feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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---
entity_slug: monopoly_in_trade
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T05:55:30.526511'
overall_score: 4.4
scores:
- name: definition_precision
value: 4.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly from competitive markets
by specifying exclusive control and its price effects. It avoids circularity and
captures the essential mechanism of artificial market power distorting natural
pricing.
- name: source_grounding
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis of treaties of
commerce in Book IV, Chapter 6, where he explicitly discusses how trade privileges
create monopolistic advantages. The entity accurately reflects Smith's concern
with exclusive trading arrangements and their economic effects.
- name: domain_placement
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: '"Regulation" is the correct domain since Smith treats monopoly in trade
as a regulatory intervention that distorts natural market mechanisms. This fits
perfectly with his broader critique of government interference in commerce.'
- name: vsm_relevance
value: 3.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This entity has moderate VSM relevance, primarily mapping to S3 (internal
regulation) as it represents regulatory mechanisms that control market operations.
However, it could also relate to S4 (intelligence) regarding how nations adapt
their trade policies to environmental conditions.
- name: explanatory_value
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This entity provides excellent explanatory power by illuminating the
core mechanism through which treaties of commerce operate to distort markets.
It reveals the structural relationship between political agreements and economic
inefficiency that is central to Smith's argument.
---
# Evaluation: Monopoly In Trade
## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly from competitive markets by specifying exclusive control and its price effects. It avoids circularity and captures the essential mechanism of artificial market power distorting natural pricing.
## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis of treaties of commerce in Book IV, Chapter 6, where he explicitly discusses how trade privileges create monopolistic advantages. The entity accurately reflects Smith's concern with exclusive trading arrangements and their economic effects.
## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
"Regulation" is the correct domain since Smith treats monopoly in trade as a regulatory intervention that distorts natural market mechanisms. This fits perfectly with his broader critique of government interference in commerce.
## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
This entity has moderate VSM relevance, primarily mapping to S3 (internal regulation) as it represents regulatory mechanisms that control market operations. However, it could also relate to S4 (intelligence) regarding how nations adapt their trade policies to environmental conditions.
## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
This entity provides excellent explanatory power by illuminating the core mechanism through which treaties of commerce operate to distort markets. It reveals the structural relationship between political agreements and economic inefficiency that is central to Smith's argument.