# WoN Mappings — Market Structure

Generated from: `artifacts/sources/market-structure.md`

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# Platform Intermediary → Merchant Capital

## Supply Chain Entity

Platform Intermediary

## WoN Entity

Merchant Capital

## Mapping Rationale

Smith analyses merchant capital as capital employed to buy in one market
and sell in another, earning profit from controlling access to exchange
rather than from production. He notes that merchants are mobile — they
have no necessary attachment to any productive system — which gives them
structural leverage over producers who are geographically fixed. Platform
intermediaries are a high-leverage form of the same structure: they control
access to exchange (the matching infrastructure) without bearing inventory
risk, earning profit from transaction fees and data rather than from
buying and reselling. The merchant's physical mobility translates into
the platform's structural mobility — the platform has no fixed attachment
to any producer's fate, yet producers cannot exit without losing network
access.

## Conceptual Continuity

Strong — Platform intermediaries are the modern form of merchant capital:
the mechanism (control of exchange access, leverage over producers,
profit from intermediation rather than production) is identical. The
innovation is eliminating inventory risk while retaining coordination
power, which makes platforms a more concentrated and profitable form of
merchant capital than Smith could have envisioned.

## VSM Inheritance

Platform Intermediary inherits S2/S4 via Merchant Capital (coordination
infrastructure with intelligence function — aggregating market data while
intermediating transactions).

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# Monopsony Power → Combination of Masters

## Supply Chain Entity

Monopsony Power

## WoN Entity

Combination of Masters

## Mapping Rationale

Smith describes the combination of masters as the coordinated exercise of
employer power to suppress wages below the competitive level. He notes
these combinations are common, rarely discussed publicly, and facilitated
by the smaller number of employers relative to workers. Modern supply chain
monopsony operates through the same structural mechanism: a concentrated
buyer (or industry norm among buyers) facing atomistic suppliers
systematically extracts terms — lower prices, extended payment, cost
absorption — that suppliers cannot individually refuse without losing the
customer. The power asymmetry (concentrated vs. atomistic; each party's
outside options) is identical. Smith's analysis predicts the modern
outcome: margin compression, underinvestment, and fragility on the supplier
side.

## Conceptual Continuity

Strong — Monopsony power in supply chains is Smith's combination of masters
applied to the buyer–supplier relationship rather than the employer–worker
relationship. The market structure (concentrated power facing fragmented
supply of a factor) and the mechanism (systematic extraction below
competitive returns) are the same.

## VSM Inheritance

Monopsony Power inherits S3* via Combination of Masters (distortion of
the S2 coordination signal through coordinated anti-competitive behaviour
at the management boundary).

---

# Single-Source Dependency → Monopoly in Trade

## Supply Chain Entity

Single-Source Dependency

## WoN Entity

Monopoly in Trade

## Mapping Rationale

Smith argues that monopolists always charge the highest price buyers will
bear, because no competitive alternative disciplines them. A single-source
supplier during a supply disruption is a temporary monopolist: the buyer
has no immediate alternative, demand for the component is inelastic in
the short run, and the supplier can extract above-natural prices. Smith's
account of monopoly — restricted supply, elevated price, distorted resource
allocation — applies precisely to the disrupted single-source scenario.
The difference is that single-source dependency produces episodic monopoly
power (during disruptions) rather than Smith's continuous monopoly; but
the mechanism and the welfare consequences are the same.

## Conceptual Continuity

Moderate — The monopoly pricing mechanism is shared, but Smith's monopoly
is a stable market structure while single-source dependency produces
temporary monopoly only during disruptions. The strategic implications
also differ: Smith focuses on restricting supply to maintain high prices,
while single-source power is an inadvertent consequence of concentrated
specialisation rather than deliberate supply restriction.

## VSM Inheritance

Single-Source Dependency inherits S4/S5 via Monopoly in Trade (intelligence
failure creating conditions for policy-level market distortion when
disruption occurs).
