feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)
Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics written with per_entity_mean=3.9556. Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS redundancy_ratio 0.0061 (max 0.10) coverage_ratio 0.6190 (min 0.40) coherence_comps 0.0000 (max 3) consistency_cycles 0.0000 (max 0) granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0) per_entity_mean 3.9556 (min 3.5) Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities): definition_precision 3.62 source_grounding 4.36 domain_placement 4.56 vsm_relevance 3.31 explanatory_value 3.94 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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entity_slug: monopoly_price_of_land
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T05:56:08.167692'
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overall_score: 4.4
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly price of land from competitive
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pricing by identifying the key mechanism - exclusive control leading to price
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determination based on tenant's ability to pay rather than provision costs. The
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concept is distinct and well-bounded, though it could be slightly more precise
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about what constitutes "competitive conditions" for land.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book I, Chapter
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11, where he explicitly argues that rent constitutes a monopoly price due to landlords'
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exclusive control over land. The entity accurately reflects Smith's reasoning
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about rent determination being based on what tenants can afford rather than costs
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of provision.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The placement in "Distribution" is exactly correct, as this concept deals
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with how economic returns (specifically rent) are distributed to landowners. This
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is a core distributional mechanism in Smith's framework for understanding how
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wealth is allocated among different factors of production.
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 3.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S1 (as
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a primary economic operation) or S4 (as intelligence about market conditions and
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pricing power). However, it's somewhat abstract as a pricing mechanism rather
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than a clear operational or regulatory function within an economic system.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the
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fundamental mechanism behind rent determination and distinguishing it from other
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forms of economic returns. It reveals the structural relationship between property
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rights, market power, and price formation in land markets.
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---
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# Evaluation: Monopoly Price Of Land
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## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
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The definition clearly distinguishes monopoly price of land from competitive pricing by identifying the key mechanism - exclusive control leading to price determination based on tenant's ability to pay rather than provision costs. The concept is distinct and well-bounded, though it could be slightly more precise about what constitutes "competitive conditions" for land.
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## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
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This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book I, Chapter 11, where he explicitly argues that rent constitutes a monopoly price due to landlords' exclusive control over land. The entity accurately reflects Smith's reasoning about rent determination being based on what tenants can afford rather than costs of provision.
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## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
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The placement in "Distribution" is exactly correct, as this concept deals with how economic returns (specifically rent) are distributed to landowners. This is a core distributional mechanism in Smith's framework for understanding how wealth is allocated among different factors of production.
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## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
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This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S1 (as a primary economic operation) or S4 (as intelligence about market conditions and pricing power). However, it's somewhat abstract as a pricing mechanism rather than a clear operational or regulatory function within an economic system.
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## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the fundamental mechanism behind rent determination and distinguishing it from other forms of economic returns. It reveals the structural relationship between property rights, market power, and price formation in land markets.
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