--- id: NET-WP-0015 type: workplan title: "King Credential And OpenBao Identity Bootstrap" domain: netkingdom repo: net-kingdom status: active owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-05-24" updated: "2026-05-24" depends_on: - NK-WP-0006 - NK-WP-0012 state_hub_workstream_id: "6b9c25e4-1008-429a-8de6-54361872c0dd" --- # NET-WP-0015 - King Credential And OpenBao Identity Bootstrap ## Goal Define and execute the first safe bridge between low-trust setup operations, a dedicated king credential, NetKingdom identity, and Railiance OpenBao bootstrap. The revised decision is that `tegwick` / `bernd.worsch@gmail.com` is the initial accountable setup operator and notification contact, not the long-term platform root of trust. The actual platform-root authority should move to a separate king credential before OpenBao becomes live secret custody. ## Context Railiance owns OpenBao deployment and operations. NetKingdom owns the identity, custody, and security semantics that say who can administer the platform and how that authority transitions from bootstrap material into normal IAM claims. The platform is still in MVP/prototype bootstrap. That means early databases, admin accounts, tokens, and access paths must be treated as potentially contaminated by convenience. The platform should be assembled in low-trust mode, then handed over to the king credential, reset/rotated, checked, and reopened under explicit custody. ## Scope In scope: - record the setup operator/contact identity; - define the separate king credential target; - define the temporary single-operator king custody exception; - specify target NetKingdom IAM claims for the first admin identity; - coordinate the OpenBao initialization prerequisites with Railiance; - define the transition from OpenBao root token to scoped admin access; and - add follow-up gates for independent escrow, OIDC/JWT admin auth, reset/rotation, scan checks, and restore verification. Out of scope: - storing any secret material in this repo; - running `bao operator init` from an unattended agent session; - deploying key-cape, Keycloak, privacyIDEA, or OpenBao itself; and - granting tenant administrators platform-root authority. ## Tasks ### T01 - Record Setup Operator And King Credential Model ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T01 status: done priority: high state_hub_task_id: "60659e25-fed1-478e-b8a3-4bc7b2f3846b" ``` Record `tegwick` / `bernd.worsch@gmail.com` / Gitea `tegwick` as the initial setup operator and contact. Define the separate king credential as the actual platform-root target. **2026-05-24:** Added `docs/platform-root-custody.md` and updated `docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md` plus `SCOPE.md`. **2026-05-24:** Revised the custody model: `tegwick` is no longer modeled as the platform root of trust. The day-to-day account can assemble and observe the platform, while a dedicated king credential receives final custody after the guided bootstrap path is ready. ### T02 - Define King Credential Kit ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T02 status: done priority: high state_hub_task_id: "1a1c45a2-be66-4667-89f8-581f4fe9970b" ``` Define the first king credential kit: dedicated identity name, local/offline password-safe storage, second factor, recovery-code handling, no email secret transfer, no day-to-day browsing/Git use, and operator instructions clear enough for a non-expert. **2026-05-24:** Defined the v1 kit in `docs/security-bootstrap-king-credential-kit.md`: label `platform-root`, setup operator/contact `tegwick`, notification-only email `bernd.worsch@gmail.com`, local password safe plus offline custody packet, TOTP/WebAuthn/hardware-token second factor, no day-to-day use, and no email or Git secret transfer. Added `examples/security-bootstrap/king-credential-metadata.example.json` plus console validation for non-secret kit metadata. Custody-mode approval remains blocked under T03. ### T03 - Approve King Custody Mode ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T03 status: blocked priority: high state_hub_task_id: "56a6266a-4acd-41e6-a395-85e90a5c35c6" ``` Choose either the preferred independent two-of-three king custody model or an explicit temporary single-operator king credential exception for pre-production bootstrap. Do not run OpenBao initialization until this choice is recorded. **2026-05-24:** Added local approval surfaces for this human gate: `approve-custody-mode` for the CLI and `web-ui` for the localhost console. Both write non-secret metadata only and keep live OpenBao initialization as a separate attended ceremony. Current recommended approval mode is `temporary-single-king`; `two-of-three-planned` records the target state but does not unblock live init. **2026-05-24:** Tightened MFA handling after review: a TOTP QR code or setup key must come from the authority that will verify login, not from the local metadata console. Custody approval now requires explicit non-secret confirmation that the factor was enrolled with its real verifier. **2026-05-24:** Clarified credential placement in the UI and custody docs: the dedicated king account currently belongs in the lightweight NetKingdom identity path (LLDAP user, Authelia login, privacyIDEA MFA, KeyCape OIDC). OpenBao is the secrets/audit/admin-policy custody service after the ceremony, not the place where the human password or OTP seed lives. **2026-05-24:** Expanded the local UI toward a NetKingdom control surface: the bootstrap flow now has action buttons for LLDAP, privacyIDEA, and KeyCape, plus non-secret progress saving for account creation, MFA enrollment, OIDC verification, and custody approval. **2026-05-24:** Clarified the LLDAP first-user path in the UI and docs: LLDAP has no registration flow; the operator logs in as bootstrap `admin` using `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` from `net-kingdom/LLDAP/admin`, then creates the dedicated `platform-root` or `king` account and assigns the current lightweight admin group. **2026-05-24:** Added explicit non-secret UI confirmations for the account having been created, assigned to `net-kingdom-admins`, stored in the password safe/offline packet, and later verified through the login path. Automated LLDAP detection is deferred because it would require authenticated access to LLDAP and should be built as an audited integration. **2026-05-24:** Improved the KeyCape login-check path: the local bootstrap UI now acts as the `demo-app` OIDC callback, exposes `/oidc/start` and `/oidc/callback`, and adds hover-help text to the external action buttons. The live KeyCape rollout still needs the updated `keycape-config` Secret applied from decrypted `sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets/` inputs. If the browser flow reaches Authelia but never presents an OTP challenge, KeyCape needs a browser MFA prompt surface before this gate can be marked verified. **2026-05-24:** Filed `KEY-WP-0003` in the KeyCape repo for the current OIDC verification blocker. The immediate error `redirect_uri does not match any registered URI` means the local bootstrap callback is not yet registered in live KeyCape. The follow-up KeyCape work also covers the browser OTP challenge needed after Authelia password login. **2026-05-24:** Implemented `KEY-WP-0003` in source. KeyCape now supports a dedicated `netkingdom-bootstrap-console` client, split browser/server Authelia URLs, and a browser OTP challenge before issuing the final OIDC code. The local control surface now uses that dedicated client. Live verification remains pending until the updated KeyCape image and regenerated `keycape-config` Secret are rolled out. **2026-05-24:** Rolled the fix to the public Railiance SSO host (`kc.coulomb.social`, currently resolving to `railiance01`). The live `keycape-config` Secret was patched without printing or rotating secret values, the `main-1d68639` KeyCape image was direct-imported into k3s, and the deployment was set to `IfNotPresent`. Public `/authorize` now accepts `netkingdom-bootstrap-console` and redirects to `https://auth.coulomb.social/...`. Follow-up: clean up the Gitea HTTP registry push/pull path so direct image import is no longer needed. **2026-05-24:** Fixed the next live login failure before OTP: Authelia rejected KeyCape's token exchange because the upstream `keycape` client only permits `client_secret_basic`, while KeyCape was sending `client_secret_post`. KeyCape commit `56d279a` now uses HTTP Basic auth for the upstream token exchange, the image `main-56d279a` was direct-imported into Railiance k3s, and the live deployment runs that tag. **2026-05-24:** Fixed the follow-up `mfa check error`. Live privacyIDEA validation succeeds in the `coulomb` realm, while KeyCape had been configured for `netkingdom` and was also trying to pre-list tokens with an expired or invalid privacyIDEA admin JWT. KeyCape commit `937cb39` adds bootstrap mode `privacyidea.requireForAll`, which requires OTP for every authenticated user without depending on token-list admin credentials. The live `keycape-config` now uses `realm: coulomb` and `requireForAll: true`, and Railiance runs image `main-937cb39`. **2026-05-25:** Fixed the subsequent token-exchange `user not found` error. Live LLDAP stores users under `ou=people`, while KeyCape's default lookup base was `ou=users`. KeyCape commit `06d20c3` makes the LLDAP OU settings explicit in YAML, live `keycape-config` now sets `userOU: ou=people` and `groupOU: ou=groups`, and Railiance runs image `main-06d20c3`. **2026-05-24:** Stepped back from ad hoc secret rollout and added the custodian age-key bootstrap model to the control surface. The UI now records the custodian public age recipient, a derived fingerprint, and a non-secret private-key custody reference while refusing to treat the private key as normal metadata. It also detects encrypted bootstrap bundle presence and plaintext `sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets/` exposure. This is the intended foundation for trial-mode, custody-mode, unlock/apply, and later OpenBao handover flows. ### T04 - Complete Railiance OpenBao Bootstrap Ceremony ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T04 status: blocked priority: high state_hub_task_id: "2102366e-064b-4071-8b6a-574d9d37d109" ``` Coordinate with `RAIL-PL-WP-0002-T03` to initialize and unseal OpenBao under the king credential model, enable audit and the first mounts/policies, create a non-root `platform-admin` access path, and revoke or offline-escrow the initial root token. ### T05 - Provision First NetKingdom Admin Identity ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T05 status: todo priority: high state_hub_task_id: "d2a81d7b-9964-4bd5-9b8c-ef1324e02cd4" ``` Provision the first king/admin identity in the selected NetKingdom IAM implementation. The target claims are `tenant=platform`, `principal_type=human` or `break_glass`, MFA-backed assurance, and groups/roles for `platform-root`, `platform-admin`, `netkingdom-admin`, and `railiance-platform-admin`. `tegwick` may receive delegated day-to-day admin roles later, but must be revocable without losing root custody. ### T06 - Bind OpenBao Admin Auth To NetKingdom IAM ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T06 status: todo priority: medium state_hub_task_id: "ef97f3cb-9792-4b9d-bd2b-8871d368a50f" ``` Replace temporary operator tokens with NetKingdom IAM-backed OpenBao admin auth when the issuer and claim mapping are ready. The OpenBao root token must not be the normal admin path. ### T07 - Verify Recovery, Audit, And Rotation ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T07 status: todo priority: medium state_hub_task_id: "aa40cbb4-36d3-405d-b59d-0c21ae8c9539" ``` Confirm snapshot/restore drill, durable audit-log handling, root-token disposition, unseal/recovery rotation expectations, and the follow-up owner for adding at least one additional human escrow holder. ### T08 - Reset, Rotate, And Reopen Under King Oversight ```task id: NET-WP-0015-T08 status: todo priority: high state_hub_task_id: "e6a60dca-547b-4493-a36c-f6b668d1bf52" ``` After the king credential accepts custody, reset or rotate bootstrap-era database credentials, admin passwords, service tokens, OpenBao tokens, and temporary access paths. Run host/workload checks and reopen the platform only after the new custody state is verified. ## Acceptance Criteria - The setup operator and king credential model are recorded without secret values. - The custody mode is explicit before OpenBao initialization. - OpenBao root-token use is limited to bootstrap or break-glass handling. - Routine admin access has a non-root path and a target NetKingdom IAM path. - Production readiness has a clear gate for independent escrow, audit, restore, reset/rotation, and reopening under king oversight.