feat(example): add supply-chain-vsm composition demo (S3.5)

Demonstrates infospace composition: the Wealth of Nations infospace is
used as a discipline, applying Smith's economic framework as a lens to
analyse modern supply chain management concepts.

New example: examples/supply-chain-vsm/
- infospace.yaml binding WoN as discipline (../infospace-with-history)
- 3 source documents: coordination mechanisms, capital & inventory,
  market structure (~400 words each, original content)
- supply-chain-entity-schema-v1.0.md with WoN Concept required section
- won-mapping-schema-v1.0.md with Conceptual Continuity rating
- artifacts/won-reference/core-entities.md — 12 curated WoN entities
  for injection as discipline context
- 8 hand-crafted entity files demonstrating LLM output format
- 3 mapping files with full rationale and VSM inheritance chains
- Viable: YES (5/5 thresholds)

Key mappings demonstrated:
  Demand Signal          → Effectual Demand        (Strong, S2)
  Vendor-Managed Inventory → Division of Labour    (Strong, S1/S2)
  Just-in-Time Inventory → Circulating Capital     (Strong, S1/S3)
  Bullwhip Effect        → Natural Price           (Moderate, S2)
  Platform Intermediary  → Merchant Capital        (Strong, S2/S4)
  Monopsony Power        → Combination of Masters  (Strong, S3*)

Platform fix: entity_parser.py now recognises ## Supply Chain Domain
as a domain alias for ## Economic Domain, enabling composed infospaces
to use their own domain section name.

Tutorial §13 rewritten with real commands, real output, and the full
mapping table from the demo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

examples/supply-chain-vsm/output/mappings/market-structure-mappings.md

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+# WoN Mappings — Market Structure
+
+Generated from: `artifacts/sources/market-structure.md`
+
+---
+
+# Platform Intermediary → Merchant Capital
+
+## Supply Chain Entity
+
+Platform Intermediary
+
+## WoN Entity
+
+Merchant Capital
+
+## Mapping Rationale
+
+Smith analyses merchant capital as capital employed to buy in one market
+and sell in another, earning profit from controlling access to exchange
+rather than from production. He notes that merchants are mobile — they
+have no necessary attachment to any productive system — which gives them
+structural leverage over producers who are geographically fixed. Platform
+intermediaries are a high-leverage form of the same structure: they control
+access to exchange (the matching infrastructure) without bearing inventory
+risk, earning profit from transaction fees and data rather than from
+buying and reselling. The merchant's physical mobility translates into
+the platform's structural mobility — the platform has no fixed attachment
+to any producer's fate, yet producers cannot exit without losing network
+access.
+
+## Conceptual Continuity
+
+Strong — Platform intermediaries are the modern form of merchant capital:
+the mechanism (control of exchange access, leverage over producers,
+profit from intermediation rather than production) is identical. The
+innovation is eliminating inventory risk while retaining coordination
+power, which makes platforms a more concentrated and profitable form of
+merchant capital than Smith could have envisioned.
+
+## VSM Inheritance
+
+Platform Intermediary inherits S2/S4 via Merchant Capital (coordination
+infrastructure with intelligence function — aggregating market data while
+intermediating transactions).
+
+---
+
+# Monopsony Power → Combination of Masters
+
+## Supply Chain Entity
+
+Monopsony Power
+
+## WoN Entity
+
+Combination of Masters
+
+## Mapping Rationale
+
+Smith describes the combination of masters as the coordinated exercise of
+employer power to suppress wages below the competitive level. He notes
+these combinations are common, rarely discussed publicly, and facilitated
+by the smaller number of employers relative to workers. Modern supply chain
+monopsony operates through the same structural mechanism: a concentrated
+buyer (or industry norm among buyers) facing atomistic suppliers
+systematically extracts terms — lower prices, extended payment, cost
+absorption — that suppliers cannot individually refuse without losing the
+customer. The power asymmetry (concentrated vs. atomistic; each party's
+outside options) is identical. Smith's analysis predicts the modern
+outcome: margin compression, underinvestment, and fragility on the supplier
+side.
+
+## Conceptual Continuity
+
+Strong — Monopsony power in supply chains is Smith's combination of masters
+applied to the buyer–supplier relationship rather than the employer–worker
+relationship. The market structure (concentrated power facing fragmented
+supply of a factor) and the mechanism (systematic extraction below
+competitive returns) are the same.
+
+## VSM Inheritance
+
+Monopsony Power inherits S3* via Combination of Masters (distortion of
+the S2 coordination signal through coordinated anti-competitive behaviour
+at the management boundary).
+
+---
+
+# Single-Source Dependency → Monopoly in Trade
+
+## Supply Chain Entity
+
+Single-Source Dependency
+
+## WoN Entity
+
+Monopoly in Trade
+
+## Mapping Rationale
+
+Smith argues that monopolists always charge the highest price buyers will
+bear, because no competitive alternative disciplines them. A single-source
+supplier during a supply disruption is a temporary monopolist: the buyer
+has no immediate alternative, demand for the component is inelastic in
+the short run, and the supplier can extract above-natural prices. Smith's
+account of monopoly — restricted supply, elevated price, distorted resource
+allocation — applies precisely to the disrupted single-source scenario.
+The difference is that single-source dependency produces episodic monopoly
+power (during disruptions) rather than Smith's continuous monopoly; but
+the mechanism and the welfare consequences are the same.
+
+## Conceptual Continuity
+
+Moderate — The monopoly pricing mechanism is shared, but Smith's monopoly
+is a stable market structure while single-source dependency produces
+temporary monopoly only during disruptions. The strategic implications
+also differ: Smith focuses on restricting supply to maintain high prices,
+while single-source power is an inadvertent consequence of concentrated
+specialisation rather than deliberate supply restriction.
+
+## VSM Inheritance
+
+Single-Source Dependency inherits S4/S5 via Monopoly in Trade (intelligence
+failure creating conditions for policy-level market distortion when
+disruption occurs).