Add unified metadata-only audit.jsonl with secret-material guard, instrument sign/access/worker paths, and expose warden activity CLI. Surface broker hint when VAULT_TOKEN is unset, refresh INTENT/SCOPE docs, and add production integration checklists plus catalog lane promotion playbook.
4.5 KiB
id, type, title, domain, repo, status, owner, topic_slug, planning_priority, planning_order, created, updated, state_hub_workstream_id
| id | type | title | domain | repo | status | owner | topic_slug | planning_priority | planning_order | created | updated | state_hub_workstream_id |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WARDEN-WP-0022 | workplan | Audit trail + `warden activity` — one place to see what ops-warden did | infotech | ops-warden | finished | claude | custodian | high | 22 | 2026-07-01 | 2026-07-01 | fc8afa28-68a7-4250-a19e-9754829f0cd5 |
WARDEN-WP-0022 — Audit trail + warden activity
Problem: ops-warden's actions are recorded in scattered places — signatures.log
access-audit.log, the systemd journal (worker ticks), and
State Hub progress notes (the narrative). There is no single, structured audit trail
and no one command to answer "what did ops-warden do in the last N days?". For a security
steward, a coherent, metadata-only audit record is table stakes.
Goal: a unified, append-only audit log that captures every ops-warden action with a
common shape (never a secret value), and a single warden activity command to read it.
Non-negotiable (this is a security tool's audit): the audit record holds metadata
only — actor/subject, action, target/path id, decision id, TTL, outcome, timestamp — and
never a token, key, cert body, or other secret. A secret-material guard rejects any
event field that looks like a value (mirrors the catalog _assert_no_secret_material).
Posture: read/append-only, in-boundary (local logs + optional hub read). Tamper-evident hash-chaining is noted as an optional hardening for when the ecosystem reaches testing.
Relates to: WP-0014 (access-audit.log), the SSH lane (signatures.log), WP-0020/0021
(the worker). Linger is now enabled (worker survives logout); full logged-out value also
needs the State Hub + tunnels to be login-independent (State Hub → railiance01,
cust-wp-0011).
Tasks
T1 — Unified audit event log
id: WARDEN-WP-0022-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "7f8f768a-4c62-4096-bad8-912cea0f35a7"
src/warden/audit.py: append-only JSONL atstate_dir/audit.jsonl. Common event schema —ts,kind(sign|access|worker),action,subject,target,decision_id,outcome,source.record_event(**meta)with a secret-material guard (reject token prefixes / high-entropy runs) so no value can ever land here.read_events(*, since, kinds)for the reader.- Log rotation / bound (size or age) so it stays manageable.
T2 — Instrument the actions
id: WARDEN-WP-0022-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e7ae4037-ca79-4557-81f0-bfb8478ff647"
- Emit an audit event from each ops-warden action:
warden sign(cert issued — actor, type, ttl, backend, policy_decision_id),warden access --fetch/--exec(proxy — need id, owner, decision id), and the worker (approve→ reply sent to X; tick → triage summary N/drafted/escalated). Fold the existingsignatures.log/access-audit.login as sources (keep back-compat; don't drop a record). - Assert no secret value reaches the audit in any path (tests).
T3 — warden activity command
id: WARDEN-WP-0022-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4439bdd8-1461-47df-8b0b-048df7384a68"
warden activity [--days N] [--kind sign|access|worker] [--json] [--hub]— a single chronological view merging the audit log (and, for back-compat,signatures.log/access-audit.log);--hubalso pulls recent ops-warden State Hub progress notes for the narrative. Human table by default; stable--jsonfor agents.
T4 — Tests, runbook, SCOPE
id: WARDEN-WP-0022-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "bdfb8703-7a79-43e7-913b-19d61722f164"
- Tests: audit append/read/rotation, the secret-material guard rejects values, the
instrumented actions emit events,
warden activityfiltering +--jsonshape. wiki/AuditTrail.md(what's recorded, the no-secret guarantee, how to query, the linger + login-independence note). SCOPE entry.
Acceptance
- Every ops-warden action (sign, access proxy, worker send/tick) appends a metadata-only audit event; the secret-material guard is proven to reject values.
warden activity --days 3answers "what did ops-warden do" in one command;--jsongives agents a stable shape.- No secret value appears in the audit log, ever.
See also
WARDEN-WP-0014(access-audit.log),WARDEN-WP-0020/0021(the worker)wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md(the metadata-only audit principle)wiki/AuditTrail.md