feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

examples/infospace-with-history/output/evaluations/ground_rent_tax.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+entity_slug: ground_rent_tax
+evaluator: null
+evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T05:34:10.810360'
+overall_score: 4.2
+scores:
+- name: definition_precision
+  value: 4.0
+  max_value: 5.0
+  rationale: The definition is quite precise, clearly distinguishing ground rent tax
+    from other forms of taxation by specifying it applies to land under buildings
+    and emphasizing the monopolistic nature of ground ownership. It avoids circularity
+    and captures a distinct fiscal concept.
+- name: source_grounding
+  value: 5.0
+  max_value: 5.0
+  rationale: This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual text from Book V, Chapter
+    2, where he explicitly discusses ground rents and their suitability for taxation.
+    The characterization of landowners as monopolists and the argument about government-derived
+    value are authentic to Smith's analysis.
+- name: domain_placement
+  value: 5.0
+  max_value: 5.0
+  rationale: '"General Theory" is the correct domain placement as this represents
+    Smith''s theoretical framework for optimal taxation policy. Ground rent tax is
+    a specific application of his broader principles about tax incidence and economic
+    efficiency.'
+- name: vsm_relevance
+  value: 3.0
+  max_value: 5.0
+  rationale: This entity has moderate VSM relevance, most naturally mapping to S3
+    (internal regulation) as a mechanism for government resource extraction and economic
+    control. However, it's primarily a policy instrument rather than a core systemic
+    function.
+- name: explanatory_value
+  value: 4.0
+  max_value: 5.0
+  rationale: The entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating Smith's
+    theory of tax incidence and his distinction between productive and unproductive
+    economic activities. It reveals the structural relationship between land monopoly,
+    government policy, and economic rent capture.
+---
+
+# Evaluation: Ground Rent Tax
+
+## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
+
+The definition is quite precise, clearly distinguishing ground rent tax from other forms of taxation by specifying it applies to land under buildings and emphasizing the monopolistic nature of ground ownership. It avoids circularity and captures a distinct fiscal concept.
+
+## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
+
+This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual text from Book V, Chapter 2, where he explicitly discusses ground rents and their suitability for taxation. The characterization of landowners as monopolists and the argument about government-derived value are authentic to Smith's analysis.
+
+## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
+
+"General Theory" is the correct domain placement as this represents Smith's theoretical framework for optimal taxation policy. Ground rent tax is a specific application of his broader principles about tax incidence and economic efficiency.
+
+## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
+
+This entity has moderate VSM relevance, most naturally mapping to S3 (internal regulation) as a mechanism for government resource extraction and economic control. However, it's primarily a policy instrument rather than a core systemic function.
+
+## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0
+
+The entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating Smith's theory of tax incidence and his distinction between productive and unproductive economic activities. It reveals the structural relationship between land monopoly, government policy, and economic rent capture.