feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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---
entity_slug: taille
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T06:28:57.228034'
overall_score: 4.6
scores:
- name: definition_precision
value: 4.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: The definition clearly specifies the taille as a French land tax based
on supposed profits from farm stock, with well-articulated perverse incentives.
It's precise and non-circular, though could benefit from slightly more detail
about the assessment mechanism.
- name: source_grounding
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This is directly grounded in Smith's text from Book III, Chapter 2, where
he explicitly discusses the taille as a problematic French tax system. The description
of its effects on cultivation and investment aligns closely with Smith's analysis.
- name: domain_placement
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: '"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as the taille represents
a specific regulatory mechanism (taxation) that creates systematic economic distortions.
It fits perfectly within Smith''s broader analysis of how regulatory frameworks
affect economic behavior.'
- name: vsm_relevance
value: 4.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as a regulatory mechanism
that's supposed to monitor and extract value from economic activity, though it's
a dysfunctional one. It also touches on S4 concerns about how regulatory systems
adapt (or fail to adapt) to economic realities.
- name: explanatory_value
value: 5.0
max_value: 5.0
rationale: This entity illuminates a crucial mechanism showing how tax design creates
systematic incentives that distort economic behavior, serving as a concrete example
of Smith's broader principles about the relationship between institutional design
and economic outcomes. It demonstrates structural causation rather than just naming
a phenomenon.
---
# Evaluation: Taille
## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
The definition clearly specifies the taille as a French land tax based on supposed profits from farm stock, with well-articulated perverse incentives. It's precise and non-circular, though could benefit from slightly more detail about the assessment mechanism.
## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
This is directly grounded in Smith's text from Book III, Chapter 2, where he explicitly discusses the taille as a problematic French tax system. The description of its effects on cultivation and investment aligns closely with Smith's analysis.
## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as the taille represents a specific regulatory mechanism (taxation) that creates systematic economic distortions. It fits perfectly within Smith's broader analysis of how regulatory frameworks affect economic behavior.
## vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0
This maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as a regulatory mechanism that's supposed to monitor and extract value from economic activity, though it's a dysfunctional one. It also touches on S4 concerns about how regulatory systems adapt (or fail to adapt) to economic realities.
## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
This entity illuminates a crucial mechanism showing how tax design creates systematic incentives that distort economic behavior, serving as a concrete example of Smith's broader principles about the relationship between institutional design and economic outcomes. It demonstrates structural causation rather than just naming a phenomenon.