---
entity_slug: tonnage_bounty
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T06:32:05.933208'
overall_score: 4.2
scores:
- name: definition_precision
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types
    of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual
    fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition
    that captures a distinct policy mechanism.
- name: source_grounding
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book
    IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing
    industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects
    Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.
- name: domain_placement
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties
    represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies.
    This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and
    their economic effects.
- name: vsm_relevance
  value: 3.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a
    control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental
    systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or
    illuminating for this concept.
- name: explanatory_value
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: "This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of\
    \ government intervention\u2014how the structure of incentives (capacity-based\
    \ vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates\
    \ a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes."
---

# Evaluation: Tonnage Bounty

## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition that captures a distinct policy mechanism.

## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.

## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies. This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.

## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0

While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or illuminating for this concept.

## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0

This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of government intervention—how the structure of incentives (capacity-based vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes.
