other\ + \ Sugar shorts.\" \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Market Drive\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Market\ + \ Drive \n## Definition \nA tactic employed to artificially inflate or deflate\ + \ stock prices in a way that leads to trader losses and profits for others. \n\ + ## Category \nstrategy \n## Context \nRefers to the strategy used by operators\ + \ to manipulate stock prices causing losses for long holders. \n## Source Evidence\ + \ \n\"whenever there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant\ + \ recovery, the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive.\"\ + \ \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Dollar Manipulation \n## Definition \nThe practice of manipulating stock prices\ + \ to extract profits from the market, often at the expense of average investors.\ + \ \n## Category \nerror \n## Context \nIt underscores the dangers of participating\ + \ in manipulative market practices without adequate knowledge. \n## Source Evidence\ + \ \n\"Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it fell right\ + \ back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out.\" \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ New York Stock Exchange \n## Definition \nA premier stock exchange in the\ + \ United States where stocks are bought and sold, often used as a backdrop for\ + \ trading strategies and manipulations. \n## Category \nmarket \n## Context\ + \ \nThe trading activities of the Cosmopolitan and other manipulators influence\ + \ prices on this exchange. \n## Source Evidence \n\"They made thousands of dollars...\ + \ to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange and wipe us out.\" \ + \ \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-western-union.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Western Union\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Western\ + \ Union \n## Definition \nA specific stock favored for trading due to its liquidity\ + \ and ease of price manipulation. \n## Category \ninstrument \n## Context \ + \ \nReferencing a stock used strategically to execute manipulative trades benefiting\ + \ the instigator. \n## Source Evidence \n\"One of his favorite stocks was Western\ + \ Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive stock like that a few points\ + \ up or down.\"\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T22:53:11.449445+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c02bba00267b.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c02bba00267b.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..845db2d --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c02bba00267b.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +run_id: c02bba00267b +workflow_id: generic-source-summary +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + slug: chapter-01-part-001 + content: "# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: summarize-source + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779145951-FkLRXkLXZ3zEqEomYYe7 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1135 + completion_tokens: 270 + total_tokens: 1405 + cost: 0.00033225 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00033225 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.00017025 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.000162 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 8.75 +- stage_id: summarize-source + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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duration_seconds: 10.391 +- stage_id: summarize-source + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + output_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146001-w8PrWTBeSd2L2FVpBZmb + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1046 + completion_tokens: 398 + total_tokens: 1444 + cost: 0.0003957 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0003957 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.0001569 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0002388 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 9.505 +outputs: +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 1 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 2 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 3 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 4 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 5 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 6 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nI went\ + \ to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as quotation-board\ + \ boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At school I did three\ + \ years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental arithmetic. As\ + \ quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in the customers\u2019\ + \ room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and called out the prices.\ + \ They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always remembered figures. No\ + \ trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in that office. Of course\ + \ I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I did, if the market was\ + \ active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M. to let me do much talking.\ + \ I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business hours. But a busy market did\ + \ not keep me from thinking about the work. Those quotations did not represent\ + \ prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share. They were numbers. Of course,\ + \ they meant something. They were always changing. It was all I had to be interested\ + \ in\u2014the changes. Why did they change? I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t\ + \ care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply saw that they changed. That was\ + \ all I had to think about five hours every day and two on Saturdays: that they\ + \ were always changing. That is how I first came to be interested in the behaviour\ + \ of prices. I had a very good memory for figures. I could remember in detail\ + \ how the prices had acted on the previous day, just before they went up or down.\ + \ My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very handy. I noticed that in advances\ + \ as well as declines, stock prices were apt to show certain habits, so to speak.\ + \ There was no end of parallel cases and these made precedents to guide me. I\ + \ was only fourteen, but after I had taken hundreds of observations in my mind\ + \ I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing the behaviour of stocks to-day\ + \ with other days. It was not long before I was anticipating movements in prices.\ + \ My only guide, as I say, was their past performances. I carried the \u201Cdope\ + \ sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices to run on form. I had \u201C\ + clocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can spot, for instance, where the\ + \ buying is only a trifle better than the selling. A battle goes on in the stock\ + \ market and the tape is your telescope. You can depend upon it seven out of ten\ + \ cases. Another lesson I learned early is that there is nothing new in Wall Street.\ + \ There can\u2019t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever happens\ + \ in the stock market to-day has happened before and will happen again. I\u2019\ + ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really manage to remember when and how it\ + \ happened. The fact that I remember that way is my way of capitalizing experience.\ + \ I got so interested in my game and so anxious to anticipate advances and declines\ + \ in all the active stocks that I got a little book. I put down my observations\ + \ in it. It was not a record of imaginary transactions such as so many people\ + \ keep merely to make or lose millions of dollars without getting the swelled\ + \ head or going to the poorhouse. It was rather a sort of record of my hits and\ + \ misses, and next to the determination of probable movements I was most interested\ + \ in verifying whether I had observed accurately; in other words, whether I was\ + \ right. Say that after studying every fluctuation of the day in an active stock\ + \ I would conclude that it was behaving as it always did before it broke eight\ + \ or ten points. Well, I would jot down the stock and the price on Monday, and\ + \ remembering past performances I would write down what it ought to do on Tuesday\ + \ and Wednesday. Later I would check up with actual transcriptions from the tape.\ + \ That is how I first came to take an interest in the message of the tape. The\ + \ fluctuations were from the first associated in my mind with upward or downward\ + \ movements. Of course there is always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape\ + \ does not concern itself with the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into\ + \ explanations. I didn\u2019t ask the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019\ + t ask it to-day, at forty. The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may\ + \ not be known for two or three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens\ + \ does that matter? Your business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The\ + \ reason can wait. But you must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\ninstantly\ + \ or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember that Hollow\ + \ Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the market rallied\ + \ sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that the directors\ + \ passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they were going to\ + \ do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they at least didn\u2019\ + t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should not break. Well,\ + \ I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead of leaving for\ + \ home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down the figures I\ + \ wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions and parallelisms\ + \ of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was not aware of it\ + \ at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older than I\u2014came\ + \ to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet if I had any money.\ + \ \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D he said, \u201C\ + I\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play it if I can get\ + \ somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play it?\u201D I asked.\ + \ To me the only people who played or could play tips were the customers\u2014\ + old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds, even thousands of dollars,\ + \ to get into the game. It was like owning your private carriage and having a\ + \ coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I mean; play it!\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you need?\u201D \u201C\ + Well, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201CHow are you going\ + \ to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington the bucket\ + \ shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D he said.\ + \ \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019ll double\ + \ ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled out my\ + \ little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but in his\ + \ saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to show it.\ + \ I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting as it\ + \ usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in my life,\ + \ and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that this was\ + \ a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck me at\ + \ once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in the theory\ + \ of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our pooled resources\ + \ he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some Burlington. Two days\ + \ later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that first trade, I got\ + \ to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019d go during my lunch\ + \ hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to me. I was playing\ + \ a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All I knew was the arithmetic\ + \ of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way to operate in a bucket shop,\ + \ where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations as they are printed by\ + \ the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was taking much more money\ + \ out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from my job in the brokerage\ + \ office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected, but they couldn\u2019t\ + \ say much when they saw what I was making. I was only a kid and office-boy wages\ + \ were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook. I was fifteen when I had\ + \ my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my mother\u2014all made in the\ + \ bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had taken home. My mother carried\ + \ on something awful. She wanted me to put it away in the savings bank out of\ + \ reach of temptation. She said it was more money than she ever heard any boy\ + \ of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019t quite believe it\ + \ was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I didn\u2019t think\ + \ of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring was right. That\u2019\ + s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head. If I was right when\ + \ I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times more right if I\ + \ traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nall\ + \ that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically. More\ + \ courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it, I am\ + \ much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted away.\ + \ Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market. I began\ + \ in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares at a\ + \ clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nit\ + \ would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019t take\ + \ a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nthirty-five\ + \ hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for five hundred shares\ + \ each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space on them where they\ + \ could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket shops never ask for\ + \ more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them, for their profit\ + \ lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted to margin your\ + \ trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they could charge\ + \ you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a point on each\ + \ point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission also exactly as\ + \ if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over $10,000 in margins.\ + \ I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand dollars in cash. And\ + \ you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought that ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except old John D., and\ + \ she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular business. I had\ + \ a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making money by figuring.\ + \ But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a lot of money and all\ + \ I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares of Sugar at 105\xBC\ + . There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who was short 2500 shares.\ + \ I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations for the board boy. The\ + \ price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went down a couple of points\ + \ and paused a little to get its breath before taking another dip. The general\ + \ market was pretty soft and everything looked promising. Then all of a sudden\ + \ I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating. I began to feel uncomfortable.\ + \ I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then it sold at 103\u2014that was\ + \ low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more confident I felt more uncertain.\ + \ I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But\ + \ if something was coming and I didn\u2019t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be\ + \ on my guard against it. That being the case I\u2019d better be out of the market.\ + \ You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly. I don\u2019t like to. I never did.\ + \ Even as a kid I had to know why I should do certain things. But this time I\ + \ had no definite reason to give to myself, and yet I was so uncomfortable that\ + \ I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said\ + \ to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here. I want you to do something for me.\ + \ Wait a little before you call out the next price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He\ + \ said he would, and I got up and gave him my place by the ticker so he could\ + \ call out the prices for the boy. I took my seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket\ + \ and walked over to the counter, to where the clerk was who marked the tickets\ + \ when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019t really know why I should get\ + \ out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning against the counter, my tickets\ + \ in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see them. Pretty soon I heard the\ + \ clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom Burnham, the clerk, turn his\ + \ head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something crooked was hatching, and\ + \ I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman by the ticker, began:\ + \ \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my tickets on the counter\ + \ in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D before Dave had finished\ + \ calling the price. So, of course, the house had to close my Sugar at the last\ + \ quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103 again. According to my dope\ + \ Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine wasn\u2019t hitting right. I\ + \ had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood. At all events, the\ + \ telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed that Tom Burnham,\ + \ the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them, and was listening\ + \ to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I yelled at him: \u201C\ + Hey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price on these tickets\u2014\ + 103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard me and began to look toward\ + \ us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while the Cosmopolitan had never\ + \ laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nand\ + \ a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer gets\ + \ suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and marked\ + \ my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over toward\ + \ me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place to the\ + \ cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got to the\ + \ cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly: \u201C\ + Gosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called over\ + \ to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of course,\ + \ it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand shares\ + \ of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there may have\ + \ been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten thousand\ + \ shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was enough to\ + \ pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange and wipe\ + \ us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded with too\ + \ many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some broker to\ + \ wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out all the\ + \ customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more than a\ + \ couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of dollars.\ + \ That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and the other\ + \ Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it\ + \ fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever there\ + \ was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers\ + \ in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest thing was\ + \ that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to double-cross\ + \ me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars. This man,\ + \ who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York Stock\ + \ Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic of\ + \ \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept him\ + \ from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members. One\ + \ day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange or\ + \ the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some of\ + \ their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men to\ + \ act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches. On\ + \ a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain stock\ + \ as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at a certain\ + \ profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that stock among\ + \ his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange and bid up\ + \ the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good sport. Being\ + \ careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no trouble in putting\ + \ up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket shops cashed in\ + \ as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy thousand\ + \ dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides. He played\ + \ that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger bucket shops\ + \ of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St. Louis. One of\ + \ his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive\ + \ stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought it at a certain figure,\ + \ sold at two points profit, went short and took three points more. By the way,\ + \ I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure. If he had died in\ + \ 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page of every New York\ + \ paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T23:13:32.511248+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c845a568d7fb.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c845a568d7fb.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf8e2c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/c845a568d7fb.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +run_id: c845a568d7fb +workflow_id: generic-source-summary +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + slug: chapter-01-part-001 + content: "# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: summarize-source + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-001-summary.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144579-N5GuKMq38HrQCN7lYPf2 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1135 + completion_tokens: 344 + total_tokens: 1479 + cost: 0.00037665 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00037665 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.00017025 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0002064 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 9.839 +- stage_id: summarize-source + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-002-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 2 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-003-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 3 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-004-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 4 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-005-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 5 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: summarize-source + artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md + path: artifacts/generated/chapter-01-part-006-summary.md + kind: generated + title: I Part 6 Summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nI went\ + \ to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as quotation-board\ + \ boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At school I did three\ + \ years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental arithmetic. As\ + \ quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in the customers\u2019\ + \ room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and called out the prices.\ + \ They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always remembered figures. No\ + \ trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in that office. Of course\ + \ I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I did, if the market was\ + \ active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M. to let me do much talking.\ + \ I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business hours. But a busy market did\ + \ not keep me from thinking about the work. Those quotations did not represent\ + \ prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share. They were numbers. Of course,\ + \ they meant something. They were always changing. It was all I had to be interested\ + \ in\u2014the changes. Why did they change? I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t\ + \ care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply saw that they changed. That was\ + \ all I had to think about five hours every day and two on Saturdays: that they\ + \ were always changing. That is how I first came to be interested in the behaviour\ + \ of prices. I had a very good memory for figures. I could remember in detail\ + \ how the prices had acted on the previous day, just before they went up or down.\ + \ My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very handy. I noticed that in advances\ + \ as well as declines, stock prices were apt to show certain habits, so to speak.\ + \ There was no end of parallel cases and these made precedents to guide me. I\ + \ was only fourteen, but after I had taken hundreds of observations in my mind\ + \ I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing the behaviour of stocks to-day\ + \ with other days. It was not long before I was anticipating movements in prices.\ + \ My only guide, as I say, was their past performances. I carried the \u201Cdope\ + \ sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices to run on form. I had \u201C\ + clocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can spot, for instance, where the\ + \ buying is only a trifle better than the selling. A battle goes on in the stock\ + \ market and the tape is your telescope. You can depend upon it seven out of ten\ + \ cases. Another lesson I learned early is that there is nothing new in Wall Street.\ + \ There can\u2019t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever happens\ + \ in the stock market to-day has happened before and will happen again. I\u2019\ + ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really manage to remember when and how it\ + \ happened. The fact that I remember that way is my way of capitalizing experience.\ + \ I got so interested in my game and so anxious to anticipate advances and declines\ + \ in all the active stocks that I got a little book. I put down my observations\ + \ in it. It was not a record of imaginary transactions such as so many people\ + \ keep merely to make or lose millions of dollars without getting the swelled\ + \ head or going to the poorhouse. It was rather a sort of record of my hits and\ + \ misses, and next to the determination of probable movements I was most interested\ + \ in verifying whether I had observed accurately; in other words, whether I was\ + \ right. Say that after studying every fluctuation of the day in an active stock\ + \ I would conclude that it was behaving as it always did before it broke eight\ + \ or ten points. Well, I would jot down the stock and the price on Monday, and\ + \ remembering past performances I would write down what it ought to do on Tuesday\ + \ and Wednesday. Later I would check up with actual transcriptions from the tape.\ + \ That is how I first came to take an interest in the message of the tape. The\ + \ fluctuations were from the first associated in my mind with upward or downward\ + \ movements. Of course there is always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape\ + \ does not concern itself with the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into\ + \ explanations. I didn\u2019t ask the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019\ + t ask it to-day, at forty. The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may\ + \ not be known for two or three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens\ + \ does that matter? Your business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The\ + \ reason can wait. But you must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\ninstantly\ + \ or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember that Hollow\ + \ Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the market rallied\ + \ sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that the directors\ + \ passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they were going to\ + \ do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they at least didn\u2019\ + t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should not break. Well,\ + \ I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead of leaving for\ + \ home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down the figures I\ + \ wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions and parallelisms\ + \ of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was not aware of it\ + \ at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older than I\u2014came\ + \ to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet if I had any money.\ + \ \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D he said, \u201C\ + I\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play it if I can get\ + \ somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play it?\u201D I asked.\ + \ To me the only people who played or could play tips were the customers\u2014\ + old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds, even thousands of dollars,\ + \ to get into the game. It was like owning your private carriage and having a\ + \ coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I mean; play it!\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you need?\u201D \u201C\ + Well, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201CHow are you going\ + \ to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington the bucket\ + \ shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D he said.\ + \ \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019ll double\ + \ ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled out my\ + \ little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but in his\ + \ saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to show it.\ + \ I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting as it\ + \ usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in my life,\ + \ and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that this was\ + \ a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck me at\ + \ once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in the theory\ + \ of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our pooled resources\ + \ he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some Burlington. Two days\ + \ later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that first trade, I got\ + \ to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019d go during my lunch\ + \ hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to me. I was playing\ + \ a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All I knew was the arithmetic\ + \ of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way to operate in a bucket shop,\ + \ where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations as they are printed by\ + \ the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was taking much more money\ + \ out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from my job in the brokerage\ + \ office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected, but they couldn\u2019t\ + \ say much when they saw what I was making. I was only a kid and office-boy wages\ + \ were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook. I was fifteen when I had\ + \ my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my mother\u2014all made in the\ + \ bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had taken home. My mother carried\ + \ on something awful. She wanted me to put it away in the savings bank out of\ + \ reach of temptation. She said it was more money than she ever heard any boy\ + \ of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019t quite believe it\ + \ was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I didn\u2019t think\ + \ of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring was right. That\u2019\ + s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head. If I was right when\ + \ I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times more right if I\ + \ traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nall\ + \ that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically. More\ + \ courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it, I am\ + \ much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted away.\ + \ Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market. I began\ + \ in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares at a\ + \ clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nit\ + \ would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019t take\ + \ a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nthirty-five\ + \ hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for five hundred shares\ + \ each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space on them where they\ + \ could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket shops never ask for\ + \ more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them, for their profit\ + \ lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted to margin your\ + \ trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they could charge\ + \ you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a point on each\ + \ point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission also exactly as\ + \ if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over $10,000 in margins.\ + \ I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand dollars in cash. And\ + \ you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought that ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except old John D., and\ + \ she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular business. I had\ + \ a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making money by figuring.\ + \ But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a lot of money and all\ + \ I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares of Sugar at 105\xBC\ + . There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who was short 2500 shares.\ + \ I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations for the board boy. The\ + \ price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went down a couple of points\ + \ and paused a little to get its breath before taking another dip. The general\ + \ market was pretty soft and everything looked promising. Then all of a sudden\ + \ I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating. I began to feel uncomfortable.\ + \ I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then it sold at 103\u2014that was\ + \ low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more confident I felt more uncertain.\ + \ I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But\ + \ if something was coming and I didn\u2019t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be\ + \ on my guard against it. That being the case I\u2019d better be out of the market.\ + \ You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly. I don\u2019t like to. I never did.\ + \ Even as a kid I had to know why I should do certain things. But this time I\ + \ had no definite reason to give to myself, and yet I was so uncomfortable that\ + \ I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said\ + \ to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here. I want you to do something for me.\ + \ Wait a little before you call out the next price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He\ + \ said he would, and I got up and gave him my place by the ticker so he could\ + \ call out the prices for the boy. I took my seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket\ + \ and walked over to the counter, to where the clerk was who marked the tickets\ + \ when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019t really know why I should get\ + \ out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning against the counter, my tickets\ + \ in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see them. Pretty soon I heard the\ + \ clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom Burnham, the clerk, turn his\ + \ head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something crooked was hatching, and\ + \ I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman by the ticker, began:\ + \ \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my tickets on the counter\ + \ in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D before Dave had finished\ + \ calling the price. So, of course, the house had to close my Sugar at the last\ + \ quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103 again. According to my dope\ + \ Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine wasn\u2019t hitting right. I\ + \ had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood. At all events, the\ + \ telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed that Tom Burnham,\ + \ the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them, and was listening\ + \ to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I yelled at him: \u201C\ + Hey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price on these tickets\u2014\ + 103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard me and began to look toward\ + \ us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while the Cosmopolitan had never\ + \ laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +- stage_id: summarize-source + workflow_id: generic-source-summary + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Summarize Trading-Literature Source\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace.\nPreserve\ + \ in this order:\n\n- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted\ + \ to\n- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions\n- explicit lessons,\ + \ rules of thumb, or warnings the text states\n- evidence phrases (dollar figures,\ + \ dates, tape behaviour, counter-party\n names) that should guide later entity\ + \ and relation extraction\n- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should\ + \ flag\n\nKeep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the\n\ + chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs.\n\nSource title: I Part\ + \ 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\n# I\n\nand\ + \ a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer gets\ + \ suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and marked\ + \ my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over toward\ + \ me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place to the\ + \ cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got to the\ + \ cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly: \u201C\ + Gosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called over\ + \ to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of course,\ + \ it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand shares\ + \ of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there may have\ + \ been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten thousand\ + \ shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was enough to\ + \ pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange and wipe\ + \ us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded with too\ + \ many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some broker to\ + \ wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out all the\ + \ customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more than a\ + \ couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of dollars.\ + \ That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and the other\ + \ Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it\ + \ fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever there\ + \ was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers\ + \ in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest thing was\ + \ that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to double-cross\ + \ me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars. This man,\ + \ who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York Stock\ + \ Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic of\ + \ \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept him\ + \ from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members. One\ + \ day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange or\ + \ the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some of\ + \ their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men to\ + \ act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches. On\ + \ a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain stock\ + \ as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at a certain\ + \ profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that stock among\ + \ his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange and bid up\ + \ the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good sport. Being\ + \ careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no trouble in putting\ + \ up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket shops cashed in\ + \ as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy thousand\ + \ dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides. He played\ + \ that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger bucket shops\ + \ of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St. Louis. One of\ + \ his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive\ + \ stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought it at a certain figure,\ + \ sold at two points profit, went short and took three points more. By the way,\ + \ I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure. If he had died in\ + \ 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page of every New York\ + \ paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-summary.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Summary' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T22:50:39.954035+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/da0c6e77da98.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/da0c6e77da98.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c45dfbf --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/da0c6e77da98.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1439 @@ +run_id: da0c6e77da98 +workflow_id: generic-source-entities +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + kind: source + title: I Part 1 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-001.md + slug: chapter-01-part-001 + content: "# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job\ + \ as quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures.\ + \ At school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at\ + \ mental arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board\ + \ in the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker\ + \ and called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + kind: source + title: I Part 2 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-002.md + slug: chapter-01-part-002 + content: "# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019\ + ll remember that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest\ + \ of the market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you\ + \ saw that the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what\ + \ they were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves\ + \ they at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why\ + \ it should not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months.\ + \ Instead of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d\ + \ jot down the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for\ + \ the repetitions and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape,\ + \ although I was not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014\ + he was older than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on\ + \ the quiet if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201C\ + Well,\u201D he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going\ + \ to play it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean,\ + \ play it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips\ + \ were the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + kind: source + title: I Part 3 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-003.md + slug: chapter-01-part-003 + content: "# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + kind: source + title: I Part 4 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-004.md + slug: chapter-01-part-004 + content: "# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + kind: source + title: I Part 5 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-005.md + slug: chapter-01-part-005 + content: "# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets\ + \ for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n" +- name: source + artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + kind: source + title: I Part 6 + path: artifacts/sources/chapter-01-part-006.md + slug: chapter-01-part-006 + content: "# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one\ + \ customer gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came\ + \ over and marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of\ + \ them over toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019\ + s place to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019\ + t got to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n" +stages: +- stage_id: extract-entities + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + output_artifact_id: generated/chapter-01-part-001-entities.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779144641-BYGRwQSXw5Xwqi62GqQM + usage: + prompt_tokens: 1346 + completion_tokens: 253 + total_tokens: 1599 + cost: 0.0003537 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0003537 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 0.0002019 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001518 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.486 +- stage_id: extract-entities + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + output_artifact_id: 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entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +- stage_id: split-entities + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union' + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-001.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 1\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-001.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nI went to work when I was just out of grammar school. I got a job as\ + \ quotation-board boy in a stock-brokerage office. I was quick at figures. At\ + \ school I did three years of arithmetic in one. I was particularly good at mental\ + \ arithmetic. As quotation-board boy I posted the numbers on the big board in\ + \ the customers\u2019 room. One of the customers usually sat by the ticker and\ + \ called out the prices. They couldn\u2019t come too fast for me. I have always\ + \ remembered figures. No trouble at all. There were plenty of other employes in\ + \ that office. Of course I made friends with the other fellows, but the work I\ + \ did, if the market was active, kept me too busy from ten A.M. to three P.M.\ + \ to let me do much talking. I don\u2019t care for it, anyhow, during business\ + \ hours. But a busy market did not keep me from thinking about the work. Those\ + \ quotations did not represent prices of stocks to me, so many dollars per share.\ + \ They were numbers. Of course, they meant something. They were always changing.\ + \ It was all I had to be interested in\u2014the changes. Why did they change?\ + \ I didn\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t care. I didn\u2019t think about that. I simply\ + \ saw that they changed. That was all I had to think about five hours every day\ + \ and two on Saturdays: that they were always changing. That is how I first came\ + \ to be interested in the behaviour of prices. I had a very good memory for figures.\ + \ I could remember in detail how the prices had acted on the previous day, just\ + \ before they went up or down. My fondness for mental arithmetic came in very\ + \ handy. I noticed that in advances as well as declines, stock prices were apt\ + \ to show certain habits, so to speak. There was no end of parallel cases and\ + \ these made precedents to guide me. I was only fourteen, but after I had taken\ + \ hundreds of observations in my mind I found myself testing their accuracy, comparing\ + \ the behaviour of stocks to-day with other days. It was not long before I was\ + \ anticipating movements in prices. My only guide, as I say, was their past performances.\ + \ I carried the \u201Cdope sheets\u201D in my mind. I looked for stock prices\ + \ to run on form. I had \u201Cclocked\u201D them. You know what I mean. You can\ + \ spot, for instance, where the buying is only a trifle better than the selling.\ + \ A battle goes on in the stock market and the tape is your telescope. You can\ + \ depend upon it seven out of ten cases. Another lesson I learned early is that\ + \ there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can\u2019t be because speculation\ + \ is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market to-day has happened\ + \ before and will happen again. I\u2019ve never forgotten that. I suppose I really\ + \ manage to remember when and how it happened. The fact that I remember that way\ + \ is my way of capitalizing experience. I got so interested in my game and so\ + \ anxious to anticipate advances and declines in all the active stocks that I\ + \ got a little book. I put down my observations in it. It was not a record of\ + \ imaginary transactions such as so many people keep merely to make or lose millions\ + \ of dollars without getting the swelled head or going to the poorhouse. It was\ + \ rather a sort of record of my hits and misses, and next to the determination\ + \ of probable movements I was most interested in verifying whether I had observed\ + \ accurately; in other words, whether I was right. Say that after studying every\ + \ fluctuation of the day in an active stock I would conclude that it was behaving\ + \ as it always did before it broke eight or ten points. Well, I would jot down\ + \ the stock and the price on Monday, and remembering past performances I would\ + \ write down what it ought to do on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later I would check\ + \ up with actual transcriptions from the tape. That is how I first came to take\ + \ an interest in the message of the tape. The fluctuations were from the first\ + \ associated in my mind with upward or downward movements. Of course there is\ + \ always a reason for fluctuations, but the tape does not concern itself with\ + \ the why and wherefore. It doesn\u2019t go into explanations. I didn\u2019t ask\ + \ the tape why when I was fourteen, and I don\u2019t ask it to-day, at forty.\ + \ The reason for what a certain stock does to-day may not be known for two or\ + \ three days, or weeks, or months. But what the dickens does that matter? Your\ + \ business with the tape is now\u2014not to-morrow. The reason can wait. But you\ + \ must act\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-002.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 2\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-002.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\ninstantly or be left. Time and again I see this happen. You\u2019ll remember\ + \ that Hollow Tube went down three points the other day while the rest of the\ + \ market rallied sharply. That was the fact. On the following Monday you saw that\ + \ the directors passed the dividend. That was the reason. They knew what they\ + \ were going to do, and even if they didn\u2019t sell the stock themselves they\ + \ at least didn\u2019t buy it. There was no inside buying; no reason why it should\ + \ not break. Well, I kept up my little memorandum book perhaps six months. Instead\ + \ of leaving for home the moment I was through with my work, I\u2019d jot down\ + \ the figures I wanted and would study the changes, always looking for the repetitions\ + \ and parallelisms of behaviour\u2014learning to read the tape, although I was\ + \ not aware of it at the time. One day one of the office boys\u2014he was older\ + \ than I\u2014came to me where I was eating my lunch and asked me on the quiet\ + \ if I had any money. \u201CWhy do you want to know?\u201D I said. \u201CWell,\u201D\ + \ he said, \u201CI\u2019ve got a dandy tip on Burlington. I\u2019m going to play\ + \ it if I can get somebody to go in with me.\u201D \u201CHow do you mean, play\ + \ it?\u201D I asked. To me the only people who played or could play tips were\ + \ the customers\u2014old jiggers with oodles of dough. Why, it cost hundreds,\ + \ even thousands of dollars, to get into the game. It was like owning your private\ + \ carriage and having a coachman who wore a silk hat. \u201CThat\u2019s what I\ + \ mean; play it!\u201D he said. \u201CHow much you got?\u201D \u201CHow much you\ + \ need?\u201D \u201CWell, I can trade in five shares by putting up $5.\u201D \u201C\ + How are you going to play it?\u201D \u201CI\u2019m going to buy all the Burlington\ + \ the bucket shop will let me carry with the money I give him for margin,\u201D\ + \ he said. \u201CIt\u2019s going up sure. It\u2019s like picking up money. We\u2019\ + ll double ours in a jiffy.\u201D \u201CHold on!\u201D I said to him, and pulled\ + \ out my little dope book. I wasn\u2019t interested in doubling my money, but\ + \ in his saying that Burlington was going up. If it was, my note-book ought to\ + \ show it. I looked. Sure enough, Burlington, according to my figuring, was acting\ + \ as it usually did before it went up. I had never bought or sold anything in\ + \ my life, and I never gambled with the other boys. But all I could see was that\ + \ this was a grand chance to test the accuracy of my work, of my hobby. It struck\ + \ me at once that if my dope didn\u2019t work in practice there was nothing in\ + \ the theory of it to interest anybody. So I gave him all I had, and with our\ + \ pooled resources he went to one of the near-by bucket shops and bought some\ + \ Burlington. Two days later we cashed in. I made a profit of $3.12. After that\ + \ first trade, I got to speculating on my own hook in the bucket shops. I\u2019\ + d go during my lunch hour and buy or sell\u2014it never made any difference to\ + \ me. I was playing a system and not a favorite stock or backing opinions. All\ + \ I knew was the arithmetic of it. As a matter of fact, mine was the ideal way\ + \ to operate in a bucket shop, where all that a trader does is to bet on fluctuations\ + \ as they are printed by the ticker on the tape. It was not long before I was\ + \ taking much more money out of the bucket shops than I was pulling down from\ + \ my job in the brokerage office. So I gave up my position. My folks objected,\ + \ but they couldn\u2019t say much when they saw what I was making. I was only\ + \ a kid and office-boy wages were not very high. I did mighty well on my own hook.\ + \ I was fifteen when I had my first thousand and laid the cash in front of my\ + \ mother\u2014all made in the bucket shops in a few months, besides what I had\ + \ taken home. My mother carried on something awful. She wanted me to put it away\ + \ in the savings bank out of reach of temptation. She said it was more money than\ + \ she ever heard any boy of fifteen had made, starting with nothing. She didn\u2019\ + t quite believe it was real money. She used to worry and fret about it. But I\ + \ didn\u2019t think of anything except that I could keep on proving my figuring\ + \ was right. That\u2019s all the fun there is\u2014being right by using your head.\ + \ If I was right when I tested my convictions with ten shares I would be ten times\ + \ more right if I traded in a hundred shares. That is\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-003.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 3\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-003.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nall that having more margin meant to me\u2014I was right more emphatically.\ + \ More courage? No! No difference! If all I have is ten dollars and I risk it,\ + \ I am much braver than when I risk a million, if I have another million salted\ + \ away. Anyhow, at fifteen I was making a good living out of the stock market.\ + \ I began in the smaller bucket shops, where the man who traded in twenty shares\ + \ at a clip was suspected of being John W. Gates in disguise or J. P. Morgan traveling\ + \ incognito. Bucket shops in those days seldom lay down on their customers. They\ + \ didn\u2019t have to. There were other ways of parting customers from their money,\ + \ even when they guessed right. The business was tremendously profitable. When\ + \ it was conducted legitimately\u2014I mean straight, as far as the bucket shop\ + \ went\u2014the fluctuations took care of the shoestrings. It doesn\u2019t take\ + \ much of a reaction to wipe out a margin of only three quarters of a point. Also,\ + \ no welsher could ever get back in the game. Wouldn\u2019t have any trade. I\ + \ didn\u2019t have a following. I kept my business to myself. It was a one-man\ + \ business, anyhow. It was my head, wasn\u2019t it? Prices either were going the\ + \ way I doped them out, without any help from friends or partners, or they were\ + \ going the other way, and nobody could stop them out of kindness to me. I couldn\u2019\ + t see where I needed to tell my business to anybody else. I\u2019ve got friends,\ + \ of course, but my business has always been the same\u2014a one-man affair. That\ + \ is why I have always played a lone hand. As it was, it didn\u2019t take long\ + \ for the bucket shops to get sore on me for beating them. I\u2019d walk in and\ + \ plank down my margin, but they\u2019d look at it without making a move to grab\ + \ it. They\u2019d tell me there was nothing doing. That was the time they got\ + \ to calling me the Boy Plunger. I had to be changing brokers all the time, going\ + \ from one bucket shop to another. It got so that I had to give a fictitious name.\ + \ I\u2019d begin light, only fifteen or twenty shares. At times, when they got\ + \ suspicious, I\u2019d lose on purpose at first and then sting them proper. Of\ + \ course after a while they\u2019d find me too expensive and they\u2019d tell\ + \ me to take myself and my business elsewhere and not interfere with the owners\u2019\ + \ dividends. Once, when the big concern I\u2019d been trading with for months\ + \ shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away\ + \ from them. That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies,\ + \ and in near-by towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager\ + \ a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active\ + \ stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who\ + \ it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told\ + \ him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to\ + \ the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the\ + \ manager told me that I said to him, \u201CTell him I am a short fat man with\ + \ dark hair and a bushy beard!\u201D But he described me instead, and then he\ + \ listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it. \u201C\ + What did they say to you?\u201D I asked him politely. \u201CThey said, \u2018\ + You blankety-blank fool, didn\u2019t we tell you to take no business from Larry\ + \ Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!\u2019\u201D He\ + \ didn\u2019t say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after\ + \ another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn\u2019t any good in any\ + \ of their offices. I couldn\u2019t even go in to look at the quotations without\ + \ some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade\ + \ at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn\u2019\ + t work. Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest\ + \ of all\u2014the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company. The Cosmopolitan was rated\ + \ as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing\ + \ town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks\ + \ and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as\ + \ usual. They didn\u2019t refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns\ + \ had. Oh, not because it wasn\u2019t sportsmanship, but because they knew\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-004.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 4\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-004.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nit would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn\u2019\ + t take a fellow\u2019s business just because that fellow happened to make a little\ + \ money. But they did the next worse thing\u2014that is, they made me put up a\ + \ three-point margin and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point,\ + \ then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy!\ + \ Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally:\ + \ \u201C Bot ten Steel at 90\u215B. \u201D If you put up a point margin it meant\ + \ that if it broke 89\xBC you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the\ + \ customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of\ + \ telling his broker to sell for anything he can get. But when the Cosmopolitan\ + \ tacked on that premium they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the\ + \ price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: \u201C Bot Steel at\ + \ 90\u215B ,\u201D it read: \u201C Bot Steel at 91\u215B .\u201D Why, that stock\ + \ could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I\u2019d still be\ + \ losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point\ + \ margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still,\ + \ that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had\ + \ to accept their terms or quit trading. Of course I had my ups and downs, but\ + \ was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied\ + \ with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough\ + \ to beat anybody. They tried to double-cross me. They didn\u2019t get me. I escaped\ + \ because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.\ + \ It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit\ + \ on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had\u2014that\ + \ is, of the steady, every-day customers. They had a fine office and the largest\ + \ and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole\ + \ length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks\ + \ dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions,\ + \ metals\u2014everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston\ + \ and Liverpool. You know how they traded in bucket shops. You gave your money\ + \ to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape\ + \ or the quotation board and took the price from there\u2014the last one, of course.\ + \ He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular\ + \ broker\u2019s report\u2014that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many\ + \ shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how\ + \ much money they received from you. When you wished to close your trade you went\ + \ to the clerk\u2014the same or another, it depended on the shop\u2014and you\ + \ told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited\ + \ for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the\ + \ time on your ticket, O.K.\u2019d it and gave it back to you, and then you went\ + \ to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market\ + \ went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your\ + \ trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.\ + \ In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little\ + \ as five shares, the tickets were little slips\u2014different colors for buying\ + \ and selling\u2014and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the\ + \ shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to\ + \ be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions\ + \ and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20\xBC. You thus had only\ + \ \xBE, of a point\u2019s run for your money. But the Cosmopolitan was the finest\ + \ in New England. It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only\ + \ man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin\ + \ they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as\ + \ much as they\u2019d let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares. Well, on\ + \ the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you, I was short\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-005.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 5\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-005.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nthirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for\ + \ five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space\ + \ on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket\ + \ shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them,\ + \ for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted\ + \ to margin your trade still further they\u2019d make out a new ticket, so they\ + \ could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of \xBE of a\ + \ point on each point\u2019s decline, for they figured the selling commission\ + \ also exactly as if it were a new trade. Well, this day I remember I had up over\ + \ $10,000 in margins. I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand\ + \ dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You\u2019d have thought\ + \ that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except\ + \ old John D., and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular\ + \ business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making\ + \ money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a\ + \ lot of money and all I could see was more margin. I had put out my 3500 shares\ + \ of Sugar at 105\xBC. There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who\ + \ was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations\ + \ for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went\ + \ down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking\ + \ another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.\ + \ Then all of a sudden I didn\u2019t like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.\ + \ I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then\ + \ it sold at 103\u2014that was low for the day\u2014but instead of feeling more\ + \ confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I\ + \ couldn\u2019t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn\u2019\ + t know where from, I couldn\u2019t be on my guard against it. That being the case\ + \ I\u2019d better be out of the market. You know, I don\u2019t do things blindly.\ + \ I don\u2019t like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should\ + \ do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself,\ + \ and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn\u2019t stand it. I called to a\ + \ fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him: \u201CDave, you take my place here.\ + \ I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next\ + \ price of Sugar, will you?\u201D He said he would, and I got up and gave him\ + \ my place by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my\ + \ seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where\ + \ the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn\u2019\ + t really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning\ + \ against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn\u2019t see\ + \ them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom\ + \ Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something\ + \ crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman\ + \ by the ticker, began: \u201CSu\u2014\u201D and quick as a flash I slapped my\ + \ tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, \u201CClose Sugar!\u201D\ + \ before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to\ + \ close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103\ + \ again. According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now. The engine\ + \ wasn\u2019t hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighbourhood.\ + \ At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed\ + \ that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them,\ + \ and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I\ + \ yelled at him: \u201CHey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price\ + \ on these tickets\u2014103! Get a gait on!\u201D Everybody in the room heard\ + \ me and began to look toward us and ask what was the trouble, for, you see, while\ + \ the Cosmopolitan had never laid down, there was no telling,\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +- stage_id: extract-entities + workflow_id: generic-source-entities + input_artifact_id: source/chapter-01-part-006.md + prompt: "# Extract Trading-Literature Entities\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one\nMarkdown\ + \ bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a\n`## Definition`\ + \ section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list\nbelow. Add `## Context`\ + \ and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives\nenough material; leave them out\ + \ rather than inventing detail.\n\nAllowed categories (use exactly one per entity):\n\ + \n- `trader` \u2014 a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party\n\ + - `market` \u2014 a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family\n (e.g.\ + \ the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop\n circuit)\n\ + - `strategy` \u2014 a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook\n (e.g. pyramiding,\ + \ scale buying, tape reading)\n- `error` \u2014 a recurring mistake, anti-pattern,\ + \ or losing habit\n- `psychological_pattern` \u2014 a named cognitive or emotional\ + \ habit that\n drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence)\n\ + - `institution` \u2014 a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue\n\ + - `instrument` \u2014 a specific security, commodity, or contract\n- `evidence_bearing_claim`\ + \ \u2014 a concrete operator-level claim the text\n asserts and partially supports\ + \ (e.g. \"amateurs buy on tips, pros buy\n on tape\"); preserve the supporting\ + \ evidence in the body\n\nPrefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid\ + \ fictionalised\npeople whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping\ + \ a single\ntrade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case.\n\n\ + Source title: I Part 6\nSource artifact: source/chapter-01-part-006.md\n\n## Source\n\ + \n# I\n\nand a run on a bucket shop can start like a run on a bank. If one customer\ + \ gets suspicious the others follow suit. So Tom looked sulky, but came over and\ + \ marked my tickets \u201CClosed at 103\u201D and shoved the seven of them over\ + \ toward me. He sure had a sour face. Say, the distance from Tom\u2019s place\ + \ to the cashier\u2019s cage wasn\u2019t over eight feet. But I hadn\u2019t got\ + \ to the cashier to get my money when Dave Wyman by the ticker yelled excitedly:\ + \ \u201CGosh! Sugar, 108!\u201D But it was too late; so I just laughed and called\ + \ over to Tom, \u201CIt didn\u2019t work that time, did it, old boy?\u201D Of\ + \ course, it was a put-up job. Henry Williams and I together were short six thousand\ + \ shares of Sugar. That bucket shop had my margin and Henry\u2019s, and there\ + \ may have been a lot of other Sugar shorts in the office; possibly eight or ten\ + \ thousand shares in all. Suppose they had $20,000 in Sugar margins. That was\ + \ enough to pay the shop to thimblerig the market on the New York Stock Exchange\ + \ and wipe us out. In the old days whenever a bucket shop found itself loaded\ + \ with too many bulls on a certain stock it was a common practice to get some\ + \ broker to wash down the price of that particular stock far enough to wipe out\ + \ all the customers that were long of it. This seldom cost the bucket shop more\ + \ than a couple of points on a few hundred shares, and they made thousands of\ + \ dollars. That was what the Cosmopolitan did to get me and Henry Williams and\ + \ the other Sugar shorts. Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of\ + \ course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out. Whenever\ + \ there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant recovery,\ + \ the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive. And the funniest\ + \ thing was that not later than ten days after the Cosmopolitan people tried to\ + \ double-cross me a New York operator did them out of over seventy thousand dollars.\ + \ This man, who was quite a market factor in his day and a member of the New York\ + \ Stock Exchange, made a great name for himself as a bear during the Bryan panic\ + \ of \u201996. He was forever running up against Stock Exchange rules that kept\ + \ him from carrying out some of his plans at the expense of his fellow members.\ + \ One day he figured that there would be no complaints from either the Exchange\ + \ or the police authorities if he took from the bucket shops of the land some\ + \ of their ill-gotten gains. In the instance I speak of he sent thirty-five men\ + \ to act as customers. They went to the main office and to the bigger branches.\ + \ On a certain day at a fixed hour the agents all bought as much of a certain\ + \ stock as the managers would let them. They had instructions to sneak out at\ + \ a certain profit. Of course what he did was to distribute bull tips on that\ + \ stock among his cronies and then he went in to the floor of the Stock Exchange\ + \ and bid up the price, helped by the room traders, who thought he was a good\ + \ sport. Being careful to pick out the right stock for that work, there was no\ + \ trouble in putting up the price three or four points. His agents at the bucket\ + \ shops cashed in as prearranged. A fellow told me the originator cleaned up seventy\ + \ thousand dollars net, and his agents made their expenses and their pay besides.\ + \ He played that game several times all over the country, punishing the bigger\ + \ bucket shops of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and St.\ + \ Louis. One of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy\ + \ to move a semiactive stock like that a few points up or down. His agents bought\ + \ it at a certain figure, sold at two points profit, went short and took three\ + \ points more. By the way, I read the other day that that man died, poor and obscure.\ + \ If he had died in 1896 he would have got at least a column on the first page\ + \ of every New York paper. As it was he got two lines on the fifth.\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: artifacts/generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/{{ input.slug }}-entities.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Entity Bundle' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T22:51:55.828711+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/f4732c7504fc.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/f4732c7504fc.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7deb5ee --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/output/workflows/runs/f4732c7504fc.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1215 @@ +run_id: f4732c7504fc +workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations +status: completed +dry_run: false +inputs: +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + slug: entity-title-bucket-shop + content: '# Entity Title: Bucket Shop + + ## Definition + + A bucket shop is a type of brokerage that allows speculative trading in stocks + without actually buying shares. These shops often manipulate market prices to + exploit their clients, leading to significant losses for traders. + + ## Category + + market + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar.md + slug: entity-title-sugar + content: "# Entity Title: Sugar \n## Definition \nA specific stock that traders\ + \ engage with, which is central to the narratives involving trading strategies\ + \ and market manipulation. \n## Category \ninstrument \n## Context \nSugar\ + \ is referenced in the context of a market manipulation scheme executed by bucket\ + \ shops. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Henry Williams and I together were short six\ + \ thousand shares of Sugar.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + slug: entity-title-cosmopolitan + content: '# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan + + ## Definition + + The Cosmopolitan is identified as a bucket shop that engaged in manipulative practices, + specifically targeting short positions in Sugar by artificially inflating stock + prices. + + ## Category + + institution + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-drive.md + slug: entity-title-market-drive + content: "# Entity Title: Market Drive \n## Definition \nA tactic employed to\ + \ artificially inflate or deflate stock prices in a way that leads to trader losses\ + \ and profits for others. \n## Category \nstrategy \n## Context \nRefers to\ + \ the strategy used by operators to manipulate stock prices causing losses for\ + \ long holders. \n## Source Evidence \n\"whenever there was an unexplained sharp\ + \ drop which was followed by instant recovery, the newspapers in those days used\ + \ to call it a bucket-shop drive.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + slug: entity-title-dollar-manipulation + content: "# Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation \n## Definition \nThe practice of\ + \ manipulating stock prices to extract profits from the market, often at the expense\ + \ of average investors. \n## Category \nerror \n## Context \nIt underscores\ + \ the dangers of participating in manipulative market practices without adequate\ + \ knowledge. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Their brokers in New York ran up the price\ + \ to 108. Of course it fell right back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped\ + \ out.\" \n\n---\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + slug: entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange + content: '# Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange + + ## Definition + + The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a major stock exchange where trading of + stocks occurs, serving as a venue for some of the trading activities mentioned + in the context of market manipulation. + + ## Category + + market + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union.md + slug: entity-title-western-union + content: "# Entity Title: Western Union \n## Definition \nA specific stock favored\ + \ for trading due to its liquidity and ease of price manipulation. \n## Category\ + \ \ninstrument \n## Context \nReferencing a stock used strategically to execute\ + \ manipulative trades benefiting the instigator. \n## Source Evidence \n\"One\ + \ of his favorite stocks was Western Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive\ + \ stock like that a few points up or down.\"\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity)' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + slug: entity-title-sugar-commodity + content: '# Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity) + + ## Definition + + Sugar refers to a specific commodity that is traded on the market, in this case, + associated with the incident involving Tom and Henry Williams, where their positions + were affected by market manipulation. + + ## Category + + instrument + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + slug: entity-title-western-union-stock + content: '# Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) + + ## Definition + + Western Union is a stock that was frequently manipulated by traders due to its + relative ease of movement within the market, making it a favored target for speculative + trading schemes. + + ## Category + + instrument + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + slug: entity-title-bucket-shop-drive + content: '# Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive + + ## Definition + + A bucket-shop drive refers to a situation where the prices of stocks are manipulated + downwards in a coordinated effort to force clients who are long on those stocks + to incur losses or be wiped out. + + ## Category + + strategy + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-market-factor.md + slug: entity-title-market-factor + content: '# Entity Title: Market Factor + + ## Definition + + A market factor is an operator or trader who significantly influences trading + conditions or stock prices within the market. In the text, a certain trader is + identified as a market factor due to his previous successes in market manipulation. + + ## Category + + trader + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: entity + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996" + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + slug: entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96 + content: "# Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996\n## Definition\nThe Bryan Panic\ + \ of 1896 was a financial crisis characterized by significant volatility and manipulation\ + \ in the markets, leading to widespread impact on traders, including those in\ + \ bucket shops.\n## Category\nevent\n" +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-short-position.md + slug: entity-title-short-position + content: '# Entity Title: Short Position + + ## Definition + + A short position refers to the practice of selling stocks that a trader does not + own, with the intention of buying them back at a lower price to profit from the + decline. It was a significant factor in the losses suffered by the traders in + the context. + + ## Category + + strategy + + ' +- name: entity + artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: entity + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips' + path: artifacts/entities/entity-title-bull-tips.md + slug: entity-title-bull-tips + content: '# Entity Title: Bull Tips + + ## Definition + + Bull tips are recommendations or information suggesting that a stock''s price + will rise, encouraging traders to buy. These were used strategically to influence + market movements in the discussed scenario. + + ## Category + + evidence_bearing_claim + + ' +stages: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146193-6eewg9bA1MxNRYYTZsa5 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 401 + completion_tokens: 141 + total_tokens: 542 + cost: 0.00014475 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014475 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.015e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.46e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.813 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146197-P8dNeSpFHLjnH032KR33 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 423 + completion_tokens: 157 + total_tokens: 580 + cost: 0.00015765 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00015765 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.345e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.42e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.311 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146201-14eaLCtdwLrQRNtsl0P0 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 393 + completion_tokens: 139 + total_tokens: 532 + cost: 0.00014235 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014235 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 5.895e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.34e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.064 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-drive.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146205-YIVaxWEGh2A84PErKtKh + usage: + prompt_tokens: 447 + completion_tokens: 156 + total_tokens: 603 + cost: 0.00016065 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00016065 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.705e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.36e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.273 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146209-Rb1amtJliQTYh9XgfFfz + usage: + prompt_tokens: 446 + completion_tokens: 159 + total_tokens: 605 + cost: 0.0001623 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001623 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.69e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 9.54e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.164 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146215-Brv5ZbIzkc9wxy1jPq6Y + usage: + prompt_tokens: 408 + completion_tokens: 133 + total_tokens: 541 + cost: 0.000141 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.000141 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.12e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 7.98e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.303 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146219-BV94C3WtvtYONIkaTvv2 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 438 + completion_tokens: 139 + total_tokens: 577 + cost: 0.0001491 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001491 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.57e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.34e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.512 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146223-O0Cl1VuCgEOjNquspWcq + usage: + prompt_tokens: 403 + completion_tokens: 139 + total_tokens: 542 + cost: 0.00014385 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014385 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.045e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.34e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.67 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union-stock.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146227-qpEa5PX9NtsYDREgNRxU + usage: + prompt_tokens: 402 + completion_tokens: 128 + total_tokens: 530 + cost: 0.0001371 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001371 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.03e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 7.68e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.507 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146230-lIDRlb48UZxhQXnfHxET + usage: + prompt_tokens: 405 + completion_tokens: 178 + total_tokens: 583 + cost: 0.00016755 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00016755 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.075e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001068 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.512 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-factor.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146234-4sIcU9coqO6qAd4TZe9J + usage: + prompt_tokens: 406 + completion_tokens: 148 + total_tokens: 554 + cost: 0.0001497 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001497 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.09e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.88e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 2.937 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146239-2MYOeqdsEBiVwamUt1OR + usage: + prompt_tokens: 409 + completion_tokens: 197 + total_tokens: 606 + cost: 0.00017955 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00017955 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.135e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001182 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 4.1 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-short-position.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146245-yKJ1Zq3dMjrqe8RaZpdL + usage: + prompt_tokens: 413 + completion_tokens: 143 + total_tokens: 556 + cost: 0.00014775 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.00014775 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.195e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 8.58e-05 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.921 +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + kind: assisted + status: completed + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + output_artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bull-tips.md + provider: openrouter + metadata: + model: openai/gpt-4o-mini + request_id: gen-1779146249-h4eDeyh9ejilKIZi7gR5 + usage: + prompt_tokens: 402 + completion_tokens: 168 + total_tokens: 570 + cost: 0.0001611 + is_byok: false + prompt_tokens_details: + cached_tokens: 0 + cache_write_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + video_tokens: 0 + cost_details: + upstream_inference_cost: 0.0001611 + upstream_inference_prompt_cost: 6.03e-05 + upstream_inference_completions_cost: 0.0001008 + completion_tokens_details: + reasoning_tokens: 0 + image_tokens: 0 + audio_tokens: 0 + retry_count: 0 + duration_seconds: 3.464 +outputs: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket Shop Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Cosmopolitan Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-drive.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-market-drive.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Market Drive Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity) Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-western-union-stock.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-market-factor.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-market-factor.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Market Factor Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + kind: generated + title: "Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996 Evaluation" + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-short-position.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-short-position.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Short Position Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + written: true +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-entity-title-bull-tips.md + path: output/evaluations/entity-title-bull-tips.md + kind: generated + title: 'Entity Title: Bull Tips Evaluation' + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + written: true +assisted_requests: +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Bucket Shop\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Bucket\ + \ Shop\n## Definition\nA bucket shop is a type of brokerage that allows speculative\ + \ trading in stocks without actually buying shares. These shops often manipulate\ + \ market prices to exploit their clients, leading to significant losses for traders.\n\ + ## Category\nmarket\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-sugar.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Sugar\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Sugar \n##\ + \ Definition \nA specific stock that traders engage with, which is central to\ + \ the narratives involving trading strategies and market manipulation. \n## Category\ + \ \ninstrument \n## Context \nSugar is referenced in the context of a market\ + \ manipulation scheme executed by bucket shops. \n## Source Evidence \n\"Henry\ + \ Williams and I together were short six thousand shares of Sugar.\" \n\n---\n\ + \n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-cosmopolitan.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Cosmopolitan\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Cosmopolitan\n\ + ## Definition\nThe Cosmopolitan is identified as a bucket shop that engaged in\ + \ manipulative practices, specifically targeting short positions in Sugar by artificially\ + \ inflating stock prices.\n## Category\ninstitution\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-market-drive.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Market Drive\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Market\ + \ Drive \n## Definition \nA tactic employed to artificially inflate or deflate\ + \ stock prices in a way that leads to trader losses and profits for others. \n\ + ## Category \nstrategy \n## Context \nRefers to the strategy used by operators\ + \ to manipulate stock prices causing losses for long holders. \n## Source Evidence\ + \ \n\"whenever there was an unexplained sharp drop which was followed by instant\ + \ recovery, the newspapers in those days used to call it a bucket-shop drive.\"\ + \ \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-dollar-manipulation.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Dollar Manipulation \n## Definition \nThe practice of manipulating stock prices\ + \ to extract profits from the market, often at the expense of average investors.\ + \ \n## Category \nerror \n## Context \nIt underscores the dangers of participating\ + \ in manipulative market practices without adequate knowledge. \n## Source Evidence\ + \ \n\"Their brokers in New York ran up the price to 108. Of course it fell right\ + \ back, but Henry and a lot of others were wiped out.\" \n\n---\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-new-york-stock-exchange.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ New York Stock Exchange\n## Definition\nThe New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is\ + \ a major stock exchange where trading of stocks occurs, serving as a venue for\ + \ some of the trading activities mentioned in the context of market manipulation.\n\ + ## Category\nmarket\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-western-union.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Western Union\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Western\ + \ Union \n## Definition \nA specific stock favored for trading due to its liquidity\ + \ and ease of price manipulation. \n## Category \ninstrument \n## Context \ + \ \nReferencing a stock used strategically to execute manipulative trades benefiting\ + \ the instigator. \n## Source Evidence \n\"One of his favorite stocks was Western\ + \ Union, because it was so easy to move a semiactive stock like that a few points\ + \ up or down.\"\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-sugar-commodity.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity)\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Sugar (Commodity)\n## Definition\nSugar refers to a specific commodity that\ + \ is traded on the market, in this case, associated with the incident involving\ + \ Tom and Henry Williams, where their positions were affected by market manipulation.\n\ + ## Category\ninstrument\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-western-union-stock.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Western Union (Stock)\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Western Union (Stock)\n## Definition\nWestern Union is a stock that was frequently\ + \ manipulated by traders due to its relative ease of movement within the market,\ + \ making it a favored target for speculative trading schemes.\n## Category\ninstrument\n\ + \n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-bucket-shop-drive.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Bucket-Shop Drive\n## Definition\nA bucket-shop drive refers to a situation\ + \ where the prices of stocks are manipulated downwards in a coordinated effort\ + \ to force clients who are long on those stocks to incur losses or be wiped out.\n\ + ## Category\nstrategy\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-market-factor.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Market Factor\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Market\ + \ Factor\n## Definition\nA market factor is an operator or trader who significantly\ + \ influences trading conditions or stock prices within the market. In the text,\ + \ a certain trader is identified as a market factor due to his previous successes\ + \ in market manipulation.\n## Category\ntrader\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-bryan-panic-of-96.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Bryan Panic of \u201996\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title:\ + \ Bryan Panic of \u201996\n## Definition\nThe Bryan Panic of 1896 was a financial\ + \ crisis characterized by significant volatility and manipulation in the markets,\ + \ leading to widespread impact on traders, including those in bucket shops.\n\ + ## Category\nevent\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-short-position.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-short-position.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Short Position\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Short\ + \ Position\n## Definition\nA short position refers to the practice of selling\ + \ stocks that a trader does not own, with the intention of buying them back at\ + \ a lower price to profit from the decline. It was a significant factor in the\ + \ losses suffered by the traders in the context.\n## Category\nstrategy\n\n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +- stage_id: evaluate-entity + workflow_id: generic-source-evaluations + input_artifact_id: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md + prompt: "# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity\n\nProfile: trading-literature\n\n\ + Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include\n`artifact_id`,\ + \ `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score\neach criterion on a\ + \ 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best.\n\nRequired score names:\n\n- `groundedness` \u2014\ + \ does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk,\n with no invented dates,\ + \ dollar figures, or quotes?\n- `lesson_clarity` \u2014 for `strategy`, `error`,\ + \ `psychological_pattern`,\n and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level\ + \ lesson\n stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely\n\ + \ factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score\n this on\ + \ the clarity of the definition.\n- `historical_context` \u2014 is the entity\ + \ placed correctly in the era and\n venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American\ + \ equities) without\n importing modern terminology or instruments?\n- `overgeneralization_risk`\ + \ \u2014 is the entity scoped narrowly enough to\n resist becoming a vague universal\ + \ claim? Higher score means lower\n risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to\ + \ apply to all markets or\n all operators when the source restricts the claim.\n\ + \nAdd a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from\nthe entity\ + \ body that drove a low score on any criterion.\n\nEntity artifact: entity/entity-title-bull-tips.md\n\ + Entity title: Entity Title: Bull Tips\n\n## Entity\n\n# Entity Title: Bull Tips\n\ + ## Definition\nBull tips are recommendations or information suggesting that a\ + \ stock's price will rise, encouraging traders to buy. These were used strategically\ + \ to influence market movements in the discussed scenario.\n## Category\nevidence_bearing_claim\n\ + \n" + provider_hint: openrouter + metadata: + output: + path: output/evaluations/{{ input.slug }}.md + kind: generated + artifact_id: generated/evaluation-{{ input.slug }}.md + title: '{{ input.title }} Evaluation' +recorded_at: '2026-05-18T23:17:34.947476+00:00' diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/entity.contract.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/entity.contract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9b3390 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/entity.contract.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Entity Contract — Trading Literature + +Each generated entity must be a Markdown artifact with: + +- one top-level heading containing the entity title +- a `## Category` line containing exactly one of: `trader`, `market`, + `strategy`, `error`, `psychological_pattern`, `institution`, + `instrument`, `evidence_bearing_claim` +- a `## Definition` section +- optional `## Context`, `## Source Evidence`, and `## Review Notes` + sections + +Entity titles should be stable, short, and reusable across chapters of +the same source. Do not include the chapter number in the title; that +provenance belongs in the source artifact, not the entity. diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/evaluation.contract.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/evaluation.contract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ca11af --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/evaluation.contract.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# Evaluation Contract — Trading Literature + +Each evaluation must be Markdown with YAML frontmatter containing: + +- `artifact_id` +- `evaluator` +- `evaluated_at` +- `scores` + +Scores must include all four criteria on a 0 to 5 scale, with 5 best: + +- `groundedness` +- `lesson_clarity` +- `historical_context` +- `overgeneralization_risk` (higher = lower risk; an entity that + silently universalises a chapter-local claim scores low) + +Optional `## Review Notes` should quote any specific lines from the +entity body that drove a low score on any criterion. diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/relation.contract.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/relation.contract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0dff2e --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/relation.contract.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# Relation Contract — Trading Literature + +Each generated relation must be a Markdown artifact with: + +- one top-level heading containing the relation title +- `## Subject` +- `## Predicate` +- `## Object` +- `## Relation Type` — exactly one of: `cause_effect`, `lesson_evidence`, + `risk_mitigation`, `actor_venue`, `strategy_outcome` +- optional `## Evidence` and `## Feedback Role` + +Subject and object values should match generated entity titles whenever +possible. A relation whose subject or object does not correspond to any +extracted entity must include an `## Evidence` section that quotes the +phrase from the source supporting the link. diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/summary.contract.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/summary.contract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3629b77 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/contracts/summary.contract.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Summary Contract — Trading Literature + +Each source summary should preserve: + +- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted to +- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions present in + the chunk +- explicit lessons or rules of thumb the chunk states +- evidence phrases (dollar figures, dates, counter-party names, tape + behaviour) useful for later extraction +- unresolved ambiguities or anachronisms a reviewer should flag diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/profile.yaml b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/profile.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0ee351 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/profile.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +id: trading-literature +name: Trading Literature +description: | + Infospace generation profile for trading memoirs, market-structure texts, + and operator narratives. Tunes entity, relation, and evaluation prompts + for traders, markets, strategies, errors, psychological patterns, + institutions, instruments, and the lessons drawn from them. +terminology: + source_chunk: Chapter or chapter-part of a trading memoir or market-structure text + entity: Trader, market, strategy, error pattern, psychological habit, institution, instrument, or evidence-bearing claim + relation: Typed link between two trading-literature entities (cause/effect, lesson/evidence, risk/mitigation, actor/venue, strategy/outcome) +entity_categories: + - traders + - markets + - strategies + - errors + - psychological_patterns + - institutions + - instruments + - evidence_bearing_claims +relation_categories: + - cause_effect + - lesson_evidence + - risk_mitigation + - actor_venue + - strategy_outcome +granularity: + default: | + Prefer durable trading concepts and operator-level lessons over biographical + detail or stock-price trivia. Each entity should be reusable across chapters. +evaluation_criteria: + - groundedness + - lesson_clarity + - historical_context + - overgeneralization_risk diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/evaluate-entity.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/evaluate-entity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d37e8c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/evaluate-entity.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include +`artifact_id`, `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score +each criterion on a 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best. + +Required score names: + +- `groundedness` — does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk, + with no invented dates, dollar figures, or quotes? +- `lesson_clarity` — for `strategy`, `error`, `psychological_pattern`, + and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level lesson + stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely + factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score + this on the clarity of the definition. +- `historical_context` — is the entity placed correctly in the era and + venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American equities) without + importing modern terminology or instruments? +- `overgeneralization_risk` — is the entity scoped narrowly enough to + resist becoming a vague universal claim? Higher score means lower + risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to apply to all markets or + all operators when the source restricts the claim. + +Add a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from +the entity body that drove a low score on any criterion. + +Entity artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} +Entity title: {{ input.title }} + +## Entity + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3f7524 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# Extract Trading-Literature Entities + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one +Markdown bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a +`## Definition` section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list +below. Add `## Context` and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives +enough material; leave them out rather than inventing detail. + +Allowed categories (use exactly one per entity): + +- `trader` — a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party +- `market` — a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family + (e.g. the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop + circuit) +- `strategy` — a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook + (e.g. pyramiding, scale buying, tape reading) +- `error` — a recurring mistake, anti-pattern, or losing habit +- `psychological_pattern` — a named cognitive or emotional habit that + drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence) +- `institution` — a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue +- `instrument` — a specific security, commodity, or contract +- `evidence_bearing_claim` — a concrete operator-level claim the text + asserts and partially supports (e.g. "amateurs buy on tips, pros buy + on tape"); preserve the supporting evidence in the body + +Prefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid fictionalised +people whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping a single +trade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0689770 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/extract-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# Extract Trading-Literature Relations + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Extract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return +one Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections +`## Subject`, `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add +`## Evidence` whenever the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase. + +Use exactly one of these relation types per relation: + +- `cause_effect` — one entity drives a measurable market or operator + outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a market event causing a + policy change) +- `lesson_evidence` — an `evidence_bearing_claim` is supported (or + undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source +- `risk_mitigation` — a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk +- `actor_venue` — a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit +- `strategy_outcome` — a named strategy is applied to a specific trade + or campaign and produces a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch) + +Subject and object values should match entity titles you would (or did) +extract in the entities stage. Skip relations whose subject or object +would be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip implicit moralising; prefer +relations the chunk actually evidences. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/summarize-source.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/summarize-source.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..859d8af --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/summarize-source.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# Summarize Trading-Literature Source + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace. +Preserve in this order: + +- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted to +- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions +- explicit lessons, rules of thumb, or warnings the text states +- evidence phrases (dollar figures, dates, tape behaviour, counter-party + names) that should guide later entity and relation extraction +- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should flag + +Keep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the +chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/synthesize-report.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/synthesize-report.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1c667d --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/profiles/trading-literature/templates/synthesize-report.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# Synthesize Trading-Literature Report + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Synthesize a concise review report from the generated source summaries, +entities, relations, evaluations, and collection metrics. Group entities +by category (trader, market, strategy, error, psychological pattern, +institution, instrument, evidence-bearing claim). Surface the relations +whose `relation_type` is `lesson_evidence` or `strategy_outcome` first — +those are the operator-level findings a reviewer will want to read +before anything else. End the report with an explicit "Overgeneralization +risks" section that quotes any entities whose evaluation flagged that +score below 3. diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/reports/generation-summary.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/reports/generation-summary.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42b62fa --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/reports/generation-summary.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# Generation Report + +Snapshot: 85a91ca0 +Sources: 6 +Entities: 14 +Relations: 6 +Evaluations: 14 + +## Metrics + +- coherence_components: 6.0 +- consistency_cycles: 0.0 +- coverage_ratio: 1.0 +- evaluated_artifact_count: 14 +- granularity_entropy: 1.7286329568116936 +- per_artifact_mean: 3.732142857142857 +- redundancy_ratio: 0.0 + +## Plan variance + +- calls 32/30 · cost $0.0088/$8.4012 + +## Chapter coverage + +- Chapter 01 (I): 6 source chunk(s), 14 entity, 6 relation, 13 page anchor + +## Entities + +- Entity Title: Bryan Panic of ’96 +- Entity Title: Bucket Shop +- Entity Title: Bucket-Shop Drive +- Entity Title: Bull Tips +- Entity Title: Cosmopolitan +- Entity Title: Dollar Manipulation +- Entity Title: Market Drive +- Entity Title: Market Factor +- Entity Title: New York Stock Exchange +- Entity Title: Short Position +- Entity Title: Sugar +- Entity Title: Sugar (Commodity) +- Entity Title: Western Union +- Entity Title: Western Union (Stock) + +## Page anchors + +- Total distinct anchors: 13 +- Sample: Page_1, Page_2, Page_3, Page_4, Page_5, Page_6 + +## Per-stage adapter choices + +- `evaluate-entity` (evaluate-entity) -> `openai/gpt-4o-mini` · 14 call(s) · 5796 prompt + 2125 completion tokens +- `extract-entities` (extract-entities) -> `openai/gpt-4o-mini` · 6 call(s) · 8044 prompt + 1987 completion tokens +- `extract-relations` (extract-relations) -> `openai/gpt-4o-mini` · 6 call(s) · 7570 prompt + 1368 completion tokens +- `summarize-source` (summarize-source) -> `openai/gpt-4o-mini` · 6 call(s) · 6778 prompt + 2081 completion tokens diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/evaluate-entity.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/evaluate-entity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d37e8c --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/evaluate-entity.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# Evaluate Trading-Literature Entity + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Evaluate the generated entity as Markdown with YAML frontmatter. Include +`artifact_id`, `evaluator`, `evaluated_at`, and a `scores` list. Score +each criterion on a 0 to 5 scale where 5 is best. + +Required score names: + +- `groundedness` — does the entity stay anchored to the source chunk, + with no invented dates, dollar figures, or quotes? +- `lesson_clarity` — for `strategy`, `error`, `psychological_pattern`, + and `evidence_bearing_claim` entities, is the operator-level lesson + stated crisply enough to be reused in later chapters? For purely + factual entities (trader, market, institution, instrument), score + this on the clarity of the definition. +- `historical_context` — is the entity placed correctly in the era and + venue of the source (e.g. early-1900s American equities) without + importing modern terminology or instruments? +- `overgeneralization_risk` — is the entity scoped narrowly enough to + resist becoming a vague universal claim? Higher score means lower + risk. Flag entities that quietly claim to apply to all markets or + all operators when the source restricts the claim. + +Add a short `## Review Notes` section listing any specific lines from +the entity body that drove a low score on any criterion. + +Entity artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} +Entity title: {{ input.title }} + +## Entity + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-entities.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-entities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3f7524 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-entities.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# Extract Trading-Literature Entities + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Extract reusable infospace entities from the source chunk. Return one +Markdown bundle where each entity starts with `# Entity Title` and has a +`## Definition` section, plus a `## Category` line drawn from the list +below. Add `## Context` and `## Source Evidence` when the chunk gives +enough material; leave them out rather than inventing detail. + +Allowed categories (use exactly one per entity): + +- `trader` — a named operator, broker, manipulator, or counter-party +- `market` — a market, exchange, pit, or named instrument family + (e.g. the New York Stock Exchange, the cotton market, the bucket-shop + circuit) +- `strategy` — a named tactic, system, or recurring playbook + (e.g. pyramiding, scale buying, tape reading) +- `error` — a recurring mistake, anti-pattern, or losing habit +- `psychological_pattern` — a named cognitive or emotional habit that + drives decisions (e.g. tip-following, hope-against-evidence) +- `institution` — a firm, regulator, news organisation, or social venue +- `instrument` — a specific security, commodity, or contract +- `evidence_bearing_claim` — a concrete operator-level claim the text + asserts and partially supports (e.g. "amateurs buy on tips, pros buy + on tape"); preserve the supporting evidence in the body + +Prefer entities that will recur across chapters. Avoid fictionalised +people whose role is purely narrative colour. Avoid wrapping a single +trade as an entity unless the trade is itself a teachable case. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-relations.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-relations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0689770 --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/extract-relations.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# Extract Trading-Literature Relations + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Extract a small set of important relations from the source chunk. Return +one Markdown relation artifact per relation. Each artifact uses sections +`## Subject`, `## Predicate`, `## Object`, and `## Relation Type`. Add +`## Evidence` whenever the chunk supplies a concrete supporting phrase. + +Use exactly one of these relation types per relation: + +- `cause_effect` — one entity drives a measurable market or operator + outcome (e.g. a strategy causing a loss; a market event causing a + policy change) +- `lesson_evidence` — an `evidence_bearing_claim` is supported (or + undercut) by a concrete trade, event, or quote in the source +- `risk_mitigation` — a strategy, rule, or habit reduces a named risk +- `actor_venue` — a trader operates in a market, institution, or pit +- `strategy_outcome` — a named strategy is applied to a specific trade + or campaign and produces a labelled outcome (win, loss, scratch) + +Subject and object values should match entity titles you would (or did) +extract in the entities stage. Skip relations whose subject or object +would be a one-off fictional flourish. Skip implicit moralising; prefer +relations the chunk actually evidences. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/summarize-source.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/summarize-source.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..859d8af --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/summarize-source.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# Summarize Trading-Literature Source + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Summarize the source chunk as Markdown for a trading-literature infospace. +Preserve in this order: + +- the narrator's actions and the market events they reacted to +- named strategies, instruments, venues, and institutions +- explicit lessons, rules of thumb, or warnings the text states +- evidence phrases (dollar figures, dates, tape behaviour, counter-party + names) that should guide later entity and relation extraction +- ambiguities or anachronisms that a reviewer should flag + +Keep the summary to a single page; do not paraphrase the moral of the +chapter, only the material a downstream extractor needs. + +Source title: {{ input.title }} +Source artifact: {{ input.artifact_id }} + +## Source + +{{ input.content }} diff --git a/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/synthesize-report.md b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/synthesize-report.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1c667d --- /dev/null +++ b/infospaces/lefevre-reminiscences-of-a-stock-operator/workflows/templates/trading-literature/synthesize-report.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# Synthesize Trading-Literature Report + +Profile: {{ macros.profile }} + +Synthesize a concise review report from the generated source summaries, +entities, relations, evaluations, and collection metrics. Group entities +by category (trader, market, strategy, error, psychological pattern, +institution, instrument, evidence-bearing claim). Surface the relations +whose `relation_type` is `lesson_evidence` or `strategy_outcome` first — +those are the operator-level findings a reviewer will want to read +before anything else. End the report with an explicit "Overgeneralization +risks" section that quotes any entities whose evaluation flagged that +score below 3.