feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)
Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics written with per_entity_mean=3.9556. Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS redundancy_ratio 0.0061 (max 0.10) coverage_ratio 0.6190 (min 0.40) coherence_comps 0.0000 (max 3) consistency_cycles 0.0000 (max 0) granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0) per_entity_mean 3.9556 (min 3.5) Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities): definition_precision 3.62 source_grounding 4.36 domain_placement 4.56 vsm_relevance 3.31 explanatory_value 3.94 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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entity_slug: agricultural_price_floors
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T00:29:59.899867'
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overall_score: 4.2
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The definition clearly specifies minimum prices set above market equilibrium
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for agricultural products, with clear intended purpose and consequences. It avoids
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circularity and captures a distinct policy mechanism rather than a vague concept.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity is directly grounded in Smith's discussion of agricultural
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price supports, particularly the bounty on grain exports in Book I, Chapter 11.
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Smith explicitly analyzes such interventions and their market distortions.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: '"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as agricultural price
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floors are a specific form of government market intervention. This fits perfectly
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within Smith''s broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.'
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 3.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This maps primarily to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism,
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but could also relate to S4 (policy intelligence) regarding agricultural sector
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management. While it has VSM relevance, it's not as naturally systemic as core
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operational or coordination mechanisms.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity illuminates a specific mechanism of market intervention and
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its structural consequences (surpluses, inefficiencies), providing concrete insight
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into how government price controls distort natural market operations. It goes
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beyond mere naming to explain causal relationships Smith identified.
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---
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# Evaluation: Agricultural Price Floors
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## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
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The definition clearly specifies minimum prices set above market equilibrium for agricultural products, with clear intended purpose and consequences. It avoids circularity and captures a distinct policy mechanism rather than a vague concept.
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## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity is directly grounded in Smith's discussion of agricultural price supports, particularly the bounty on grain exports in Book I, Chapter 11. Smith explicitly analyzes such interventions and their market distortions.
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## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
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"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as agricultural price floors are a specific form of government market intervention. This fits perfectly within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.
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## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
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This maps primarily to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism, but could also relate to S4 (policy intelligence) regarding agricultural sector management. While it has VSM relevance, it's not as naturally systemic as core operational or coordination mechanisms.
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## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0
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This entity illuminates a specific mechanism of market intervention and its structural consequences (surpluses, inefficiencies), providing concrete insight into how government price controls distort natural market operations. It goes beyond mere naming to explain causal relationships Smith identified.
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