11 KiB
id, type, title, domain, repo, status, owner, topic_slug, created, updated, depends_on, state_hub_workstream_id
| id | type | title | domain | repo | status | owner | topic_slug | created | updated | depends_on | state_hub_workstream_id | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NET-WP-0015 | workplan | King Credential And OpenBao Identity Bootstrap | netkingdom | net-kingdom | active | codex | netkingdom | 2026-05-24 | 2026-05-24 |
|
6b9c25e4-1008-429a-8de6-54361872c0dd |
NET-WP-0015 - King Credential And OpenBao Identity Bootstrap
Goal
Define and execute the first safe bridge between low-trust setup operations, a dedicated king credential, NetKingdom identity, and Railiance OpenBao bootstrap.
The revised decision is that tegwick / bernd.worsch@gmail.com is the
initial accountable setup operator and notification contact, not the long-term
platform root of trust. The actual platform-root authority should move to a
separate king credential before OpenBao becomes live secret custody.
Context
Railiance owns OpenBao deployment and operations. NetKingdom owns the identity, custody, and security semantics that say who can administer the platform and how that authority transitions from bootstrap material into normal IAM claims.
The platform is still in MVP/prototype bootstrap. That means early databases, admin accounts, tokens, and access paths must be treated as potentially contaminated by convenience. The platform should be assembled in low-trust mode, then handed over to the king credential, reset/rotated, checked, and reopened under explicit custody.
Scope
In scope:
- record the setup operator/contact identity;
- define the separate king credential target;
- define the temporary single-operator king custody exception;
- specify target NetKingdom IAM claims for the first admin identity;
- coordinate the OpenBao initialization prerequisites with Railiance;
- define the transition from OpenBao root token to scoped admin access; and
- add follow-up gates for independent escrow, OIDC/JWT admin auth, reset/rotation, scan checks, and restore verification.
Out of scope:
- storing any secret material in this repo;
- running
bao operator initfrom an unattended agent session; - deploying key-cape, Keycloak, privacyIDEA, or OpenBao itself; and
- granting tenant administrators platform-root authority.
Tasks
T01 - Record Setup Operator And King Credential Model
id: NET-WP-0015-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "60659e25-fed1-478e-b8a3-4bc7b2f3846b"
Record tegwick / bernd.worsch@gmail.com / Gitea tegwick as the initial
setup operator and contact. Define the separate king credential as the actual
platform-root target.
2026-05-24: Added docs/platform-root-custody.md and updated
docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md plus SCOPE.md.
2026-05-24: Revised the custody model: tegwick is no longer modeled as
the platform root of trust. The day-to-day account can assemble and observe the
platform, while a dedicated king credential receives final custody after the
guided bootstrap path is ready.
T02 - Define King Credential Kit
id: NET-WP-0015-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1a1c45a2-be66-4667-89f8-581f4fe9970b"
Define the first king credential kit: dedicated identity name, local/offline password-safe storage, second factor, recovery-code handling, no email secret transfer, no day-to-day browsing/Git use, and operator instructions clear enough for a non-expert.
2026-05-24: Defined the v1 kit in
docs/security-bootstrap-king-credential-kit.md: label platform-root, setup
operator/contact tegwick, notification-only email
bernd.worsch@gmail.com, local password safe plus offline custody packet,
TOTP/WebAuthn/hardware-token second factor, no day-to-day use, and no email or
Git secret transfer. Added
examples/security-bootstrap/king-credential-metadata.example.json plus
console validation for non-secret kit metadata. Custody-mode approval remains
blocked under T03.
T03 - Approve King Custody Mode
id: NET-WP-0015-T03
status: blocked
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "56a6266a-4acd-41e6-a395-85e90a5c35c6"
Choose either the preferred independent two-of-three king custody model or an explicit temporary single-operator king credential exception for pre-production bootstrap. Do not run OpenBao initialization until this choice is recorded.
2026-05-24: Added local approval surfaces for this human gate:
approve-custody-mode for the CLI and web-ui for the localhost console.
Both write non-secret metadata only and keep live OpenBao initialization as a
separate attended ceremony. Current recommended approval mode is
temporary-single-king; two-of-three-planned records the target state but
does not unblock live init.
2026-05-24: Tightened MFA handling after review: a TOTP QR code or setup key must come from the authority that will verify login, not from the local metadata console. Custody approval now requires explicit non-secret confirmation that the factor was enrolled with its real verifier.
2026-05-24: Clarified credential placement in the UI and custody docs: the dedicated king account currently belongs in the lightweight NetKingdom identity path (LLDAP user, Authelia login, privacyIDEA MFA, KeyCape OIDC). OpenBao is the secrets/audit/admin-policy custody service after the ceremony, not the place where the human password or OTP seed lives.
2026-05-24: Expanded the local UI toward a NetKingdom control surface: the bootstrap flow now has action buttons for LLDAP, privacyIDEA, and KeyCape, plus non-secret progress saving for account creation, MFA enrollment, OIDC verification, and custody approval.
2026-05-24: Clarified the LLDAP first-user path in the UI and docs:
LLDAP has no registration flow; the operator logs in as bootstrap admin
using LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS from net-kingdom/LLDAP/admin, then creates the
dedicated platform-root or king account and assigns the current lightweight
admin group.
2026-05-24: Added explicit non-secret UI confirmations for the account
having been created, assigned to net-kingdom-admins, stored in the password
safe/offline packet, and later verified through the login path. Automated
LLDAP detection is deferred because it would require authenticated access to
LLDAP and should be built as an audited integration.
2026-05-24: Improved the KeyCape login-check path: the local bootstrap UI
now acts as the demo-app OIDC callback, exposes /oidc/start and
/oidc/callback, and adds hover-help text to the external action buttons.
The live KeyCape rollout still needs the updated keycape-config Secret
applied from decrypted sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets/ inputs. If the browser
flow reaches Authelia but never presents an OTP challenge, KeyCape needs a
browser MFA prompt surface before this gate can be marked verified.
2026-05-24: Filed KEY-WP-0003 in the KeyCape repo for the current OIDC
verification blocker. The immediate error
redirect_uri does not match any registered URI means the local bootstrap
callback is not yet registered in live KeyCape. The follow-up KeyCape work also
covers the browser OTP challenge needed after Authelia password login.
2026-05-24: Implemented KEY-WP-0003 in source. KeyCape now supports a
dedicated netkingdom-bootstrap-console client, split browser/server Authelia
URLs, and a browser OTP challenge before issuing the final OIDC code. The local
control surface now uses that dedicated client. Live verification remains
pending until the updated KeyCape image and regenerated keycape-config Secret
are rolled out.
2026-05-24: Rolled the fix to the public Railiance SSO host
(kc.coulomb.social, currently resolving to railiance01). The live
keycape-config Secret was patched without printing or rotating secret values,
the main-1d68639 KeyCape image was direct-imported into k3s, and the
deployment was set to IfNotPresent. Public /authorize now accepts
netkingdom-bootstrap-console and redirects to
https://auth.coulomb.social/.... Follow-up: clean up the Gitea HTTP registry
push/pull path so direct image import is no longer needed.
2026-05-24: Fixed the next live login failure before OTP: Authelia rejected
KeyCape's token exchange because the upstream keycape client only permits
client_secret_basic, while KeyCape was sending client_secret_post. KeyCape
commit 56d279a now uses HTTP Basic auth for the upstream token exchange, the
image main-56d279a was direct-imported into Railiance k3s, and the live
deployment runs that tag.
2026-05-24: Stepped back from ad hoc secret rollout and added the
custodian age-key bootstrap model to the control surface. The UI now records
the custodian public age recipient, a derived fingerprint, and a non-secret
private-key custody reference while refusing to treat the private key as normal
metadata. It also detects encrypted bootstrap bundle presence and plaintext
sso-mfa/bootstrap/secrets/ exposure. This is the intended foundation for
trial-mode, custody-mode, unlock/apply, and later OpenBao handover flows.
T04 - Complete Railiance OpenBao Bootstrap Ceremony
id: NET-WP-0015-T04
status: blocked
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "2102366e-064b-4071-8b6a-574d9d37d109"
Coordinate with RAIL-PL-WP-0002-T03 to initialize and unseal OpenBao under
the king credential model, enable audit and the first mounts/policies, create a
non-root platform-admin access path, and revoke or offline-escrow the initial
root token.
T05 - Provision First NetKingdom Admin Identity
id: NET-WP-0015-T05
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d2a81d7b-9964-4bd5-9b8c-ef1324e02cd4"
Provision the first king/admin identity in the selected NetKingdom IAM
implementation. The target claims are tenant=platform,
principal_type=human or break_glass, MFA-backed assurance, and groups/roles
for platform-root, platform-admin, netkingdom-admin, and
railiance-platform-admin. tegwick may receive delegated day-to-day admin
roles later, but must be revocable without losing root custody.
T06 - Bind OpenBao Admin Auth To NetKingdom IAM
id: NET-WP-0015-T06
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "ef97f3cb-9792-4b9d-bd2b-8871d368a50f"
Replace temporary operator tokens with NetKingdom IAM-backed OpenBao admin auth when the issuer and claim mapping are ready. The OpenBao root token must not be the normal admin path.
T07 - Verify Recovery, Audit, And Rotation
id: NET-WP-0015-T07
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "aa40cbb4-36d3-405d-b59d-0c21ae8c9539"
Confirm snapshot/restore drill, durable audit-log handling, root-token disposition, unseal/recovery rotation expectations, and the follow-up owner for adding at least one additional human escrow holder.
T08 - Reset, Rotate, And Reopen Under King Oversight
id: NET-WP-0015-T08
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e6a60dca-547b-4493-a36c-f6b668d1bf52"
After the king credential accepts custody, reset or rotate bootstrap-era database credentials, admin passwords, service tokens, OpenBao tokens, and temporary access paths. Run host/workload checks and reopen the platform only after the new custody state is verified.
Acceptance Criteria
- The setup operator and king credential model are recorded without secret values.
- The custody mode is explicit before OpenBao initialization.
- OpenBao root-token use is limited to bootstrap or break-glass handling.
- Routine admin access has a non-root path and a target NetKingdom IAM path.
- Production readiness has a clear gate for independent escrow, audit, restore, reset/rotation, and reopening under king oversight.