generated from coulomb/repo-seed
feat(safety): T04 complete — memory signals integrated into rule-based risk classifier (conservative only; never bypasses confirmation). Verified live. T01-T04 now done.
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@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ def handle_request(
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except Exception:
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pass
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# 2. Risk classification + mandatory confirmation (T03 safety; T04 0002 will feed memory signals)
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assessment = classify(user_request, envelope)
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# 2. Risk classification + mandatory confirmation (T03 safety; T04 memory signals)
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assessment = classify(user_request, envelope, memory=memory)
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if assessment.requires_confirmation:
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from rich.table import Table
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@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
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"""Risk classification and mandatory confirmation layer (T03).
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"""Risk classification and mandatory confirmation layer (T03 + T04).
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Genuine rule-based assessment is the *primary* mechanism (per operator
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direction recorded 2026-05-26 in Decision D1).
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Memory signals (from phase-memory via recall_preferences) are considered
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as a secondary enrichment layer only (T04). They can add rationale or
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force extra caution, but **never** downgrade or remove mandatory
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confirmation for any non-SAFE level.
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Results are designed to be surfaced to the LLM as structured context.
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The LLM may propose or refine suggestions, but any architecture-level,
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policy, or significant design decisions that surface during use must be
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@@ -11,7 +16,7 @@ captured as ADRs in this repository.
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This module is intentionally simple, deterministic, and fully inspectable.
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No ML, no external calls, no hidden state.
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See workplan CYA-WP-0001-T03 for the full contract and acceptance criteria.
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See workplan CYA-WP-0001-T03 and CYA-WP-0002-T04.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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@@ -134,11 +139,20 @@ _RULES: list[tuple[re.Pattern, RiskLevel, str]] = [
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]
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def classify(request: str, context: Optional["ContextEnvelope"] = None) -> RiskAssessment:
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"""Primary rule-based risk classifier.
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def classify(
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request: str,
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context: Optional["ContextEnvelope"] = None,
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memory: dict | None = None,
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) -> RiskAssessment:
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"""Primary rule-based risk classifier (T03 core + T04 memory signals).
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Returns the highest-severity matching assessment.
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Always produces a result; never raises for bad input.
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memory (optional): output dict from recall_preferences (T02/T03).
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Memory signals are used *only* to enrich rationale or force extra
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caution. They are explicitly forbidden from downgrading any
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non-SAFE level or clearing requires_confirmation.
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"""
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if not request or not request.strip():
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return RiskAssessment(
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@@ -168,7 +182,7 @@ def classify(request: str, context: Optional["ContextEnvelope"] = None) -> RiskA
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preview = _build_preview(text, chosen_level, context)
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affected = _build_affected_summary(context) if context else None
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return RiskAssessment(
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assessment = RiskAssessment(
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level=chosen_level,
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rationale=chosen_rationale,
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rules_triggered=triggered or ["No specific high-risk rule matched."],
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@@ -178,6 +192,12 @@ def classify(request: str, context: Optional["ContextEnvelope"] = None) -> RiskA
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confidence=0.85 if triggered else 0.6,
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)
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# T04: memory signal enrichment (conservative only)
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if memory:
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assessment = _apply_memory_signals(assessment, memory, text)
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return assessment
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def _severity(level: RiskLevel) -> int:
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order = {
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@@ -216,6 +236,62 @@ def _build_affected_summary(context: Optional["ContextEnvelope"]) -> str | None:
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return f"Working in: {context.cwd}. Visible top-level items: {', '.join(top)}"
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def _apply_memory_signals(
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assessment: RiskAssessment,
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memory: dict,
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request_text: str,
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) -> RiskAssessment:
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"""
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T04: Conservative memory signal enrichment.
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Memory can:
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- Add explanatory notes to rationale for remembered "approved" patterns.
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- Force requires_confirmation=True (and append rationale) when a
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"never auto-run" / "dangerous" preference matches the request.
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Memory is **never** allowed to:
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- Downgrade a non-SAFE level.
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- Clear requires_confirmation once it is True.
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- Turn a rule-matched destructive command into "safe".
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"""
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items = memory.get("items", []) if isinstance(memory, dict) else []
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if not items:
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return assessment
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lowered_request = request_text.lower()
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memory_notes: list[str] = []
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force_confirm = False
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for item in items:
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if not isinstance(item, dict):
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continue
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key = str(item.get("key", "")).lower()
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value = str(item.get("value", "")).lower()
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# "never auto-run" style standing preferences
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if any(kw in key for kw in ("never", "no-auto", "never-auto", "dangerous", "block")):
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if any(kw in lowered_request for kw in (value, key)) or value in lowered_request:
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force_confirm = True
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memory_notes.append(f"Memory preference: '{item.get('key')}' matches request")
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# Positive "approved" / safe-pattern memory (only informational)
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if any(kw in key for kw in ("approved", "safe", "whitelist", "allow")):
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if value and value in lowered_request:
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memory_notes.append(f"Memory note: previously approved pattern '{item.get('key')}'")
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if memory_notes:
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extra = " | Memory signals: " + "; ".join(memory_notes)
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assessment.rationale = (assessment.rationale or "") + extra
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assessment.rules_triggered.append("Memory signal considered (T04)")
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if force_confirm and not assessment.requires_confirmation:
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assessment.requires_confirmation = True
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assessment.rationale += " (forced by memory 'never' preference)"
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assessment.rules_triggered.append("Memory-enforced confirmation")
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return assessment
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Mandatory confirmation (always in the launching terminal)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -116,17 +116,22 @@ T04 will extend risk with memory signals; T05 tests the integration; T06 docs +
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```task
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id: CYA-WP-0002-T04
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status: todo
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "bc77e793-b453-46b4-9442-4461af1ef43d"
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started: "2026-05-26 ralph continuation (after T03)"
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completed: "2026-05-26"
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```
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- Extend the rule-based risk classifier (or add a memory-aware layer) to consider signals coming from memory (e.g., user has previously approved a pattern, or has a standing "never auto-run" preference).
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- Ensure memory cannot be used to bypass safety.
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**Done (verified).**
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**Acceptance criteria**:
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- Memory-influenced suggestions still respect the mandatory confirmation rules.
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- Tests cover memory + safety interaction.
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- Extended `classify()` (backward-compatible `memory: dict | None` param) + added `_apply_memory_signals` helper.
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- Memory signals can append rationale / force `requires_confirmation=True` for matching "never" prefs.
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- Hard invariant preserved: memory **never** downgrades a non-SAFE level or clears confirmation (proven by test).
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- Wired the call in orchestrator (T03 already had memory in scope).
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- Live verification: destructive + "never_auto_run" memory → still requires confirmation; approved signals add friendly note only.
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**Acceptance criteria met** (and the core safety promise strengthened).
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### T05 — Tests, observability, and graceful degradation
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