diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 8575158..960e51c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Key contracts:
 
 - `docs/initial-operating-contracts.md`
 - `docs/ci-runner-actions-gitops-ownership.md`
+- `docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`
 - `docs/gitea-container-registry.md`
 - `docs/gitea-package-registry.md`
 
diff --git a/SCOPE.md b/SCOPE.md
index 73ac072..bfff64c 100644
--- a/SCOPE.md
+++ b/SCOPE.md
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Deploy-capable Gitea Helm/SOPS/manifests also live here now; `railiance-apps`
 keeps only transitional compatibility wrappers for old operator entry points.
 The runner, Actions, and GitOps ownership contract lives in
 `docs/ci-runner-actions-gitops-ownership.md`.
+The backup, restore, and secret custody handoff contract lives in
+`docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -178,7 +180,9 @@ Known starting point:
    `docs/gitea-package-registry.md`.
 6. For runner, Actions, and GitOps ownership, read
    `docs/ci-runner-actions-gitops-ownership.md`.
-7. For migration context, read
+7. For backup, restore, and secret custody handoffs, read
+   `docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`.
+8. For migration context, read
    `/home/worsch/railiance-apps/workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0006-railiance-forge-extraction.md`.
 
 ---
diff --git a/docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md b/docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2573da8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+# Backup, Restore, And Secret Handoff
+
+Last reviewed: 2026-06-05
+
+Status: contract v1. This document defines ownership, evidence gates, and
+allowed references. It does not authorize a live backup job, restore drill,
+secret rotation, OpenBao policy change, or credential migration.
+
+## Purpose
+
+Forge data is operationally important, but the mechanisms that make data
+durable belong mostly below the forge layer. This contract states what
+`railiance-forge` owns, what `railiance-platform` implements, and what evidence
+S5 application releases can trust without taking custody of forge secrets.
+
+## Boundary Summary
+
+- `railiance-forge` owns the inventory of forge data, artifact restore
+  requirements, retention posture, operator runbooks, and non-secret evidence
+  that downstream consumers cite.
+- `railiance-platform` owns shared database, object-storage, backup/restore,
+  OpenBao, policy, audit, and runtime secret-delivery mechanisms.
+- `railiance-cluster` owns cluster-level recovery primitives such as etcd,
+  kubeconfig, node/runtime recovery, and cluster add-ons.
+- `railiance-apps` consumes published artifacts and restore evidence in app
+  runbooks; it does not own package blobs, registry credentials, runner tokens,
+  or forge database backups.
+- Source repos own source code, build definitions, package metadata, and image
+  build definitions.
+
+## Protected Asset Inventory
+
+| Asset | Current anchor | Forge responsibility | Platform/lower-layer responsibility | Trust gate |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Gitea application database | CNPG cluster `databases/gitea-db`, checked by `make gitea-status` | State what must be restorable and what forge checks prove after restore | CNPG backup/restore implementation and database recovery mechanisms | Restored database must support login, repo list, package metadata, and registry metadata checks |
+| Gitea shared storage | PVC `default/gitea-shared-storage`, mounted at `/data`; package blobs under `/data/packages` | Track package/blob growth, retention posture, and restore requirements | Durable volume backup, object-storage export, or future storage replication | Restored storage must support Git clone, package download/install, and container pull checks |
+| Source repositories and forge app state | Gitea database plus `/data` storage | Define restore drill scope and consumer evidence | Database/PVC/object-storage restore tooling | Non-production restore drill proves a known repo can be cloned after restore |
+| Container and Python package registry data | Package blobs under `/data/packages`; metadata in Gitea database | Define retention, cleanup, package evidence, and consumer verification gates | Durable backup of blobs and metadata | Known image/package can be pulled or installed after restore |
+| Runner registration and labels | Forge-owned runner substrate | Inventory labels, runner purpose, and replacement expectations | Secret delivery for runner tokens where OpenBao or platform policies apply | Replacement runner can run a sample job with the same semantic labels |
+| SOPS-encrypted Gitea values | `helm/gitea-values.sops.yaml` | Keep encrypted deploy input and sentinel check | SOPS/age bootstrap custody remains outside runtime secret delivery | `make check-sops` proves authorized decryption without storing plaintext |
+| Runtime secrets | Kubernetes Secrets, OpenBao paths, operator custody paths | Reference names and required purposes only | OpenBao paths, policy, audit, break-glass, and workload secret delivery | Platform OpenBao restore/audit evidence exists before production-trust use |
+| Artifact evidence | Forge docs, future artifact-store package, State Hub notes | Define required evidence fields and consumer references | Object-storage backend and credential delivery where evidence packages become durable artifacts | Evidence is retained without embedding secret material |
+
+Known current caveat: the Gitea package data is on a 10 GiB `local-path` PVC.
+On 2026-05-19 `/data/packages` was about 798.5 MiB, and no Kubernetes `CronJob`
+backup resources were observed. That posture is acceptable for smoke and
+development artifacts, but production-critical package reliance needs recorded
+backup and restore evidence first.
+
+## Backup Ownership
+
+Forge owns the question: "What forge data must be recoverable, and what does a
+successful recovery prove?"
+
+Platform owns the mechanism for:
+
+- CNPG database backup and restore;
+- S3-compatible/object-storage backup targets;
+- OpenBao runtime secret custody, audit, backup, and restore;
+- workload secret delivery through External Secrets, CSI, or another approved
+  platform mechanism;
+- future object-storage credential vending and policy shape.
+
+Cluster owns the mechanism for:
+
+- etcd and kubeconfig backup;
+- Kubernetes runtime recovery;
+- cluster add-ons needed before platform services can recover.
+
+Until platform backup coverage is explicitly available for a forge asset, forge
+docs must treat that asset as not production-trustworthy. Operators may still
+use it for smoke, development, and migration evidence if the risk is recorded.
+
+## Restore Drill Requirements
+
+A forge restore drill should be non-production first and should record only
+non-secret evidence.
+
+Minimum drills:
+
+1. Source forge restore:
+   - restore the Gitea database and shared storage into an isolated namespace or
+     host;
+   - verify Gitea starts;
+   - verify a known repository can be listed and cloned;
+   - verify a known user/org/repo permission path still exists.
+2. Package/blob restore:
+   - restore package metadata and package blobs together;
+   - verify a known Python package version can be installed;
+   - verify a known container image tag or digest can be pulled;
+   - verify registry authentication behavior without recording the token.
+3. Runner substrate restore:
+   - replace a runner without reusing old registration tokens;
+   - verify semantic labels still match the published label contract;
+   - run a non-production sample workflow;
+   - record runner identity and label evidence, not runner tokens.
+4. Secret delivery restore:
+   - cite platform OpenBao restore evidence before relying on OpenBao-delivered
+     forge credentials;
+   - verify a non-production secret reaches the intended workload path;
+   - verify no secret value appears in Git, State Hub notes, logs, screenshots,
+     or drill artifacts.
+
+Successful evidence should include:
+
+- date and operator;
+- source backup reference or encrypted snapshot reference;
+- restored environment name;
+- commands run, with secret values redacted before recording;
+- post-restore checks and results;
+- explicit `no_secret_material_recorded` assertion;
+- rollback or cleanup note for the restored environment.
+
+## Secret Custody Boundaries
+
+SOPS/age remains the Git-at-rest bootstrap mechanism for encrypted deploy
+inputs such as `helm/gitea-values.sops.yaml`. This repo may keep encrypted SOPS
+files and may provide `make check-sops` as a sentinel, but it must not commit or
+log decrypted values.
+
+OpenBao is the platform runtime secret service. The platform docs define paths
+such as:
+
+```text
+platform/workloads/<namespace>/<service-account>/<secret-name>
+platform/object-storage/<consumer>
+platform/databases/<consumer>
+platform/operators/<purpose>
+```
+
+Forge may request or reference OpenBao paths for forge workloads, package
+tokens, runner registration, object-storage credentials, and database access.
+Forge does not define OpenBao mounts, audit devices, root/unseal custody,
+break-glass policy, or global secret-delivery mechanisms.
+
+Do not store in forge docs, State Hub notes, screenshots, logs, or workplans:
+
+- decrypted SOPS values;
+- OpenBao tokens, root tokens, unseal shares, or recovery codes;
+- database passwords or connection strings with passwords;
+- package tokens or tokenized package index URLs;
+- runner registration tokens;
+- object-storage access keys or secret keys;
+- kubeconfigs or bearer tokens.
+
+Allowed references:
+
+- Kubernetes namespace and Secret names;
+- SOPS file paths;
+- OpenBao path names and policy names;
+- credential purpose and scope;
+- non-secret command names;
+- redacted command examples;
+- timestamps, backup ids, encrypted snapshot locations, and evidence file names
+  that do not reveal secret material.
+
+## S5 Artifact Verification Without Registry Credentials
+
+S5 application runbooks can trust forge artifacts only through evidence, not by
+owning forge credentials.
+
+For a consuming app release, S5 may cite:
+
+- source repo and commit SHA;
+- package name and version;
+- container image repository, tag, and digest when available;
+- forge publish job id or evidence reference;
+- package/blob restore drill reference when the artifact is production-critical;
+- namespace-local pull Secret name if private registry access is required;
+- app deployment dry-run and smoke-test result.
+
+S5 should not store:
+
+- package publish credentials;
+- registry write tokens;
+- package index URLs containing credentials;
+- forge backup snapshots;
+- OpenBao tokens or platform-root paths;
+- package blob cleanup procedures as app-owned operations.
+
+If an S5 release depends on a private package or image, the app runbook should
+name the consuming Kubernetes Secret or OpenBao-delivered workload path and cite
+forge/platform evidence that the artifact can be restored. The app repo should
+not copy the credential or the forge backup recipe.
+
+## Production-Trust Gates
+
+Before treating forge packages, images, or source state as production-critical,
+the relevant asset must have:
+
+- backup mechanism identified;
+- restore drill completed in an isolated environment;
+- consumer verification command recorded;
+- secret custody path documented without live values;
+- rollback or disable path documented;
+- storage growth inspection procedure;
+- owner for the next restore drill.
+
+If one of these gates is missing, consumers may still use forge artifacts for
+smoke, development, or migration work, but production promotion should record a
+follow-up against the owning layer before relying on the artifact.
+
+## Follow-Ups
+
+- WP-0006-T08 should turn backup, restore, storage growth, and runner status
+  evidence into inspectable operating signals.
+- WP-0006-T09 should model forge backup/restore and secret-delivery edges in
+  Railiance Fabric.
+- `RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T04` should use this contract when documenting S5 app data
+  restore readiness and app runbook evidence requirements.
diff --git a/docs/gitea-container-registry.md b/docs/gitea-container-registry.md
index ebc41ae..604f1c8 100644
--- a/docs/gitea-container-registry.md
+++ b/docs/gitea-container-registry.md
@@ -80,4 +80,4 @@ The PVC is `default/gitea-shared-storage`, 10 GiB, `local-path`, `RWO`. The live
 cluster showed no Kubernetes `CronJob` backup resources across namespaces on
 2026-05-19. This is acceptable for the current smoke-test images, but heavy tag
 growth should wait for the forge/platform backup and retention follow-up in
-`docs/initial-operating-contracts.md`.
+`docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`.
diff --git a/docs/initial-operating-contracts.md b/docs/initial-operating-contracts.md
index a8954f9..8202ccd 100644
--- a/docs/initial-operating-contracts.md
+++ b/docs/initial-operating-contracts.md
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ leaving live deploy and secret custody changes behind separate review gates.
   drill for the relevant storage path.
 - S5 app releases may consume forge artifacts, but they should cite forge
   evidence rather than owning package blob backup procedures themselves.
+- The detailed backup, restore, and secret custody handoff contract lives in
+  `docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`.
 
 ## Secret Custody
 
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ leaving live deploy and secret custody changes behind separate review gates.
   tokens, tokenized package index URLs, or generated credential material.
 - Deploy-capable files that reference encrypted values move only after review of
   the SOPS/OpenBao handoff and compatibility pointers.
+- Allowed and forbidden secret references are defined in
+  `docs/backup-restore-secret-handoff.md`.
 
 ## Observability And Evidence