diff --git a/docs/whynot-design-npm-publish-handoff.md b/docs/whynot-design-npm-publish-handoff.md
new file mode 100644
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+# whynot-design npm Publish Token Handoff
+
+This is the next-session handoff for `CCR-2026-0001` and the
+`whynot-design-npm-publish` access lane.
+
+## Current State
+
+- CCR: `CCR-2026-0001`
+- Decision: `e6381a56-6b04-4fd5-b2de-f3ef59cde888`
+- Status: approved
+- Front door: `template`, `resolvable=false`
+- Catalog id: `whynot-design-npm-publish`
+- Tenant/org: `coulomb`
+- Workload/project: `whynot-design`
+- Secret path: `platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`
+- Field: `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`
+- Token source: Gitea package token for
+  `https://gitea.coulomb.social/api/packages/coulomb/npm/`
+
+The operator reported that the Gitea token was generated and stored in OpenBao.
+Codex could not verify the metadata from the current token-helper identity:
+metadata lookup, policy read, and auth-role read all returned `403 permission
+denied`. No secret value was read or printed.
+
+## Safety Rules
+
+- Do not paste `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` into Git, State Hub, chat, shell history, logs,
+  workplans, or screenshots.
+- Do not run verification with shell tracing enabled.
+- Record only non-secret evidence: path, field name, metadata keys, policy name,
+  role name, actor, timestamp, and pass/fail result.
+- Do not mark the ops-warden catalog entry ready until positive and negative
+  verification are complete.
+
+## OpenBao Secret Check
+
+In the OpenBao UI, confirm the secret exists under the `platform` KV engine:
+
+```text
+workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish
+```
+
+Expected field:
+
+```text
+NPM_AUTH_TOKEN
+```
+
+Expected custom metadata:
+
+```text
+catalog-id = whynot-design-npm-publish
+```
+
+Do not reveal the value during review.
+
+## Policy
+
+Create or update ACL policy:
+
+```text
+workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
+```
+
+Policy body:
+
+```hcl
+path "platform/data/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "platform/metadata/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+```
+
+Equivalent CLI command from an approved OpenBao operator context:
+
+```bash
+bao policy write workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish \
+  openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish.hcl
+```
+
+## OIDC Role
+
+Create or update:
+
+```text
+auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read
+```
+
+Role payload:
+
+```json
+{
+  "role_type": "oidc",
+  "user_claim": "sub",
+  "groups_claim": "groups",
+  "bound_claims": {
+    "groups": ["whynot-design"]
+  },
+  "policies": "workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish",
+  "ttl": "15m"
+}
+```
+
+Equivalent CLI command from an approved OpenBao operator context:
+
+```bash
+bao write auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read \
+  'bound_claims={"groups":["whynot-design"]}' \
+  groups_claim=groups \
+  policies=workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish \
+  role_type=oidc \
+  ttl=15m \
+  user_claim=sub
+```
+
+## Non-Secret Reads
+
+These commands should succeed from an operator-capable identity and do not print
+the token value:
+
+```bash
+bao kv metadata get platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish
+bao policy read workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
+bao read auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read
+```
+
+## Positive Verification
+
+Positive verification proves the approved whynot-design identity can fetch the
+field without exposing it in logs.
+
+Use an attended shell, keep tracing disabled, and suppress command output:
+
+```bash
+set +x
+bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read
+bao kv get -format=json platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish \
+  | jq -e '.data.data.NPM_AUTH_TOKEN | type == "string" and length > 0' \
+  >/dev/null
+```
+
+Record only that the check passed.
+
+## Negative Verification
+
+Negative verification proves a non-whynot identity cannot read the same field.
+
+Use a non-whynot identity or role and confirm the read is denied. Do not print
+or store any token value.
+
+Record only the denial result and non-secret audit timestamp/request metadata.
+
+## Activation
+
+Only after these are true:
+
+- secret metadata confirmed;
+- policy exists and is scoped to the corrected `coulomb/whynot-design` path;
+- OIDC role exists and binds only `groups=["whynot-design"]`;
+- positive verification passed;
+- negative verification passed;
+
+then `CCR-2026-0001` can move toward `active`, and ops-warden can mark
+`whynot-design-npm-publish` `ready`/`resolvable=true`.
+
+Until then, keep the front door as:
+
+```text
+readiness = template
+resolvable = false
+```
diff --git a/workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0007-credential-change-approval-workflow.md b/workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0007-credential-change-approval-workflow.md
index c7a9ff3..89c8843 100644
--- a/workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0007-credential-change-approval-workflow.md
+++ b/workplans/RAILIANCE-WP-0007-credential-change-approval-workflow.md
@@ -275,6 +275,17 @@ remains `readiness: template` and `resolvable: false`. Added guarded
 reviewed non-secret policy and auth-role commands without hand-writing them;
 secret value provisioning and verification remain under approved custody.
 
+**2026-06-28:** After correcting the tenant/org to `coulomb`, the corrected
+approval was synced from State Hub decision
+`e6381a56-6b04-4fd5-b2de-f3ef59cde888`; `CCR-2026-0001` is approved and
+`apply_allowed: true` for
+`platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish`. The operator reported
+secret provisioning likely completed, but Codex metadata-only verification still
+received `403 permission denied`. Prepared
+`docs/whynot-design-npm-publish-handoff.md` as the next-session checklist for
+policy, auth-role, metadata verification, positive verification, negative
+verification, and activation without printing the token.
+
 ## T08 - Add deactivation, rotation, and compromise flows
 
 ```task