generated from coulomb/repo-seed
Initiated flex-auth with Scope and PRD
This commit is contained in:
@@ -6,5 +6,9 @@ systems.
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Start with [INTENT.md](INTENT.md) for the project boundary and direction.
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Research notes live in [docs/](docs/).
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The product boundary is captured in [SCOPE.md](SCOPE.md), and the current
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Product Requirements Document is
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[docs/ProductRequirementsDocument.md](docs/ProductRequirementsDocument.md).
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Initial workplans live in [workplans/](workplans/), with sequencing captured
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in [docs/workplan-planning-map.md](docs/workplan-planning-map.md).
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162
SCOPE.md
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162
SCOPE.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
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# flex-auth Scope
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## One-liner
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flex-auth is a policy-as-code authorization registry and control plane for
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NetKingdom-aligned systems.
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## Core Idea
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flex-auth turns verified identity claims, resource manifests, relationship
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facts, policy packages, and request context into inspectable authorization
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decisions. It is intentionally separate from identity providers and from the
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applications that enforce decisions.
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The product should start as a useful standalone local authorization system,
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then grow into delegated mode where Topaz, OpenFGA, SpiceDB, OPA, Cedar,
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Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra, Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and similar systems
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can be coordinated behind a stable flex-auth API.
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## In Scope
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- Protected-system registration.
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- Resource namespaces, resource hierarchy, and action vocabularies.
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- Subject, group, team, tenant, role, and service-account records needed for
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authorization.
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- Relationship facts and inherited access.
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- Versioned policy packages with metadata, fixtures, validation, tests, and
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activation state.
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- Deterministic check, batch-check, list-allowed, explain, and decision-record
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capabilities.
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- Local decision logs with policy version and provenance.
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- CLI and service entry points for local development and integration tests.
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- Markitect as the first concrete protected-system consumer.
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- Delegated PDP and directory adapter boundaries after the standalone core is
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stable.
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## Out of Scope
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- Acting as an identity provider.
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- Replacing key-cape, NetKingdom SSO, Keycloak, Entra, or other identity
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systems.
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- Owning login, MFA, PKCE, token issuance, token lifecycle, or canonical
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identity profile behavior.
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- Embedding protected-system enforcement logic inside flex-auth.
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- Making Markitect-specific assumptions part of the generic authorization
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model.
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- Forcing a single PDP backend or directory provider.
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- Hiding policy behavior behind opaque administrative toggles.
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## Relevant When
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- A protected system needs resource-specific authorization decisions.
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- A team needs policy-as-code packages that can be reviewed, tested, versioned,
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and explained.
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- Authorization must combine identity claims, groups, roles, tenants,
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relationships, context, and resource metadata.
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- A local development workflow needs deterministic authorization behavior
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before enterprise PDP integrations exist.
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- Markitect resources need central authorization decisions and durable audit
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records.
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- A delegated backend needs to be introduced without changing the
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protected-system-facing API.
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## Not Relevant When
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- The task is only about authentication, login, token issuance, or MFA.
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- The desired outcome can be handled by coarse identity-provider roles alone.
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- The protected system only needs local development labels and no central
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policy administration.
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- A team is choosing identity-provider configuration rather than
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resource-specific authorization.
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## Current State
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The repository contains the intent baseline, authorization landscape research,
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and initial workplans. `FLEX-WP-0001` is complete. Current implementation work
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starts with `FLEX-WP-0002`, the standalone policy-as-code core. Markitect
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consumer integration and delegated PDP/directory adapters are planned after
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the core contracts stabilize.
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State Hub integration is present through:
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- `.custodian-brief.md`
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- `state_hub_workstream_id` fields in workplans
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- `state_hub_task_id` fields in task blocks
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- active State Hub dispatch for the `flex-auth` repo
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## How It Fits
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flex-auth sits between identity and protected systems:
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```text
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key-cape / NetKingdom SSO
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-> verified identity claims
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-> flex-auth authorization registry and policy decisions
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-> protected systems such as Markitect
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```
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Identity systems establish who the caller is and provide coarse claims.
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flex-auth decides what that caller can do to a specific resource under a
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specific context. Protected systems enforce the decision and keep their own
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local diagnostics.
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## Terminology
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- **Subject:** Human, service account, group, team, tenant, role, or emergency
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principal.
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- **Resource:** Protected object registered by a system.
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- **Namespace:** Resource type and ownership boundary.
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- **Action:** Operation requested against a resource.
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- **Context:** Request, environment, assurance, workflow, or runtime
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attributes.
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- **Policy package:** Versioned policy-as-code bundle with metadata and tests.
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- **Relationship fact:** Subject-resource or resource-resource relation.
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- **Decision:** Allow, deny, redact, audit-only, or not-applicable outcome with
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reason and provenance.
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- **PDP:** Policy decision point, either flex-auth standalone logic or a
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delegated backend.
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- **PEP:** Policy enforcement point in the protected system.
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## Related / Overlapping
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- key-cape / NetKingdom SSO: identity source and coarse claims provider.
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- Markitect: first protected-system consumer and policy enforcement point.
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- Topaz: candidate MVP delegated backend combining local directory and
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OPA/Rego evaluation.
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- OpenFGA and SpiceDB: candidate relationship authorization backends.
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- OPA and Cedar: candidate rule and typed-policy engines.
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- Keycloak Authorization Services: adapter path for Keycloak-centric
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deployments.
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- Entra, Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and Keycloak APIs: directory and group resolver
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sources.
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## Provided Capabilities
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```capability
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type: orientation
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title: Agent orientation
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status: current
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description: Repo intent, boundaries, research, workplan map, and State Hub agent brief are available for new coding agents.
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```
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```capability
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type: workplan
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title: Standalone policy core plan
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status: planned
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description: Workplan for schemas, local registry, policy packages, check APIs, list/explain, decision log, CLI/service skeleton, tests, and examples.
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```
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```capability
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type: workplan
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title: Markitect consumer integration plan
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status: planned
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description: Workplan for Markitect resource namespace, manifest import, action vocabulary, check fixtures, contract tests, and integration flow.
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```
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```capability
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type: workplan
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title: Delegated adapter plan
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status: planned
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description: Workplan for Topaz evaluation, relationship PDP adapters, rule PDP adapters, Keycloak AuthZ path, directory resolvers, and operations docs.
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```
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351
docs/ProductRequirementsDocument.md
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351
docs/ProductRequirementsDocument.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
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# flex-auth Product Requirements Document
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Date: 2026-05-04
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Status: Draft for alignment
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## 1. Definition
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flex-auth is a policy-as-code authorization registry and control plane for
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organizations that need to grow from simple application roles into
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enterprise-grade, inspectable authorization.
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The product is expected to define and operate the authorization layer between
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verified identity claims and protected systems. It should let resource owners
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register protected systems and resources, publish reviewable policy packages,
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evaluate authorization requests, explain decisions, and preserve decision
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records for diagnostics and audit.
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This PRD defines what flex-auth must achieve within this repository's current
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boundary. It intentionally avoids prescribing internal architecture or
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implementation details beyond the product-level constraints already established
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by the repo.
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## 2. Context
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NetKingdom-aligned systems separate identity from authorization:
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```text
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key-cape / NetKingdom SSO
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-> verified OIDC/SAML identity claims
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-> flex-auth policy-as-code and authorization registry
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-> protected systems and knowledge tools
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```
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Identity providers issue tokens, manage login, and provide coarse claims.
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Protected systems enforce allow, deny, redact, and audit outcomes at their own
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runtime boundaries. flex-auth exists between those responsibilities as the
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stable authorization product surface.
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The first concrete consumer is Markitect, which needs central authorization for
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knowledge bases, repositories, documents, sections, context packages, workflow
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artifacts, and exports. The product must use that consumer to validate real
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resource and decision needs without becoming Markitect-specific.
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## 3. Product Intent
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flex-auth should provide a path that starts small and grows cleanly:
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- Local developers and small teams can run flex-auth in standalone mode.
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- Policy authors can version, review, validate, test, publish, and activate
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policy packages.
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- Protected systems can register resources and ask stable authorization
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questions.
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- Operators can inspect and export decision records with enough provenance to
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diagnose policy behavior.
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- Enterprise deployments can later delegate relationship, rule, or directory
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concerns to established backends without changing protected-system contracts.
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The product outcome is not merely a collection of adapters. The core value is a
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canonical, backend-neutral authorization model that keeps ownership clear as
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policy complexity grows.
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## 4. Users and Stakeholders
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### Primary Users
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- Protected-system developers integrating authorization checks.
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- Policy authors defining resource-specific access behavior.
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- Platform engineers operating local or shared flex-auth instances.
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- Product and architecture owners aligning identity, authorization, and
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protected-system boundaries.
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### Secondary Users
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- Security reviewers inspecting policy behavior and audit records.
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- Support or operations staff diagnosing denied, redacted, stale, partial, or
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uncertain decisions.
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- Future backend integrators connecting Topaz, OpenFGA, SpiceDB, OPA, Cedar,
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Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra, Graph, SCIM, LDAP, or related
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systems.
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## 5. In Scope
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### Standalone Authorization Core
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- Protected-system manifests.
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- Resource manifests and resource hierarchies.
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- Subject, group, team, tenant, role, service-account, and emergency-principal
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representations needed for authorization.
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- Relationship fact manifests.
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- Canonical action vocabularies.
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- Check request and decision envelope definitions.
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- Deterministic `check` and `batch_check` behavior.
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- `list_allowed` for discoverable allowed resources.
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- `explain` for decision diagnostics.
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- Local registry storage suitable for development, tests, and small
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deployments.
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### Policy-as-Code Lifecycle
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- Policy package metadata, validation, fixtures, tests, versions, and
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activation state.
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- Local policy package testing before activation.
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- Policy decision outputs that include effect, reason, matched policy version,
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matched rule, obligations, diagnostics, and provenance.
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### Audit and Diagnostics
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- Local decision records.
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- Durable recording for denies, redactions, exports, and emergency actions.
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- Compact decision envelopes suitable for later audit export.
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- Clear diagnostics for stale, partial, uncertain, denied, and redacted
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results.
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### Developer and Operator Experience
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- CLI workflows for validating manifests, loading registry data, testing
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policies, checking one request, batch checking, and explaining a decision.
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- A service entry point after library and CLI behavior are stable enough.
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- Examples and tests for local users, groups, teams, project resources,
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inherited relationships, and policy fixtures.
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### First Consumer: Markitect
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- Markitect resource namespace and hierarchy.
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- Import of Markitect resource manifests into the flex-auth registry.
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- Markitect action vocabulary: `read`, `query`, `search`, `package`,
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`activate_context`, `export`, `workflow_run`, and `admin`.
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- Markitect-compatible decision fixtures and contract tests.
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||||
- Integration documentation for publish, check, enforce, record, and explain
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flows.
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### Future Delegated Mode
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||||
|
||||
- Adapter boundaries for relationship PDPs such as OpenFGA and SpiceDB.
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- Adapter boundaries for rule PDPs such as OPA/Rego and Cedar.
|
||||
- Topaz evaluation as the first delegated-backend candidate.
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||||
- Keycloak Authorization Services adapter path for Keycloak-centric
|
||||
deployments.
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||||
- Directory and group resolver patterns for Entra/Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and
|
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Keycloak APIs.
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- Operations documentation for caching, consistency, failure modes, and
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||||
fail-open/fail-closed behavior.
|
||||
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## 6. Out of Scope
|
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|
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- Acting as an identity provider.
|
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- Replacing key-cape, NetKingdom SSO, Keycloak, Entra, or other identity
|
||||
providers.
|
||||
- Owning login, MFA, PKCE, token issuance, token lifecycle, OIDC discovery, or
|
||||
canonical IAM profile behavior.
|
||||
- Making protected systems passive; they remain responsible for enforcement.
|
||||
- Embedding Markitect-specific policy administration into flex-auth's generic
|
||||
model.
|
||||
- Treating identity-provider roles, scopes, or groups as final
|
||||
resource-specific authorization by themselves.
|
||||
- Forcing all deployments to use Topaz, OpenFGA, SpiceDB, OPA, Cedar,
|
||||
Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra, or any other single backend.
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||||
- Providing backlog, sprint, or task execution details beyond the existing
|
||||
workplans.
|
||||
- Defining detailed technical architecture, database schema internals, service
|
||||
framework choices, or deployment manifests in this PRD.
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## 7. Functional Requirements
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### FR1. Protected-System Registration
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flex-auth must let a protected system declare its identity, ownership, resource
|
||||
namespaces, action vocabulary, and integration metadata in a registered
|
||||
manifest.
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||||
|
||||
### FR2. Resource Registration
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must accept resource manifests that describe resource identity,
|
||||
namespace, hierarchy, owner metadata, policy labels, trust zones, and relevant
|
||||
provenance.
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|
||||
### FR3. Subject and Relationship Registration
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must represent authorization-relevant subjects and relationships,
|
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including humans, service accounts, groups, teams, tenants, roles, emergency
|
||||
principals, subject-resource relations, and resource-resource relations.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR4. Policy Package Validation
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must load policy packages with metadata, fixtures, test cases,
|
||||
version information, and activation metadata, and must reject invalid packages
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||||
with useful diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR5. Policy Package Testing
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must support policy fixtures and test cases so policy authors can
|
||||
verify expected decisions before activation.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR6. Authorization Checks
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must provide `check(subject, action, resource, context)` returning a
|
||||
decision envelope with effect, reason, policy version, matched rule,
|
||||
obligations, diagnostics, and provenance.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR7. Batch Authorization Checks
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must provide `batch_check(subject, action, resources, context)` for
|
||||
query/search workflows where multiple resources must be evaluated together.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR8. Allowed Resource Listing
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must provide `list_allowed(subject, action, resource_type, filters,
|
||||
context)` for workflows that need to discover resources a subject can access.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR9. Decision Explanation
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must provide `explain(decision_id)` so developers, policy authors,
|
||||
and operators can understand why a decision was produced.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR10. Decision Recording
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must record decisions with compact, durable metadata, always
|
||||
including denies, redactions, exports, and emergency actions.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR11. Markitect Compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must represent Markitect resource manifests, resource hierarchy,
|
||||
action vocabulary, and decision shapes without making Markitect the only
|
||||
consumer model.
|
||||
|
||||
### FR12. Delegated Backend Readiness
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must preserve a stable protected-system-facing contract when
|
||||
authorization evaluation is later delegated to external PDP or directory
|
||||
systems.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Non-Functional Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR1. Implementation Independence
|
||||
|
||||
Product contracts must be expressed in backend-neutral vocabulary. External PDP
|
||||
engines are adapters, not product definitions.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR2. Explainability
|
||||
|
||||
Denied, redacted, stale, partial, uncertain, audit-only, and not-applicable
|
||||
decisions must produce useful diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR3. Local Usefulness
|
||||
|
||||
Standalone mode must be useful for development, smaller deployments, and
|
||||
integration tests before delegated integrations are available.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR4. Reviewability
|
||||
|
||||
Policies must be versioned, testable, and suitable for code review.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR5. Auditability
|
||||
|
||||
Decision records must include policy version and enough provenance to support
|
||||
diagnostics and audit export.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR6. Backend Portability
|
||||
|
||||
The product must not require protected systems to change contracts when a PDP
|
||||
backend changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR7. Operational Clarity
|
||||
|
||||
Failure modes, caching behavior, consistency, stale directory data, group
|
||||
overage, and fail-open/fail-closed behavior must be explicit.
|
||||
|
||||
### NFR8. Ownership Clarity
|
||||
|
||||
flex-auth must preserve clear boundaries between identity ownership,
|
||||
authorization ownership, and protected-system enforcement ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Assumptions and Dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
- Identity claims come from key-cape, NetKingdom SSO, Keycloak, Entra, or
|
||||
compatible identity systems.
|
||||
- Protected systems are able to extract resource metadata and enforce
|
||||
decisions locally.
|
||||
- Markitect remains the first concrete consumer for shaping realistic resource
|
||||
and workflow needs.
|
||||
- Delegated backends should be introduced only after standalone request,
|
||||
decision, registry, and audit vocabulary are stable.
|
||||
- Directory group membership can be stale, incomplete, or oversized for tokens;
|
||||
freshness and source metadata are therefore product requirements.
|
||||
- This repo currently contains planning and documentation artifacts, not an
|
||||
implemented service.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
### MVP Success
|
||||
|
||||
- flex-auth can run standalone for local development.
|
||||
- Protected systems, resources, subjects, relationships, and policy packages
|
||||
can be validated and loaded.
|
||||
- `check`, `batch_check`, `list_allowed`, and `explain` are available.
|
||||
- Decision envelopes are stable and include actionable diagnostics.
|
||||
- Local decision logs record required high-value events.
|
||||
- CLI workflows cover validation, loading, policy testing, checking, batch
|
||||
checking, and explaining.
|
||||
- Tests and examples cover representative local users, groups, teams,
|
||||
resources, inheritance, and policy fixtures.
|
||||
|
||||
### First Consumer Success
|
||||
|
||||
- Markitect resource manifests can be imported.
|
||||
- Markitect action vocabulary is represented.
|
||||
- Markitect-compatible decisions are produced for allow, deny, redact, and
|
||||
audit-denied cases.
|
||||
- Markitect integration docs cover publish, check, enforce, record, and explain
|
||||
flows.
|
||||
- The integration remains generic enough for another protected system to reuse
|
||||
the same flex-auth model.
|
||||
|
||||
### Expansion Success
|
||||
|
||||
- Topaz has a clear MVP recommendation or rejection.
|
||||
- Relationship PDP and rule PDP adapter contracts are documented and tested at
|
||||
their boundaries.
|
||||
- Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra/Graph, SCIM, LDAP, and Keycloak API
|
||||
resolver paths are documented with explicit freshness and failure behavior.
|
||||
- Protected-system APIs remain stable as delegated mode is introduced.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Product Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- flex-auth must not collapse identity and authorization into one concern.
|
||||
- flex-auth must not let the first Markitect integration narrow the generic
|
||||
protected-system model.
|
||||
- flex-auth must keep policy behavior inspectable rather than relying on opaque
|
||||
administrative toggles.
|
||||
- flex-auth must treat roles, scopes, groups, tenants, claims, relationships,
|
||||
and context as authorization inputs, not as automatic final decisions.
|
||||
- flex-auth must be useful before enterprise infrastructure is available.
|
||||
- flex-auth must make uncertainty visible instead of silently hiding stale or
|
||||
partial authorization data.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Traceability
|
||||
|
||||
This PRD is grounded in the current repository material:
|
||||
|
||||
- `INTENT.md`
|
||||
- `docs/flex-auth-authorization-registry-research.md`
|
||||
- `docs/workplan-planning-map.md`
|
||||
- `workplans/FLEX-WP-0001-repo-intent-and-architecture-baseline.md`
|
||||
- `workplans/FLEX-WP-0002-standalone-policy-as-code-core.md`
|
||||
- `workplans/FLEX-WP-0003-markitect-consumer-integration.md`
|
||||
- `workplans/FLEX-WP-0004-delegated-pdp-and-directory-adapters.md`
|
||||
- `.custodian-brief.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Downstream technical specifications, ADRs, schemas, backlog items, tests, and
|
||||
implementation tasks should derive from this document without treating it as a
|
||||
technical design.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user