Files
markitect-main/examples/supply-chain-vsm/artifacts/sources/market-structure.md
tegwick 574bb11db6 feat(example): add supply-chain-vsm composition demo (S3.5)
Demonstrates infospace composition: the Wealth of Nations infospace is
used as a discipline, applying Smith's economic framework as a lens to
analyse modern supply chain management concepts.

New example: examples/supply-chain-vsm/
- infospace.yaml binding WoN as discipline (../infospace-with-history)
- 3 source documents: coordination mechanisms, capital & inventory,
  market structure (~400 words each, original content)
- supply-chain-entity-schema-v1.0.md with WoN Concept required section
- won-mapping-schema-v1.0.md with Conceptual Continuity rating
- artifacts/won-reference/core-entities.md — 12 curated WoN entities
  for injection as discipline context
- 8 hand-crafted entity files demonstrating LLM output format
- 3 mapping files with full rationale and VSM inheritance chains
- Viable: YES (5/5 thresholds)

Key mappings demonstrated:
  Demand Signal          → Effectual Demand        (Strong, S2)
  Vendor-Managed Inventory → Division of Labour    (Strong, S1/S2)
  Just-in-Time Inventory → Circulating Capital     (Strong, S1/S3)
  Bullwhip Effect        → Natural Price           (Moderate, S2)
  Platform Intermediary  → Merchant Capital        (Strong, S2/S4)
  Monopsony Power        → Combination of Masters  (Strong, S3*)

Platform fix: entity_parser.py now recognises ## Supply Chain Domain
as a domain alias for ## Economic Domain, enabling composed infospaces
to use their own domain section name.

Tutorial §13 rewritten with real commands, real output, and the full
mapping table from the demo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-23 00:08:51 +01:00

3.9 KiB

Market Structure in Modern Supply Chains

Platform Intermediaries

A platform intermediary in a supply chain context is a company that does not itself produce or consume goods but instead controls the infrastructure through which buyers and sellers transact. Platform intermediaries include e-commerce marketplaces (Amazon, Alibaba), logistics platforms (Flexport, FreightOS), and procurement networks (Coupa, Ariba). Their value lies not in physical capital but in network effects: the platform becomes more valuable to each participant as the total number of participants grows.

Platform intermediaries extract value by charging transaction fees, selling data analytics, providing financing, or leveraging their position to capture margin that previously accrued to producers or carriers. Their market power derives from control of the matching infrastructure: a seller who abandons the platform loses access to the buyer network; a buyer who abandons the platform loses access to the supplier network.

Unlike traditional merchant intermediaries — who bought and sold goods, bearing inventory risk — platform intermediaries transfer inventory risk to the counterparties. The platform earns commission on each transaction but holds no stock; the asymmetry concentrates profit in the intermediary while concentrating risk in producers and carriers.

Monopsony and Buyer Power

Monopsony is market power on the buyer's side: a situation in which a single buyer (or a small number of buyers acting in concert) faces many sellers. In supply chains, monopsony manifests when a large retailer or manufacturer is the dominant customer for a category of suppliers. The buyer's ability to credibly threaten to switch suppliers — or to reduce purchase volumes — gives it negotiating leverage that suppliers cannot easily counter.

Buyer power is exercised through price pressure (demanding lower unit costs in each contract renegotiation), terms pressure (extending payment terms, imposing fines for delivery failures), and specification creep (adding requirements without cost compensation). Suppliers facing strong buyer power are systematically squeezed: their margins decline, their ability to invest in quality and capacity is constrained, and their bargaining position deteriorates further as the buyer grows.

The long-run consequence of sustained monopsony pressure is supplier consolidation — weaker suppliers exit, leaving the buyer with fewer but larger suppliers — and supply fragility, as the surviving suppliers have insufficient margin to hold safety stock or invest in resilience.

Market Concentration and Single-Source Dependencies

Single-source dependency occurs when a supply chain relies on one supplier for a critical component or material with no readily substitutable alternative. Single-source situations arise from supplier specialisation (only one firm has the required capability), geographic concentration (all competent suppliers are in one region), or deliberate buyer policy (choosing the best supplier and extracting maximum scale economies).

Single-source dependencies concentrate supply chain risk. When a single-sourced supplier fails — due to fire, flood, earthquake, insolvency, or geopolitical disruption — the buyer has no immediate alternative. The semiconductor industry exemplifies this: certain advanced logic chips can only be produced by one or two foundries globally, making entire sectors of the world economy dependent on the operational continuity of a small number of facilities in Taiwan and South Korea.

From a market structure perspective, single-source suppliers possess temporary monopoly power: during a supply disruption, they can charge prices far above their normal level, because no substitute exists. Smith's analysis of monopoly price — that it is the highest that can be squeezed from buyers — applies directly: a disrupted single-source supplier in a critical category faces demand that is inelastic in the short run.