feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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---
entity_slug: private_interest_monopoly_spirit
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T06:09:04.849718'
overall_score: 4.4
scores:
- name: definition_precision
value: 4.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: The definition clearly identifies a specific behavioral tendency of merchants
and manufacturers to use government power for monopolistic advantage. It avoids
circularity and distinguishes this concept from general profit-seeking by focusing
on the specific mechanism of securing government-backed exclusive privileges.
- name: source_grounding
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book IV, Chapter
3, where he explicitly discusses how private commercial interests invented mercantilist
doctrines to secure monopolies and protection. Smith clearly identifies this as
the driving force behind much mercantilist policy advocacy.
- name: domain_placement
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate since this entity specifically
concerns how private interests manipulate government regulatory power to create
monopolies. This is fundamentally about the intersection of private commercial
behavior and regulatory capture.
- name: vsm_relevance
value: 3.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This entity has some VSM relevance as it represents a pathological relationship
between S1 (commercial operations) and S5 (policy/identity), where private interests
corrupt the policy-making function. However, it's more of a dysfunction pattern
than a clear structural component of any single VSM system.
- name: explanatory_value
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: "This entity provides excellent explanatory power by identifying the\
\ causal mechanism behind mercantilist policies\u2014showing how private interests\
\ drive seemingly public policy doctrines. It illuminates the structural relationship\
\ between commercial self-interest and regulatory capture that Smith saw as fundamental\
\ to understanding mercantilism."
---
# Evaluation: Private Interest Monopoly Spirit
## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
The definition clearly identifies a specific behavioral tendency of merchants and manufacturers to use government power for monopolistic advantage. It avoids circularity and distinguishes this concept from general profit-seeking by focusing on the specific mechanism of securing government-backed exclusive privileges.
## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
This concept is directly grounded in Smith's analysis in Book IV, Chapter 3, where he explicitly discusses how private commercial interests invented mercantilist doctrines to secure monopolies and protection. Smith clearly identifies this as the driving force behind much mercantilist policy advocacy.
## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate since this entity specifically concerns how private interests manipulate government regulatory power to create monopolies. This is fundamentally about the intersection of private commercial behavior and regulatory capture.
## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
This entity has some VSM relevance as it represents a pathological relationship between S1 (commercial operations) and S5 (policy/identity), where private interests corrupt the policy-making function. However, it's more of a dysfunction pattern than a clear structural component of any single VSM system.
## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
This entity provides excellent explanatory power by identifying the causal mechanism behind mercantilist policies—showing how private interests drive seemingly public policy doctrines. It illuminates the structural relationship between commercial self-interest and regulatory capture that Smith saw as fundamental to understanding mercantilism.