---
entity_slug: monopoly_price_of_land
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T05:56:08.167692'
overall_score: 4.4
scores:
- name: definition_precision
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly price of land from competitive
    pricing by identifying the key mechanism - exclusive control leading to price
    determination based on tenant's ability to pay rather than provision costs. The
    concept is distinct and well-bounded, though it could be slightly more precise
    about what constitutes "competitive conditions" for land.
- name: source_grounding
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book I, Chapter
    11, where he explicitly argues that rent constitutes a monopoly price due to landlords'
    exclusive control over land. The entity accurately reflects Smith's reasoning
    about rent determination being based on what tenants can afford rather than costs
    of provision.
- name: domain_placement
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The placement in "Distribution" is exactly correct, as this concept deals
    with how economic returns (specifically rent) are distributed to landowners. This
    is a core distributional mechanism in Smith's framework for understanding how
    wealth is allocated among different factors of production.
- name: vsm_relevance
  value: 3.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S1 (as
    a primary economic operation) or S4 (as intelligence about market conditions and
    pricing power). However, it's somewhat abstract as a pricing mechanism rather
    than a clear operational or regulatory function within an economic system.
- name: explanatory_value
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the
    fundamental mechanism behind rent determination and distinguishing it from other
    forms of economic returns. It reveals the structural relationship between property
    rights, market power, and price formation in land markets.
---

# Evaluation: Monopoly Price Of Land

## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly price of land from competitive pricing by identifying the key mechanism - exclusive control leading to price determination based on tenant's ability to pay rather than provision costs. The concept is distinct and well-bounded, though it could be slightly more precise about what constitutes "competitive conditions" for land.

## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book I, Chapter 11, where he explicitly argues that rent constitutes a monopoly price due to landlords' exclusive control over land. The entity accurately reflects Smith's reasoning about rent determination being based on what tenants can afford rather than costs of provision.

## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

The placement in "Distribution" is exactly correct, as this concept deals with how economic returns (specifically rent) are distributed to landowners. This is a core distributional mechanism in Smith's framework for understanding how wealth is allocated among different factors of production.

## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0

This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S1 (as a primary economic operation) or S4 (as intelligence about market conditions and pricing power). However, it's somewhat abstract as a pricing mechanism rather than a clear operational or regulatory function within an economic system.

## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the fundamental mechanism behind rent determination and distinguishing it from other forms of economic returns. It reveals the structural relationship between property rights, market power, and price formation in land markets.
