---
entity_slug: false_coiners_and_seignorage
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T05:27:15.400435'
overall_score: 4.4
scores:
- name: definition_precision
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The definition clearly articulates a specific economic mechanism - the
    relationship between seignorage levels and counterfeiting incentives. It avoids
    circularity and identifies a distinct causal relationship between the gap in bullion/coin
    value and profitable counterfeiting opportunities.
- name: source_grounding
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV,
    Chapter 6, where he explicitly analyzes seignorage policy and its effects on counterfeiting,
    including the French example mentioned. The concept directly reflects Smith's
    reasoning about calibrating seignorage levels.
- name: domain_placement
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: '"Regulation" is the appropriate domain since this concerns government
    policy decisions about seignorage levels and their regulatory effects on counterfeiting
    behavior. This is fundamentally about state regulation of monetary systems rather
    than pure market mechanisms.'
- name: vsm_relevance
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity maps well to S3 (internal regulation) as it concerns regulatory
    mechanisms that maintain system stability by preventing counterfeiting, and potentially
    S4 (intelligence) regarding environmental monitoring of counterfeiting threats.
    It represents a clear regulatory control function.
- name: explanatory_value
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The entity illuminates an important regulatory mechanism showing how
    policy parameters (seignorage levels) create or eliminate perverse incentives
    (counterfeiting). It explains a structural relationship between monetary policy
    design and unintended criminal consequences.
---

# Evaluation: False Coiners And Seignorage

## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition clearly articulates a specific economic mechanism - the relationship between seignorage levels and counterfeiting incentives. It avoids circularity and identifies a distinct causal relationship between the gap in bullion/coin value and profitable counterfeiting opportunities.

## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV, Chapter 6, where he explicitly analyzes seignorage policy and its effects on counterfeiting, including the French example mentioned. The concept directly reflects Smith's reasoning about calibrating seignorage levels.

## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

"Regulation" is the appropriate domain since this concerns government policy decisions about seignorage levels and their regulatory effects on counterfeiting behavior. This is fundamentally about state regulation of monetary systems rather than pure market mechanisms.

## vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0

This entity maps well to S3 (internal regulation) as it concerns regulatory mechanisms that maintain system stability by preventing counterfeiting, and potentially S4 (intelligence) regarding environmental monitoring of counterfeiting threats. It represents a clear regulatory control function.

## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0

The entity illuminates an important regulatory mechanism showing how policy parameters (seignorage levels) create or eliminate perverse incentives (counterfeiting). It explains a structural relationship between monetary policy design and unintended criminal consequences.
