Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
1c3d1b4d52 feat(WARDEN-WP-0014): T4 — key-cape login orchestration lane
Adds a lane: secret|login field to RouteEntry. The login lane is an
interactive auth bootstrap: it skips the caller-auth precheck (no token
yet — that's the point) and the secret-read gate (it establishes the
identity the gate needs), runs the owner's login command interactively
as the caller via inherited stdio, and rejects --exec. The token stays
in the caller's own store; warden never captures it (G2 holds). Audited
as action: login. key-cape-oidc-login populated as the reference login
entry. Advisory proxy hint updated now that T3 has shipped.

172 passed, lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 17:31:55 +02:00
6dfa69e310 feat(WARDEN-WP-0014): T3 — OpenBao proxy lane (--fetch / --exec)
Adds transparent, policy-gated, audited proxy of a non-SSH credential
through `warden access`, for exec_capable lanes. Three guardrails in code:

- G1 caller identity: runs the owner's tool with the caller's own env;
  warden injects no token of its own (caller_auth_present check).
- G2 transit-only: --fetch inherits stdout (never PIPE) so the value
  never enters warden's memory or any log; --exec injects into the child
  env only. Audit (access-audit.log) is metadata-only.
- G3 policy gate: check_fetch_policy runs before any fetch; with
  policy.enabled=false the proxy refuses unless --no-policy is given.

resolve_fetch_command refuses unresolved <…> placeholders rather than
guess owner-side names. New warden/proxy.py + policy.check_fetch_policy;
tests/test_proxy.py asserts all three guardrails. 168 passed, lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 16:26:03 +02:00