---
entity_slug: adulterine_guilds
evaluator: null
evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T00:19:54.211638'
overall_score: 4.0
scores:
- name: definition_precision
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The definition is precise and captures a distinct historical phenomenon
    - trade associations operating without formal incorporation but with tacit royal
    tolerance in exchange for fines. The concept is well-bounded and non-circular,
    clearly distinguishing these entities from legitimate guilds.
- name: source_grounding
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This appears well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion of medieval corporate
    privileges and royal prerogatives in Book I, Chapter 10. The connection to rent-seeking
    behavior accurately reflects Smith's analysis of how institutional arrangements
    served private rather than public interests.
- name: domain_placement
  value: 5.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as adulterine guilds
    represent a regulatory phenomenon - quasi-legal entities operating in the gap
    between formal incorporation and complete prohibition. This fits squarely within
    discussions of institutional regulation and corporate privileges.
- name: vsm_relevance
  value: 3.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S3 (internal
    regulation) as an example of how regulatory systems can be corrupted or co-opted.
    However, it's primarily a historical example rather than a structural cybernetic
    component, making the VSM connection somewhat indirect.
- name: explanatory_value
  value: 4.0
  max_value: 5.0
  rationale: The entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating a specific
    mechanism of rent-seeking and institutional capture that supports Smith's broader
    theoretical arguments. It demonstrates how regulatory arrangements can serve extractive
    rather than protective functions, adding concrete historical depth to abstract
    economic principles.
---

# Evaluation: Adulterine Guilds

## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition is precise and captures a distinct historical phenomenon - trade associations operating without formal incorporation but with tacit royal tolerance in exchange for fines. The concept is well-bounded and non-circular, clearly distinguishing these entities from legitimate guilds.

## source_grounding — 4.0 / 5.0

This appears well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion of medieval corporate privileges and royal prerogatives in Book I, Chapter 10. The connection to rent-seeking behavior accurately reflects Smith's analysis of how institutional arrangements served private rather than public interests.

## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as adulterine guilds represent a regulatory phenomenon - quasi-legal entities operating in the gap between formal incorporation and complete prohibition. This fits squarely within discussions of institutional regulation and corporate privileges.

## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0

This entity has moderate VSM relevance, potentially mapping to S3 (internal regulation) as an example of how regulatory systems can be corrupted or co-opted. However, it's primarily a historical example rather than a structural cybernetic component, making the VSM connection somewhat indirect.

## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0

The entity provides strong explanatory value by illuminating a specific mechanism of rent-seeking and institutional capture that supports Smith's broader theoretical arguments. It demonstrates how regulatory arrangements can serve extractive rather than protective functions, adding concrete historical depth to abstract economic principles.