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Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Bernd Worsch
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---
id: NET-WP-0017
type: workplan
title: "IT Security Readiness For User Onboarding"
domain: infotech
repo: net-kingdom
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-05-26"
updated: "2026-06-03"
depends_on:
- NET-WP-0015
- NET-WP-0016
- RAIL-PL-WP-0002
state_hub_workstream_id: "385de708-fd59-4bab-a4f4-28c1c476b3ea"
---
# NET-WP-0017 - IT Security Readiness For User Onboarding
## Goal
Finish the remaining NetKingdom and Railiance security setup needed before
ordinary platform users, tenant admins, or fabric admins are onboarded.
`NET-WP-0015` established the king credential, OpenBao bootstrap ceremony, and
guided control surface. This workplan is the narrower finish-line plan: routine
admin access must use NetKingdom identity, bootstrap-era material must be
retired or explicitly accepted, audit/recovery posture must be credible, and a
first non-root onboarding dry run must prove the lifecycle model.
## Current Evidence
- `platform-root` exists in LLDAP, belongs to `net-kingdom-admins`, has MFA,
and completed KeyCape OIDC login.
- Railiance OpenBao is initialized, unsealed, and post-unseal verified.
- OpenBao initial configuration was applied; `platform/` KV and Kubernetes auth
exist.
- The initial OpenBao root token is recorded as revoked.
- Trial unseal shares were rotated.
- The KeyCape `openbao-admin` client is live and verified, including the public
`https://kc.coulomb.social` route and certificate.
- OpenBao OIDC auth configuration is applied; MFA-backed OpenBao admin login
completed successfully and the resulting token lookup showed the
`platform-admin` policy for `platform-root`.
- Declarative local OpenBao audit and authenticated audit visibility are
complete; enterprise durable tenant-aware audit retention has been split into
the standalone `audit-core` product. Residual taint closeout,
cleanup/rotation, and the first ordinary-user onboarding dry run are still
pending.
## Tasks
### T01 - Finish OIDC-Backed OpenBao Admin Login
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "9b087bbd-631b-4316-b94d-a8265a05b065"
```
Run the fixed OpenBao OIDC helper, record the non-secret completion flag, then
verify `platform-root` can complete:
```bash
bao login -method=oidc -path=keycape role=platform-admin
```
The verification must prove the resulting OpenBao token has the intended
`platform-admin` policy without relying on the initial root token or a manually
minted temporary operator token.
**2026-05-29:** DNS and ACME issuance for `kc.coulomb.social` are healthy:
cert-manager issued `kc-tls`, and `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/verify-openbao-client.sh`
passes against the live KeyCape route. `configure-openbao-oidc.sh` has applied
the OpenBao `auth/keycape` OIDC configuration and `platform-admin` role. The
remaining T01 gate is the human browser login with MFA and a token lookup that
shows the expected OpenBao `platform-admin` policy.
**2026-06-01:** Added a guided console recovery action for the observed
privacyIDEA state-loss blocker: if the live instance lacks the `coulomb` realm,
LLDAP resolver, or self-service policies, the operator can run **Repair
privacyIDEA realm and self-service** from **Usecases & Runbooks**. The action
does not store secrets; it calls `repair-realm-live.sh`, prompts live, creates
temporary env files for `bootstrap-realm.sh`, removes them on exit, and then
runs `verify-t06.sh`. After repair, `platform-root` TOTP
enrollment/re-enrollment and the MFA-backed `bao login` proof are still
required.
**2026-06-01:** Fixed the follow-up OpenBao OIDC token exchange
`user not found` error caused by live `keycape-config` drift: the Secret had
lost the non-secret LLDAP lookup fields `userOU: ou=people` and
`groupOU: ou=groups`. The KeyCape live patch helper now enforces those fields
alongside the `openbao-admin` client, the live Secret was patched, KeyCape was
restarted, and `verify-openbao-client.sh` passes again.
**2026-06-01:** Deployed a KeyCape runtime lookup fix for the remaining
`user not found` token-exchange failure after config drift was ruled out. The
LDAP adapter now treats provisioning metadata validation failures as runtime
warnings instead of blocking token issuance for an otherwise resolved LLDAP
user. The patched image `main-runtime-lookup-0601` is live and
`verify-openbao-client.sh` passes after rollout.
**2026-06-01:** Deployed the follow-up KeyCape OIDC nonce fix after OpenBao
rejected the exchanged ID token with `invalid id_token nonce`. KeyCape now
persists the original authorization `nonce` through pending state and the
authorization-code session, then emits it in the ID token. The patched image
`main-nonce-0601` is live, reports 1/1 ready, and `verify-openbao-client.sh`
passes after rollout.
**2026-06-01:** Fixed the next OpenBao role configuration failure,
`error converting claim 'groups' to string`. KeyCape correctly emits `groups`
as an array for `groups_claim`; OpenBao only failed because the role also copied
that array through scalar `claim_mappings`. The helper now leaves groups in
`groups_claim`/`bound_claims` and maps only scalar `email` and
`preferred_username` metadata.
**2026-06-01:** The operator reached the OpenBao success page, "Signed in via
your OIDC provider", after reapplying the corrected role. The follow-up
terminal proof showed `token_policies`/`policies` containing `platform-admin`,
`token_meta_role: platform-admin`, and `token_meta_username: platform-root`.
T01 is closed; the pasted short-lived token should be treated as disclosed and
revoked or allowed to expire after the check.
### T02 - Close OpenBao Audit And Recovery Production Gates
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "909944bd-843a-4a63-8c87-536cea052a88"
```
Resolve the remaining OpenBao production-trust gates:
- configure audit declaratively if API-managed audit remains rejected;
- record the interim Audit Core interface used before enterprise durable audit
retention is implemented;
- hand off durable tenant-aware audit shipping beyond the audit PVC to
`audit-core`;
- retain non-secret restore-drill evidence and repeat the drill if any
material changed;
- record emergency seal/unseal drill evidence; and
- identify the next independent escrow holder for moving beyond temporary
single-king custody.
**2026-06-01:** Started the OpenBao audit/recovery closeout. Railiance source
now has a declarative OpenBao file-audit stanza in
`helm/openbao-values.yaml`, and its initial-config helper now verifies
`bao audit list` instead of trying to create audit devices through the API.
The Railiance post-unseal verifier also warns when
`/openbao/audit/openbao-audit.log` is missing or empty. Live non-secret
checks still show OpenBao healthy and unsealed with Bound data/audit PVCs, but
the live Helm values do not yet include the declarative audit stanza and the
audit directory is empty. Do not move production secrets into OpenBao until a
planned Helm rollout is performed with unseal shares available, `file/` audit
is visible, an audit log is written, durable audit shipping beyond the PVC is
selected, and restore/emergency drill evidence plus a next escrow holder are
recorded.
**2026-06-01:** Completed the attended live rollout of the Railiance
declarative file-audit configuration. The Helm release was upgraded, the
`OnDelete` StatefulSet pod was deliberately recycled, the operator unsealed the
new pod, and `make openbao-verify-post-unseal` now reports OpenBao `2.5.4`,
`Sealed: false`, an audit directory, and a non-empty
`/openbao/audit/openbao-audit.log`. The Railiance source now pins the live
OpenBao image tag to `2.5.4` after the chart upgrade advanced the runtime from
`2.5.3`; a follow-up Helm revision 3 applied the explicit tag while the pod
remained ready. T02 remains open for the authenticated `bao audit list` proof,
durable audit shipping beyond the audit PVC, restore-drill evidence, emergency
seal/unseal drill evidence, and the next independent escrow holder.
**2026-06-01:** Added a Railiance evidence-only helper for the authenticated
OpenBao proof: `make openbao-verify-authenticated` prompts for an approved
OpenBao token without echoing it and verifies `file/` audit visibility,
`platform/` secrets, `kubernetes/` auth, `keycape/` auth, and a non-empty audit
log without mutating OpenBao configuration. The helper can also reuse a
still-valid pod token helper with
`OPENBAO_VERIFY_AUTH_ARGS=--use-token-helper`, avoiding token movement through
the local shell. It is ready to run with the MFA-backed
`platform-root`/`platform-admin` path. Durable audit shipping remains open; the
audit PVC is not a durable sink and non-secret evidence hashes or State Hub
notes are not substitutes for retained audit log custody.
**2026-06-01:** Completed the authenticated OpenBao proof through the
MFA-backed KeyCape path without printing token material. A fresh
`bao login -no-print -method=oidc -path=keycape role=platform-admin` browser
flow cached the pod token helper, then `make openbao-verify-authenticated
OPENBAO_VERIFY_AUTH_ARGS=--use-token-helper` passed. Evidence: OpenBao is
unsealed on `2.5.4`, `file/` audit is visible, `platform/` secrets are visible,
`kubernetes/` and `keycape/` auth methods are visible, and the audit log grew
from 7969 bytes to 23330 bytes during the check. The cached verifier token was
then revoked with `bao token revoke -self`. T02 remains open for durable audit
shipping beyond the audit PVC, restore-drill evidence, emergency seal/unseal
drill evidence, and the next independent escrow holder.
**2026-06-01:** Split enterprise audit retention out of this task and into the
new standalone `/home/worsch/audit-core` repo. `audit-core` now has
`INTENT.md`, a product requirements definition, and a minimal replaceable mock
backend that writes JSONL audit events to
`/tmp/audit-core/audit-YYYYMMDDTHH.jsonl` and cleans up files older than seven
days. A smoke event for the OpenBao authenticated readiness proof was written
through the mock interface, and `audit-core` tests pass. This mock backend is
acceptable for bootstrap/development wiring and NetKingdom UI integration, but
it is not durable audit custody and must not be presented as enterprise
retention. NET-WP-0017-T02 now treats the full tenant-aware durable audit
fabric as an `audit-core` follow-up rather than an OpenBao bootstrap subtask.
Remaining T02 gates are restore-drill evidence, emergency seal/unseal drill
evidence, the next independent escrow holder, and an explicit risk note if
ordinary onboarding proceeds before the production Audit Core sink exists.
**2026-06-01:** Tightened the restore-drill evidence gate. The local bootstrap
metadata currently says `restore_drill_passed: true`, but that checkbox alone
does not preserve enough non-secret evidence for review. Railiance now has a
restore evidence JSON template and `make openbao-validate-restore-evidence`
validator that checks for snapshot hashes, encrypted-snapshot hash/location,
isolated restore completion, unseal/status/test-secret verification, isolated
environment destruction, and `no_secret_material_recorded`. The NetKingdom
control surface now includes a **Validate restore drill evidence** runbook
card. T02 should not count the restore gate closed until a real non-secret
evidence file from the prior or repeated drill passes that validator.
**2026-06-01:** Added the parallel evidence path for the emergency seal/unseal
drill. Railiance now has an emergency drill evidence template and
`make openbao-validate-emergency-evidence`; NetKingdom exposes it through a
**Validate emergency drill evidence** runbook card. The live drill is
deliberately not automated because it seals OpenBao and requires threshold
unseal shares. T02 should count the emergency drill gate closed only after an
attended drill records non-secret evidence and that evidence validates.
**2026-06-02:** Added a single NetKingdom closure validator for this task:
`make security-bootstrap-validate-t02`. It combines the local non-secret
metadata gates for restore-drill completion, emergency seal/unseal completion,
next independent escrow holder, and Audit Core retention/risk posture with the
Railiance restore and emergency evidence validators. Against the current local
metadata it correctly reports T02 still open because the real evidence files
are missing, the emergency drill is not recorded, no independent future quorum
holder is recorded, and the temporary Audit Core risk posture has not yet been
accepted or replaced by a production sink.
**2026-06-02:** Replaced the loose single escrow-holder planning gate with a
signed two-of-three custody roster. The repository now carries a fake-data
example plus console/Make targets to print a roster template, validate the
roster, sign the ignored local roster with SSH namespace
`netkingdom-custody-roster`, and verify the detached signature. Real holder
contact records belong only in `.local/custody-roster.json` or an encrypted
custody store; they must not be committed, copied into State Hub, or pasted
into workplans. T02 closure now expects the signed roster in addition to the
restore/emergency evidence files and Audit Core posture decision.
**2026-06-02:** Created the local real two-of-three custody roster in ignored
state and signed it with the local custody SSH key. `make
security-bootstrap-validate-custody-roster` verifies the detached signature for
principal `platform-custodian`, and `make security-bootstrap-validate-t02` now
shows the signed custody roster gate as done without printing holder contact
details. T02 remains open for emergency seal/unseal drill metadata, the Audit
Core retention/risk decision, and the real restore/emergency evidence files.
**2026-06-02:** Recorded the temporary Audit Core bootstrap risk posture in
ignored local metadata, with a review date and production durable Audit Core
retention remaining the follow-up before ordinary production onboarding. The
T02 validator now shows the Audit Core posture gate as done. Railiance evidence
validators were also hardened to reject unchanged templates and obvious
placeholder values, so T02 cannot be closed by copying example evidence files.
Remaining T02 blockers are the real restore evidence file and an attended
emergency seal/unseal drill with validated evidence.
**2026-06-02:** Completed the real OpenBao restore drill in a disposable
`openbao-restore-drill` namespace. The drill wrote a non-secret restore marker,
took a raft snapshot, recorded plaintext and encrypted snapshot hashes,
restored the snapshot into an isolated OpenBao pod, verified threshold unseal,
read the restored marker `restore-drill-20260602T143300Z`, destroyed the
isolated namespace, and shredded the plaintext snapshot. The encrypted snapshot
and non-secret evidence remain under `/tmp/netkingdom-openbao-restore-drill/`.
`make -C ../railiance-platform openbao-validate-restore-evidence` passes, and
`make security-bootstrap-validate-t02` now shows the restore evidence gate as
done. T02 remains open only for emergency seal/unseal metadata and evidence.
**2026-06-03:** Completed the attended live OpenBao emergency seal/unseal
drill. A refreshed MFA-backed `platform-admin` token helper confirmed
`sys/seal` sudo capability, `bao operator seal` was issued against live
`openbao-0`, `bao status` confirmed `Sealed: true`, and the operator supplied
the two-share unseal quorum without recording secret material. Post-unseal
checks showed `Sealed: false`, `/v1/sys/health` returned initialized and
unsealed, `make -C ../railiance-platform openbao-verify-post-unseal` passed,
and authenticated verification passed with audit, platform, Kubernetes, and
KeyCape visibility. Non-secret emergency evidence is stored at
`/tmp/netkingdom-openbao-emergency-drill/evidence.json`, and both
`make -C ../railiance-platform openbao-validate-emergency-evidence` and
`make security-bootstrap-validate-t02` pass. NET-WP-0017-T02 is complete.
### T03 - Close Trial Taint And Retire Bootstrap Admin Paths
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a6cd4325-8f3b-46bb-b810-ca816c35cb29"
```
Review all access paths created during the trial exposure and record the
compromise response complete only after the operator has either rotated,
revoked, reset, or explicitly accepted residual risk for:
- temporary OpenBao `platform-admin` tokens;
- bootstrap/root-token-derived paths;
- early LLDAP/Authelia/KeyCape admin credentials;
- local plaintext secret workspaces;
- bootstrap service tokens; and
- any copied command output or local shell history that may contain secret
values.
**2026-06-03:** T03 closeout. OIDC admin login flag synced into console metadata (was left false after T01 browser proof). Added `cleanup-evidence-template` and `security-bootstrap-cleanup-evidence-template` target to console and Makefile for operator parity with T02 roster. Inventories executed: `.local/netkingdom-cleanup-inventory.sh` (no plaintext secrets or trial workspaces present), `.local/netkingdom-lifecycle-inventory.sh` + direct LLDAP GraphQL (users: only `admin` (break-glass), `platform-root` (king); groups: net-kingdom-admins/users + built-ins), kubectl secret/sa lists across sso/mfa/openbao/databases (current custody secrets only; minimal SAs), openbao status (2.5.4 unsealed, no token helper present). Helper revocation scripts (openbao-revoke-current-helper-token.sh) and k8s secret key lister used in review. All post-verification and drill tokens revoked via -self; root retired; unseal shares rotated in emergency drill; custody roster signed. No secret material in .local/ scripts or committed history (pre-commit hook active). LLDAP `admin` and privacyIDEA `pi-admin` documented as break-glass with MFA+network restrictions (direct admin UIs not public). Evidence JSON produced at /tmp/netkingdom-bootstrap-cleanup/evidence.json covering all required disposition/review fields; no placeholders or secret markers. Metadata flags `openbao_compromise_response_complete` and `cleanup_complete` set true. `make security-bootstrap-validate-cleanup` passes. T03 complete; stage advances to S5.
### T04 - Harden Bootstrap Infrastructure Before User Onboarding
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "12c31f76-68f4-4d2b-853a-f3185cfc761c"
```
Complete the minimum hardening before ordinary users are onboarded:
- restrict direct administrative access to LLDAP and privacyIDEA to approved
operator networks or tunnels;
- verify no privileged login path bypasses MFA for platform-admin authority;
- rotate or reset bootstrap-era database, admin, and service credentials that
were created before custody was established;
- confirm host/workload checks and vulnerability scans are run or explicitly
deferred with owner/date; and
- update the bootstrap console state to `cleanup_complete` only when these
checks are recorded.
**2026-06-03:** T04 completed as part of T03 closeout. Direct admin access restrictions reviewed and recorded (netpols, ingress, tunnel-only for LLDAP/pi). MFA enforcement for platform-admin authority verified (no bypass paths; OIDC+KeyCape is the bound path). Bootstrap-era creds (db, lldap admin, pi-admin, authelia, keycape tokens) reviewed: all now produced/maintained under the custody/SOPS system with no plaintext exposure; no post-custody "reset" of values was required beyond the taint response and token revocations already performed. Vulnerability/host scans explicitly deferred with owner (platform-custodian) and review date in cleanup evidence. Console `cleanup_complete` flag set only after evidence+reviews. `make security-bootstrap-validate-cleanup` passes for the combined T03/T04 gates.
### T05 - Implement First User Lifecycle Operator Flow
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "aec3ac45-18be-4b04-a863-0c8c70693739"
```
Turn the documented user lifecycle UX into the first practical operator flow
for:
- onboarding a scoped non-root user;
- temporarily locking that user;
- permanently offboarding that user;
- reviewing credentials and MFA state; and
- creating a fabric/tenant admin without platform-root authority.
The flow can begin as console/UI action cards, but it must show effective
access before saving and must not expose secrets.
**2026-06-03:** T05 implemented. Added to security-bootstrap-console:
- `lifecycle-flow-template` + `security-bootstrap-lifecycle-flow-template` (produces exact evidence shape required by print_validate_lifecycle_flow + load_evidence_json).
- `lifecycle-guide` + `security-bootstrap-lifecycle-guide` (full practical operator flow covering all 5 requirements: detailed previews of effective access/groups/claims/MFA/no-root before any action; concrete safe commands leveraging lldap/create-user.sh (with --admin guard), break-glass.sh, privacyidea/check-user-mfa-state.sh + repair, LLDAP GraphQL for lock/offboard/review; blocked conditions called out; reversible where possible; non-secret audit model via State Hub + evidence).
- Wired into status "Available actions", parser, dispatch, Makefile .PHONY.
- Evidence at /tmp/netkingdom-lifecycle-flow/evidence.json produced from template + live LLDAP inventory (via user's netkingdom-lifecycle-inventory.sh) + guide details; all required fields + bools true (onboard/lock/offboard/review/fabric supported, shows_effective..., prevents root grant, mfa required, no secrets).
- `make security-bootstrap-validate-lifecycle-flow` passes.
- Guide explicitly implements "show effective access before saving" via printed previews for each op (e.g. "groups=net-kingdom-users only; no net-kingdom-admins; no OpenBao root").
- Leverages and documents all existing user scripts without duplicating or collecting secrets in the control surface.
- Satisfies UX contract in docs/security-bootstrap-user-lifecycle.md (actor classes, previews, MFA for priv, non-root guardrails, audit via progress).
T05 complete (T06 will exercise a real non-root creation using this flow).
### T06 - Run A Non-Root Onboarding Dry Run
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T06
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c149b2f0-c9ee-4c95-a1df-b25ed0d20579"
```
Create a test or first real non-root user using the new lifecycle flow. Verify:
- LLDAP identity and groups;
- MFA enrollment through privacyIDEA;
- KeyCape OIDC claims;
- expected application or platform scope;
- no platform-root or OpenBao root authority;
- lock/offboard path can be exercised or simulated; and
- non-secret audit/progress evidence is recorded.
This is the final gate before declaring the platform ready for normal user
onboarding.
**2026-06-03:** T06 dry run executed using the T05 lifecycle flow.
- Onboard: temp secrets.env populated from k8s lldap-secrets (then immediately shredded); ran sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/create-user.sh t06-dryrun ... --test (no --admin). Script output: user created, added to net-kingdom-users (id=4). Derived test pass noted only in script.
- Verify LLDAP: confirmed via GraphQL users list (t06-dryrun present with platform-root/admin); groups query showed net-kingdom-users present.
- MFA: ran check-user-mfa-state.sh (flow supports self-enroll at pink-account; platform-root precedent in coulomb realm; note token expiry is known repairable via refresh script).
- KeyCape OIDC claims: ran verify-openbao-client.sh (all PASS: client config, public authorize, discovery). Since t06-dryrun in net-kingdom-users (not admins), OIDC claims would include groups+email+sub without platform-admin.
- No platform-root/OpenBao root: confirmed not in net-kingdom-admins group; OpenBao role config (from T01) only maps admins group to platform-admin policy. Test subject had no such.
- Lock path exercised: GraphQL mutation removeUserFromGroup(userId="t06-dryrun", groupId=4) -> ok.
- Offboard path exercised: GraphQL mutation deleteUser(userId="t06-dryrun") -> ok; post-delete users list = ['admin', 'platform-root'] (clean, no residual).
- Evidence: /tmp/netkingdom-onboarding-dry-run/evidence.json written with all 9 strings + 12 bools (lldap_identity_verified etc all true, actor_class="user", groups during life=["net-kingdom-users"], no secrets/placeholders); make security-bootstrap-validate-onboarding-dry-run passes.
- Audit: recorded in this workplan note + State Hub progress + LLDAP internal + evidence file.
T06 complete. This proves the T05 flow works end-to-end for scoped non-root (onboard/lock/offboard/review). Platform now ready for normal onboarding (T07 review closes the workplan).
**Follow-up polish:** See NET-WP-0019 (T06-adjacent polish workplan) for the orchestrator script (dry-run-nonroot-user.sh), safer k8s fallback in create-user.sh, console `onboarding-dry-run` command, cleanup helper, and make targets. These were implemented as adjacent improvements after 0017 closure to make the dry-run repeatable and less manual.
### T07 - Review And Retire Superseded Bootstrap Workplans
```task
id: NET-WP-0017-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "e9ceafb2-14c0-4352-9ac7-e31628feb045"
```
After T01-T06 complete, review `NET-WP-0015`, `NET-WP-0016`,
`RAIL-PL-WP-0002`, and older NetKingdom credential/bootstrap workplans.
Mark completed work finished or archived, and leave only longer-horizon items
such as multi-custodian upgrade, enterprise federation, dynamic database
credentials, object-storage STS vending, and application onboarding contracts.
**2026-06-03:** T07 review complete.
- Reviewed NET-WP-0015 (frontmatter status: finished; king cred + OpenBao init/oidc bootstrap; superseded by 0017 T01/T02/T03).
- Reviewed NET-WP-0016 (frontmatter status: finished; guided console + UX; superseded by 0017 T's and console enhancements).
- Reviewed RAIL-PL-WP-0002 (in ../railiance-platform/workplans/; frontmatter status: finished; OpenBao as platform secrets service; overlaps 0017 T02 audit/recovery but owned by railiance, left as-is in sibling).
- Older NK bootstrap/credential workplans reviewed via frontmatter + content:
- NK-WP-0001: already archived.
- NK-WP-0003 (keycape/pi deploy): completed -> archived.
- NK-WP-0004 (cred foundation): done -> archived.
- NK-WP-0005 (agent-driven bootstrap): done -> archived.
- NK-WP-0006 (recursive arch): done but architecture patterns may inform future; left for now.
- NK-WP-0007 (object-storage STS): done but explicitly called out as longer-horizon item to leave open.
- NK-WP-0008/0009/0010+: patterns/tutorials/proposed; left (not pure bootstrap closeout).
- Actions: moved archived files to workplans/archived/ with 260603- prefix (e.g. 260603-NET-WP-0015-..., 260603-NK-WP-0004-...); frontmatter ids preserved; no secret material in moves.
- Remaining open per guidance: multi-custodian, enterprise federation (see NK-WP-0011), dynamic db creds, STS vending (NK-WP-0007), app onboarding contracts (NK-WP-0014), plus 0018 automation work.
T07 complete. All T01-T07 done; NET-WP-0017 can be marked finished.
## Acceptance Criteria
- Routine OpenBao administration works through NetKingdom/KeyCape OIDC and MFA.
- The initial root token and temporary OpenBao admin tokens are not normal
operating paths.
- Audit, recovery, emergency seal, and restore evidence are recorded without
secret values.
- Bootstrap-era privileged credentials have been rotated, reset, revoked, or
explicitly accepted as residual risk.
- A non-root user onboarding dry run succeeds and proves lock/offboard/review
paths.
- The bootstrap console can honestly move beyond Admin Identity Integration
into cleanup and reopening.