---
entity_slug: apprenticeships
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T00:34:30.485509'
overall_score: 4.2
scores:
- name: definition_precision
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: 'The definition is quite precise, clearly specifying the key elements:
    fixed term (seven years), master-apprentice relationship, labor ownership, training
    provision, and barrier-to-entry effects. It avoids circularity and captures the
    essential structural features of the apprenticeship system as an economic institution.'
- name: source_grounding
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity is strongly grounded in Smith's actual analysis in Book I,
    Chapter 10, where he extensively critiques apprenticeships as artificial restrictions
    on labor mobility and competition. The definition accurately reflects Smith's
    specific concerns about seven-year terms and their role in creating market inequalities.
- name: domain_placement
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The "Regulation" domain placement is exactly correct, as Smith treats
    apprenticeships as a prime example of how European policy artificially regulates
    and restricts natural market operations. This fits perfectly within his broader
    critique of regulatory interventions that distort economic outcomes.
- name: vsm_relevance
  value: 3.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: Apprenticeships map reasonably well to S2 (coordination) as they represent
    a regulatory mechanism that coordinates labor market entry, but they also touch
    on S3 (internal regulation) aspects. The mapping is not as natural or clear-cut
    as some other economic mechanisms, making it moderately VSM-relevant.
- name: explanatory_value
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating a specific
    mechanism through which established interests restrict competition and maintain
    artificial wage premiums. It demonstrates how seemingly beneficial institutions
    can actually create structural inequalities and market distortions.
---

# Evaluation: Apprenticeships

## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition is quite precise, clearly specifying the key elements: fixed term (seven years), master-apprentice relationship, labor ownership, training provision, and barrier-to-entry effects. It avoids circularity and captures the essential structural features of the apprenticeship system as an economic institution.

## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity is strongly grounded in Smith's actual analysis in Book I, Chapter 10, where he extensively critiques apprenticeships as artificial restrictions on labor mobility and competition. The definition accurately reflects Smith's specific concerns about seven-year terms and their role in creating market inequalities.

## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

The "Regulation" domain placement is exactly correct, as Smith treats apprenticeships as a prime example of how European policy artificially regulates and restricts natural market operations. This fits perfectly within his broader critique of regulatory interventions that distort economic outcomes.

## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0

Apprenticeships map reasonably well to S2 (coordination) as they represent a regulatory mechanism that coordinates labor market entry, but they also touch on S3 (internal regulation) aspects. The mapping is not as natural or clear-cut as some other economic mechanisms, making it moderately VSM-relevant.

## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0

This entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating a specific mechanism through which established interests restrict competition and maintain artificial wage premiums. It demonstrates how seemingly beneficial institutions can actually create structural inequalities and market distortions.
