Split OpenBao admin identity tasks

This commit is contained in:
2026-05-26 02:13:55 +02:00
parent 9dc7e140b8
commit f3c8d70270
5 changed files with 292 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ initial-root-token taint clears after the exposed OpenBao root token is
revoked. Downstream work remains visibly tainted until derived access paths
are reviewed and the compromise response is explicitly recorded complete.
**2026-05-26:** Split Admin Identity Integration into development-owned
configuration and operator-owned integration work. The `openbao-admin` KeyCape
client is now code-defined in `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh`, while
the UI action cards only ask the operator to apply live KeyCape config,
configure OpenBao with a protected token prompt, and verify MFA-backed login.
**2026-05-24:** Stepped back from ad hoc secret rollout and added the
custodian age-key bootstrap model to the control surface. The UI now records
the custodian public age recipient, a derived fingerprint, and a non-secret