Close ops-warden policy gate deployment

chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto]
Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-30: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth
2026-06-30 00:52:56 +02:00 · 2026-06-30 00:51:58 +02:00 · 2026-06-27 20:37:07 +02:00 · 2026-06-24 14:52:35 +02:00 · 2026-06-24 13:11:03 +02:00 · 2026-06-24 01:45:33 +02:00
42 changed files with 2932 additions and 65 deletions
--- a/.claude/rules/first-session.md
+++ b/.claude/rules/first-session.md
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 ## First Session Protocol

-Triggered when `get_domain_summary("netkingdom")` shows **no workstreams**.
+Triggered when `get_domain_summary("infotech")` shows **no workstreams**.
 The project is registered but work has not yet been structured.

 **Step 1 — Read, don't write**
- `~/the-custodian/canon/projects/netkingdom/project_charter_v0.1.md` — purpose, scope
- `~/the-custodian/canon/projects/netkingdom/roadmap_v0.1.md` — planned phases
+- `~/the-custodian/canon/projects/infotech/project_charter_v0.1.md` — purpose, scope
+- `~/the-custodian/canon/projects/infotech/roadmap_v0.1.md` — planned phases
 - Scan repo root: README, directory structure, existing code or docs

 **Step 2 — Survey in-progress work**
@@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ roadmap phase. **Wait for approval before creating.**

 **Step 4 — Create workplan file first, then DB record (ADR-001)**
 ```
-workplans/flex-auth-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md   ← write this first
+workplans/FLEX-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md   ← write this first
 ```
 Then register in the hub:
 ```
-create_workstream(topic_id="a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e", title="...", owner="...", description="...")
+create_workstream(topic_id="cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a", title="...", owner="...", description="...")
 create_task(workstream_id="<id>", title="...", priority="high|medium|low")
 ```

 **Step 5 — Record the setup**
 ```
 add_progress_event(
-    summary="First session: structured netkingdom into N workstreams, M tasks",
+    summary="First session: structured infotech into N workstreams, M tasks",
    event_type="milestone",
-    topic_id="a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e",
+    topic_id="cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a",
    detail={"workstreams": [...], "tasks_created": M}
 )
 ```
--- a/.claude/rules/repo-identity.md
+++ b/.claude/rules/repo-identity.md
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 **Purpose:** flex-auth - (fill in purpose)

-**Domain:** netkingdom
+**Domain:** infotech
 **Repo slug:** flex-auth
-**Topic ID:** a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e
+**Topic ID:** cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a
--- a/.claude/rules/session-protocol.md
+++ b/.claude/rules/session-protocol.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 ## Session Protocol

-State Hub: http://127.0.0.1:8000
+Dev Hub (State Hub API): http://127.0.0.1:8000
+MCP server name in `~/.claude.json`: `dev-hub`

 **Step 1 — Orient**

@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ cat .custodian-brief.md
 ```
 Then call the MCP tool for richer cross-domain context when MCP tools are exposed:
 ```
-get_domain_summary("netkingdom")
+get_domain_summary("infotech")
 ```
 If MCP tools are unavailable in the current agent session, use the REST API:
 ```bash
@@ -39,11 +40,11 @@ curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/messages/<id>/read" \
 ls workplans/
 ```
 For each file with `status: ready`, `active`, or `blocked`, note pending
-`todo`/`in_progress` tasks.
+`wait`/`todo`/`progress` tasks.

 **Step 4 — Present brief**

-1. **Active workstreams** for `netkingdom` — title, task counts, blocking decisions
+1. **Active workstreams** for `infotech` — title, task counts, blocking decisions
 2. **Pending tasks** from `workplans/` + any `[repo:flex-auth]` hub tasks
 3. **Goal guidance** — if `goal_guidance` in summary:
   - `needs_workplan`: surface as top action — *"Repo goal '{title}' has no workplan yet"*
@@ -61,13 +62,13 @@ If no workstreams: follow First Session Protocol (`first-session.md`).
 **Session close:**
 With MCP tools:
 ```
-add_progress_event(summary="...", topic_id="a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e", workstream_id="<uuid>")
+add_progress_event(summary="...", topic_id="cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a", workstream_id="<uuid>")
 ```
 Without MCP tools:
 ```bash
 curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/progress/ \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"topic_id":"a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e","workstream_id":"<uuid>","event_type":"note","summary":"what changed","author":"codex"}'
+  -d '{"topic_id":"cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a","workstream_id":"<uuid>","event_type":"note","summary":"what changed","author":"codex"}'
 ```
 If workplan files were modified, ensure the local copy is up to date first:
 ```bash
--- a/.claude/rules/workplan-convention.md
+++ b/.claude/rules/workplan-convention.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ## Workplan Convention (ADR-001)

-File location: `workplans/flex-auth-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md`
-ID prefix: `FLEX-WP`
+File location: `workplans/FLEX-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md`
+ID prefix: `FLEX-WP-`

 Work items originate as files in this repo **before** being registered in the hub.

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ repo state, and `finished` when implementation is complete. `stalled` and
 `needs_review` are derived health labels, not stored statuses.

 Closed workplans may be moved to `workplans/archived/` with a completion-date
-prefix: `YYMMDD-flex-auth-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md`. The frontmatter id remains
+prefix: `YYMMDD-FLEX-WP-NNNN-<slug>.md`. The frontmatter id remains
 unchanged; the prefix is only for quick visual reference.

 Small opportunistic tasks discovered during another session use **Ad Hoc Tasks**:
@@ -25,4 +25,16 @@ Ecosystem todos from other agents arrive as `[repo:flex-auth]` hub tasks —
 visible at session start. Pick one up by creating the workplan file, then registering
 the workstream.

+Task blocks use this shape:
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-NNNN-T01
+status: wait | todo | progress | done | cancel
+priority: high | medium | low
+state_hub_task_id: "<uuid>"         # written by fix-consistency — do not edit
+```
+
+Status progression is `todo` → `progress` → `done`; use `wait` for waiting or
+blocked work and `cancel` for stopped work.
+
 <!-- Ralph Loop rules and HEUREKA sequence: ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md — do not duplicate here -->
--- a/.custodian-brief.md
+++ b/.custodian-brief.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 <!-- custodian-brief: generated by fix-consistency — do not edit manually -->
 # Custodian Brief — flex-auth

-**Domain:** netkingdom  
-**Last synced:** 2026-05-17 05:28 UTC  
+**Domain:** communication  
+**Last synced:** 2026-06-29 22:51 UTC  
 **State Hub:** http://127.0.0.1:8000 *(adjust if running on a remote machine)*

 ## Active Workstreams
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@
 ## MCP Orientation (when available)

 If the state-hub MCP server is reachable, call:
-`get_domain_summary("netkingdom")`
+`get_domain_summary("communication")`
 This provides richer cross-domain context.
 If the MCP call fails, use this file as your orientation source.
--- a/.repo-classification.yaml
+++ b/.repo-classification.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+repo_classification:
+  standard: Repo Classification Standard
+  version: '1.0'
+  classified_at: '2026-06-22'
+  classified_by: human
+  category: product
+  domain: infotech
+  secondary_domains:
+  - government
+  capability_tags:
+  - identity
+  - access-control
+  - policy
+  - governance
+  - audit
+  business_stake:
+  - technology
+  - legal
+  - operations
+  - product
+  business_mechanics:
+  - control
+  - coordination
+  - adaptation
+  notes: Policy-as-code authorization registry; human corrected domain from communication→infotech.
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@

 **Purpose:** flex-auth - (fill in purpose)

-**Domain:** netkingdom
+**Domain:** infotech
 **Repo slug:** flex-auth
-**Topic ID:** `a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e`
+**Topic ID:** `cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a`
 **Workplan prefix:** `FLEX-WP-`

 ---
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ there is no MCP server for Codex agents.
 cat .custodian-brief.md

 # Active workstreams for this domain
-curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/workstreams/?topic_id=a6c6e745-bf54-4465-9340-1534a2be493e&status=active" \
+curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/workstreams/?topic_id=cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a&status=active" \
  | python3 -m json.tool

 # Check inbox
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ Omit `workstream_id` / `task_id` when not applicable.
 ```bash
 curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/tasks/<task_id>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"status": "in_progress"}'
-# values: todo | in_progress | done | blocked
+  -d '{"status": "progress"}'
+# values: wait | todo | progress | done | cancel
 ```

 ### Flag a task for human review
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/tasks/<task_id>" \
 1. `cat .custodian-brief.md` — domain goal and open workstreams (offline-safe)
 2. Check inbox: `GET /messages/?to_agent=flex-auth&unread_only=true`; mark read
 3. Scan workplans: `ls workplans/` — note `status: ready`, `active`, or `blocked` files and open tasks
-4. Check blocked tasks: `GET /tasks/?needs_human=true`
+4. Check human-needed tasks: `GET /tasks/?needs_human=true`

 **During work:**
 - Update task statuses in workplan files as tasks progress
@@ -151,6 +151,11 @@ every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and eas
 get wrong.

 **Canon:** `~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md` · catalog `~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml`
+
+<!-- REPO-AGENTS-EXTENSIONS -->
+<!-- Append repo-specific agent instructions below this marker.
+     The state-hub template sync preserves content after this line. -->
+
 ---

 ## Workplan Convention (ADR-001)
@@ -176,7 +181,7 @@ anything needing analysis, design, approval, dependencies, or multiple phases.
 id: FLEX-WP-NNNN
 type: workplan
 title: "..."
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 repo: flex-auth
 status: proposed | ready | active | blocked | backlog | finished | archived
 owner: codex
@@ -198,7 +203,7 @@ derived health labels, not frontmatter statuses.

 ` ` `task
 id: FLEX-WP-NNNN-T01
-status: todo | in_progress | done | blocked
+status: wait | todo | progress | done | cancel
 priority: high | medium | low
 state_hub_task_id: "<uuid>"         # written by fix-consistency — do not edit
 ` ` `
@@ -206,7 +211,7 @@ state_hub_task_id: "<uuid>"         # written by fix-consistency — do not edit
 Task description text.
 ```

-Status progression: `todo` → `in_progress` → `done` (or `blocked`)
+Status progression: `todo` → `progress` → `done`; use `wait` for waiting/blocked work and `cancel` for stopped work.

 To create a new workplan:
 1. Write the file following the format above
--- a/INTENT.md
+++ b/INTENT.md
@@ -149,9 +149,29 @@ adopting their models as its own:

 Flex-auth remains the stable control plane even when the backend changes.

-## First Consumer Pattern
+## Consumer Patterns

-The first concrete consumer is a knowledge and document management pipeline:
+Two consumer shapes drive flex-auth, and the first one to ship deliberately
+is not a document pipeline — proving the control plane stays generic.
+
+**First shipped consumer — an action gate (ops-warden SSH signing).** A
+protected system asks flex-auth a single "may this actor perform this action
+now?" question before doing irreversible work:
+
+- it registers a protected system, a resource type (`ssh-certificate`), and an
+  action (`sign`)
+- it sends one policy check per request, passing subject, resource, and
+  context (actor type, principals, TTL, key fingerprint)
+- it enforces the allow/deny decision and records the decision id for audit
+- flex-auth owns the policy and durable decision log; the protected system
+  keeps custody of its own keys and secrets
+
+This first consumer validated that flex-auth's resource/action/context model,
+`POST /v1/check` contract, and decision envelope work for a non-document,
+high-stakes gate without any consumer-specific routes.
+
+**First knowledge-pipeline consumer (planned) — a document and knowledge
+pipeline (Markitect):**

 - it registers knowledge bases, repositories, documents, sections, context
  packages, workflow artifacts, and exports
@@ -159,8 +179,9 @@ The first concrete consumer is a knowledge and document management pipeline:
 - it can redact or drop results based on decisions
 - flex-auth owns central policy administration and durable audit

-This first consumer should shape flex-auth around real document and knowledge
-pipelines without making the policy service consumer-specific.
+Together these shape flex-auth around real authorization needs — both
+point-in-time action gates and result-filtering pipelines — without making the
+policy service consumer-specific.

 ## Non-Goals

--- a/SCOPE.md
+++ b/SCOPE.md
@@ -72,15 +72,22 @@ can be coordinated behind a stable flex-auth API.

 ## Current State

-The repository contains the intent baseline, authorization landscape
-research, initial workplans, and the pre-implementation assessment and
-ADR set produced on 2026-05-15. `FLEX-WP-0001` is complete. Implementation
-now proceeds through `FLEX-WP-0005 Foundations and Topaz Alignment` —
-which lands the Go skeleton, pins the `FlexAuthResourceManifest` schema,
-runs the Topaz mapping spike, and records ADR-001/002/003 — before the
-standalone policy-as-code core in `FLEX-WP-0002`. Markitect consumer
-integration and delegated PDP/directory adapters are planned after the
-core contracts stabilize.
+The standalone core is implemented. The repository carries the intent
+baseline, authorization landscape research, ADR set, and a working Go
+service (`cmd/flex-auth`) with `validate`, `load-registry`, `serve`, and
+`POST /v1/check` plus registry, policy, decision, and audit internals.
+`FLEX-WP-0001`, `FLEX-WP-0005` (foundations and Topaz alignment), and
+`FLEX-WP-0006` (the ops-warden SSH signing policy gate) are complete.
+
+The **first shipped protected-system consumer is ops-warden**: its opt-in
+pre-sign gate calls `POST /v1/check` for `resource.type: ssh-certificate`,
+`action: sign` decisions (`examples/ops-warden/`, policy package, allow/deny
+fixtures, and tests). `FLEX-WP-0007` deploys flex-auth as a reachable
+production runtime for that gate; it is `blocked` only on T4 — the joint
+OpenBao-backed smoke awaiting a refreshed scoped `VAULT_TOKEN` — with all
+repo-side artifacts already published. Markitect consumer integration
+(`FLEX-WP-0003`) and delegated PDP/directory adapters (`FLEX-WP-0004`)
+remain planned on top of the stable core contracts.

 State Hub integration is present through:

@@ -127,7 +134,15 @@ local diagnostics.
 - key-cape / NetKingdom SSO: identity source and coarse claims provider;
  flex-auth consumes the **NetKingdom IAM Profile**
  (`~/net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md`).
- Markitect: first protected-system consumer and policy enforcement point.
+- ops-warden: first **shipped** protected-system consumer. Its opt-in
+  pre-sign gate calls flex-auth for `ssh-certificate` / `sign` decisions
+  before issuing a short-lived SSH certificate (`FLEX-WP-0006`,
+  `FLEX-WP-0007`). ops-warden owns the SSH CA, OpenBao signing, and actor
+  inventory; flex-auth owns the policy decision. ops-warden's routing
+  charter names flex-auth as the owner of every "may I perform action X?"
+  question.
+- Markitect: first planned **knowledge-pipeline** consumer and policy
+  enforcement point (`FLEX-WP-0003`).
 - Topaz: aligned evaluator. Per ADR-003 the standalone core is shaped
  to match Topaz's Rego + directory model from day one; the Topaz
  adapter in `FLEX-WP-0004` is therefore a small step rather than a
@@ -143,12 +158,13 @@ local diagnostics.

 ## Disjoint From

- **ops-warden** signs short-lived SSH certificates for ops actors
-  (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`). That is a separate identity surface — SSH certs,
-  not OIDC subjects — and ops-warden disclaims being a resource-policy
-  engine. flex-auth and ops-warden therefore do not overlap. (A future
-  flow could surface an `agt` actor as a flex-auth subject; nothing in
-  the current design requires it.)
+- **ops-warden** is a flex-auth *consumer*, not an overlap (see Related /
+  Overlapping). The two remain disjoint on **identity surface**: ops-warden
+  issues SSH certificates for ops actors (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`) and is not a
+  resource-policy engine; flex-auth decides whether a given sign request is
+  allowed and never issues certificates. The once-hypothetical flow of
+  surfacing an `agt` actor as a flex-auth subject is now realized through
+  the signing policy gate.
 - **ops-bridge** owns SSH reverse-tunnel connectivity and explicitly
  disclaims being a credential authority or policy engine. No overlap.

--- a/cmd/flex-auth/main.go
+++ b/cmd/flex-auth/main.go
@@ -337,6 +337,16 @@ func runServe(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 		return fail(stderr, err)
 	}

+	mux := newServeMux(engine)
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "flex-auth serving on http://%s\n", *addr)
+	if err := http.ListenAndServe(*addr, mux); err != nil {
+		return fail(stderr, err)
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func newServeMux(engine *decisioncore.Engine) *http.ServeMux {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		w.Header().Set("content-type", "application/json")
@@ -368,12 +378,7 @@ func runServe(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 		decisions, err := engine.BatchCheck(r.Context(), request)
 		writeHTTP(w, decisions, err)
 	})
-
-	fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "flex-auth serving on http://%s\n", *addr)
-	if err := http.ListenAndServe(*addr, mux); err != nil {
-		return fail(stderr, err)
-	}
-	return 0
+	return mux
 }

 func buildEngine(ctx context.Context, registryPath, policyPath, logPath string) (*decisioncore.Engine, error) {
--- a/cmd/flex-auth/main_test.go
+++ b/cmd/flex-auth/main_test.go
@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ package main

 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -74,6 +78,203 @@ func TestRunBatchCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestRunCheckOpsWarden(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := run([]string{
+		"check",
+		"--registry", opsPath("registry_snapshot.json"),
+		"--policy", opsPath("policy_package.md"),
+		"--request", opsPath("check_request_allow_adm.json"),
+	}, &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, stderr = %s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+
+	var decision api.DecisionEnvelope
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &decision); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal decision: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
+	}
+	if decision.Effect != api.DecisionEffectAllow {
+		t.Fatalf("decision.Effect = %q; want allow", decision.Effect)
+	}
+	if decision.ID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("decision.ID is empty; ops-warden needs a policy_decision_id")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServeOpsWardenCheckContract(t *testing.T) {
+	logPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decisions.jsonl")
+	engine, err := buildEngine(context.Background(), opsPath("registry_snapshot.json"), opsPath("policy_package.md"), logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildEngine: %v", err)
+	}
+	server := httptest.NewServer(newServeMux(engine))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/healthz")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /healthz: %v", err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /healthz status = %d; want 200", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	allow := postCheck(t, server.URL+"/v1/check", opsPath("check_request_allow_adm.json"))
+	if allow.Effect != api.DecisionEffectAllow || allow.ID == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("allow decision = %+v; want allow with id", allow)
+	}
+
+	deny := postCheck(t, server.URL+"/v1/check", opsPath("check_request_deny_ttl_above_max.json"))
+	if deny.Effect != api.DecisionEffectDeny || deny.Reason != "ttl_out_of_bounds" {
+		t.Fatalf("deny decision = %+v; want ttl_out_of_bounds deny", deny)
+	}
+
+	resp, err = http.Get(server.URL + "/v1/check")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /v1/check: %v", err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /v1/check status = %d; want 405", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	resp, err = http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/check", "application/json", strings.NewReader(`{"subject":`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("POST malformed /v1/check: %v", err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("malformed POST status = %d; want 400", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	logData, err := os.ReadFile(logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read decision log: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(logData), allow.ID) || !strings.Contains(string(logData), deny.ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("decision log does not contain both decision ids\nlog: %s\nallow: %s deny: %s", string(logData), allow.ID, deny.ID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunLoadRegistryOpsWardenProduction(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := run([]string{"load-registry", "--file", opsPath("production_registry_snapshot.json")}, &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, stderr = %s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+
+	var result map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &result); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal load-registry output: %v; stdout = %s", err, stdout.String())
+	}
+	if result["subjects"] != float64(4) || result["relationships"] != float64(4) || result["resource_manifests"] != float64(1) {
+		t.Fatalf("load-registry result = %+v; want production actor registry counts", result)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpsWardenProductionRegistryActors(t *testing.T) {
+	engine, err := buildEngine(context.Background(), opsPath("production_registry_snapshot.json"), opsPath("policy_package.md"), "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildEngine: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		subjectID  string
+		actor      string
+		actorType  string
+		principal  string
+		ttlHours   float64
+		wantEffect api.DecisionEffect
+		wantReason string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "state hub bridge agent allow",
+			subjectID:  "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actor:      "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actorType:  "agt",
+			principal:  "agt-task-bridge",
+			ttlHours:   1,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "state hub bridge IAM subject allow",
+			subjectID:  "iam:agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actor:      "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actorType:  "agt",
+			principal:  "agt-task-bridge",
+			ttlHours:   1,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "codex interhub bootstrap agent allow",
+			subjectID:  "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+			actor:      "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+			actorType:  "agt",
+			principal:  "agt-interhub-bootstrap",
+			ttlHours:   1,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "admin actor allow",
+			subjectID:  "adm-example",
+			actor:      "adm-example",
+			actorType:  "adm",
+			principal:  "adm-full",
+			ttlHours:   4,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "automation actor allow",
+			subjectID:  "atm-backup-daily",
+			actor:      "atm-backup-daily",
+			actorType:  "atm",
+			principal:  "atm-backup-daily",
+			ttlHours:   1,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "ttl above production max denies",
+			subjectID:  "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actor:      "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+			actorType:  "agt",
+			principal:  "agt-task-bridge",
+			ttlHours:   999,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectDeny,
+			wantReason: "ttl_out_of_bounds",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "unregistered production actor denies",
+			subjectID:  "agt-missing",
+			actor:      "agt-missing",
+			actorType:  "agt",
+			principal:  "agt-missing",
+			ttlHours:   1,
+			wantEffect: api.DecisionEffectDeny,
+			wantReason: "unknown_actor_resource",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range cases {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			decision, err := engine.Check(context.Background(), opsWardenProductionSignRequest(tt.subjectID, tt.actor, tt.actorType, tt.principal, tt.ttlHours))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Check: %v", err)
+			}
+			if decision.Effect != tt.wantEffect {
+				t.Fatalf("decision.Effect = %q; want %q; decision: %+v", decision.Effect, tt.wantEffect, decision)
+			}
+			if tt.wantReason != "" && decision.Reason != tt.wantReason {
+				t.Fatalf("decision.Reason = %q; want %q; decision: %+v", decision.Reason, tt.wantReason, decision)
+			}
+			if tt.wantEffect == api.DecisionEffectAllow && decision.ID == "" {
+				t.Fatal("allow decision ID is empty")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRunValidateAccessDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
 	code := run([]string{"validate", "--kind", "access-descriptor", "--file", examplePath("access_descriptor.yaml")}, &stdout, &stderr)
@@ -88,3 +289,52 @@ func TestRunValidateAccessDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
 func examplePath(name string) string {
 	return filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "caring", name)
 }
+
+func opsPath(name string) string {
+	return filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "ops-warden", name)
+}
+
+func opsWardenProductionSignRequest(subjectID, actor, actorType, principal string, ttlHours float64) api.CheckRequest {
+	return api.CheckRequest{
+		ID:     "check:ops-warden-production-" + actor,
+		Tenant: "tenant:platform",
+		Subject: api.SubjectRef{
+			ID:   subjectID,
+			Type: api.SubjectType(actorType),
+		},
+		Action: "sign",
+		Resource: api.ResourceRef{
+			ID:     "ssh-cert:actor/" + actor,
+			Type:   "ssh-certificate",
+			System: "ops-warden",
+		},
+		Context: map[string]any{
+			"principals":         []string{principal},
+			"actor_type":         actorType,
+			"ttl_hours":          ttlHours,
+			"pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-production-fingerprint",
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func postCheck(t *testing.T, url, path string) api.DecisionEnvelope {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+	resp, err := http.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("POST %s: %v", url, err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("POST %s status = %d; want 200", path, resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var decision api.DecisionEnvelope
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&decision); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode %s response: %v", path, err)
+	}
+	return decision
+}
--- a/docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md
+++ b/docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Ops-Warden Policy Gate Handoff
+
+Date: 2026-06-23
+Workplan: FLEX-WP-0006
+Ops-warden unblocker: WARDEN-WP-0009 T01
+
+## Published flex-auth assets
+
+- Policy package: examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
+- Policy fixtures: examples/ops-warden/policy_fixtures.yaml
+- Combined registry fixture: examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json
+- Protected-system manifest: examples/ops-warden/protected_system_manifest.yaml
+- Resource manifest: examples/ops-warden/resource_manifest.yaml
+- Subject manifest: examples/ops-warden/subject_manifest.yaml
+- Service request fixtures: examples/ops-warden/check_request_*.json
+
+## Local service command
+
+    flex-auth serve --addr 127.0.0.1:8080 --registry examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json --policy examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md --log /tmp/flex-auth-ops-warden-decisions.jsonl
+
+Ops-warden can point policy.flex_auth_url at that base URL for local smoke.
+Production should keep policy.fail_closed true unless an explicit break-glass
+procedure exists.
+
+## Fixture coverage
+
+Allow fixtures:
+
+- fixture:ops-warden-adm-sign-allow
+- fixture:ops-warden-agt-sign-allow
+- fixture:ops-warden-atm-sign-allow
+
+Deny fixtures:
+
+- fixture:ops-warden-unknown-subject-deny
+- fixture:ops-warden-actor-type-mismatch-deny
+- fixture:ops-warden-ttl-above-max-deny
+- fixture:ops-warden-disallowed-principal-deny
+- fixture:ops-warden-missing-fingerprint-deny
+
+## Non-secret smoke evidence
+
+CLI validation on 2026-06-23:
+
+- protected-system manifest: valid
+- resource manifest: valid
+- subject manifest: valid
+- registry snapshot: loaded 1 system, 1 resource manifest, 3 subjects,
+  3 groups, 3 relationships, and 1 tenant
+- policy package: valid with 8 passing fixtures
+
+Local /v1/check service smoke on 2026-06-23:
+
+- allow request: effect allow, reason signing_policy_matched,
+  decision id decision:706efe49f68d9ef1
+- deny request: effect deny, reason ttl_out_of_bounds,
+  decision id decision:b69bdc25a988f367
+- GET /v1/check: HTTP 405
+- malformed POST /v1/check: HTTP 400
+- decision log contained both decision ids
+
+## Production sequence for ops-warden
+
+1. Deploy the flex-auth registry and policy package above to the selected
+   flex-auth runtime.
+2. Configure ops-warden policy.flex_auth_url to the flex-auth base URL.
+3. Set policy.enabled: true.
+4. Keep policy.tenant as tenant:platform unless a tenant-specific policy package
+   is introduced.
+5. Run one allow-path sign smoke and confirm signatures.log includes
+   policy_decision_id.
+6. Run one deny-path smoke with fail_closed true and preserve only non-secret
+   evidence.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+flex-auth owns the authorization decision for the signing request. ops-warden
+continues to own actor inventory, SSH CA operation, OpenBao SSH engine
+integration, host documentation, and signatures.log production evidence.
+
+No SSH private keys, OpenBao tokens, database credentials, or real public-key
+material are stored in these fixtures.
+
+
+## FLEX-WP-0007 Production Update
+
+Additional published assets:
+
+- Production registry fixture: examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+- Registry sync runbook: docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+
+Production runtime command:
+
+    flex-auth serve --addr 0.0.0.0:8080 --registry examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json --policy examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md --log /var/log/flex-auth/ops-warden-decisions.jsonl
+
+Use http://flex-auth.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080 when cluster DNS is
+reachable from warden workstations. Otherwise use the approved operator tunnel
+or ingress URL. Always pre-flight GET /healthz from the same workstation before
+enabling policy.enabled with fail_closed true.
+
+Production actor coverage now verifies agt-state-hub-bridge,
+agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap, adm-example, atm-backup-daily, ttl_out_of_bounds,
+unknown_actor_resource, and the iam:agt-state-hub-bridge subject path used by
+WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT.
+
+## FLEX-WP-0007 Closeout Update
+
+On 2026-06-29 ops-warden reported the production policy-gate smoke as passed
+against the deployed flex-auth runtime at `127.0.0.1:18090` from CoulombCore.
+Non-secret evidence: allow decision `decision:032b096c433ad80c` for
+`agt-state-hub-bridge`, deny reason `ttl_out_of_bounds` for an excessive TTL,
+and backend `vault` for the scoped OpenBao signing path. The operator is
+keeping `policy.enabled` off during build-stage/pre-testing; this is a maturity
+posture decision, not a missing flex-auth artifact.
--- a/docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+++ b/docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# Ops-Warden Registry Sync
+
+Date: 2026-06-23
+Workplan: FLEX-WP-0007
+
+This is the flex-auth side of the production policy gate runbook for ops-warden
+SSH signing. ops-warden owns actor inventory and generated registry content;
+flex-auth hosts that registry, evaluates the policy package, and returns the
+decision envelope used by warden sign.
+
+## Production Runtime Target
+
+Use the NetKingdom operator-reachable service URL as the canonical
+policy.flex_auth_url. The preferred target is an in-cluster flex-auth Service
+fronted by the existing operator access path:
+
+    http://flex-auth.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080
+
+If cluster DNS is not reachable from the workstation that runs warden sign, use
+an approved operator tunnel or ingress URL with the same base path semantics. Do
+not turn on policy.enabled with fail_closed true until this pre-flight succeeds
+from the same workstation:
+
+    curl -fsS <policy.flex_auth_url>/healthz
+
+Start the runtime with the production registry snapshot and the ops-warden
+policy package:
+
+    flex-auth serve --addr 0.0.0.0:8080 --registry examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json --policy examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md --log /var/log/flex-auth/ops-warden-decisions.jsonl
+
+The checked-in production snapshot is a non-secret fixture and initial load
+target. Regenerate it from ops-warden inventory whenever actors, principals, or
+TTL defaults change.
+
+## Current Operator Tunnel
+
+As of 2026-06-24, the reachable operator-tunnel URL for CoulombCore is:
+
+    http://127.0.0.1:18090
+
+The tunnel name is flex-auth-coulombcore. It forwards CoulombCore
+127.0.0.1:18090 to the local flex-auth runtime on 127.0.0.1:18090. Verified
+checks from CoulombCore:
+
+- GET /healthz returned HTTP 200.
+- POST /v1/check for agt-state-hub-bridge returned allow with decision:873c6c682a52bebc.
+
+This is an operator tunnel pattern, not a substitute for a future in-cluster
+Service if flex-auth should run inside the cluster.
+
+## Ownership Contract
+
+| Concern | Owner | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Actor names and actor types | ops-warden | inventory.yaml defines adm, agt, and atm actors. |
+| Default principals and TTLs | ops-warden | Used by warden sign and by generated registry attributes. |
+| Registry hosting and reload | flex-auth | Runtime serves the generated snapshot and evaluates it with the policy package. |
+| Policy package semantics | flex-auth | examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md owns allow and deny reasons. |
+| OpenBao SSH signing | ops-warden | flex-auth never receives SSH private keys or Vault tokens. |
+| Production policy.enabled flip | ops-warden operator | Only after healthz and allow/deny smoke pass. |
+
+## Sync Procedure
+
+1. In ops-warden, update the managed inventory source or ~/.config/warden/inventory.yaml.
+2. Regenerate the flex-auth snapshot from ops-warden:
+
+       python scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py ~/.config/warden/inventory.yaml -o registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json
+
+3. Validate the generated file before handoff:
+
+       flex-auth load-registry --file registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json
+
+4. Copy or promote the snapshot to the flex-auth runtime. For repo-level drift
+   coverage, update examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json when
+   the intended production fixture changes.
+5. Restart or reload the flex-auth runtime with the new snapshot.
+6. From the workstation that runs warden sign, verify:
+
+       curl -fsS <policy.flex_auth_url>/healthz
+
+7. Run one allow smoke and one deny smoke. Record only non-secret evidence:
+   actor name, decision id, effect, reason, backend, and whether a certificate
+   was issued.
+
+## Current Production Fixture
+
+The initial fixture mirrors ops-warden production inventory as of 2026-06-23.
+It registers:
+
+| Actor | Type | Principal | Max TTL hours | Allowed subjects |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| adm-example | adm | adm-full | 48 | adm-example, iam:adm-example |
+| agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap | agt | agt-interhub-bootstrap | 2 | agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap, iam:agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap |
+| agt-state-hub-bridge | agt | agt-task-bridge | 24 | agt-state-hub-bridge, iam:agt-state-hub-bridge |
+| atm-backup-daily | atm | atm-backup-daily | 8 | atm-backup-daily, iam:atm-backup-daily |
+
+The IAM subject form is intended for WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT. If that environment
+variable is unset, ops-warden sends the actor name and the same policy path
+continues to work.
+
+## Smoke Expectations
+
+Allow path:
+
+    warden sign agt-state-hub-bridge
+
+Expected non-secret evidence: decision effect allow, reason
+signing_policy_matched, signatures.log includes policy_decision_id.
+
+Deny path:
+
+    warden sign agt-state-hub-bridge --ttl 999
+
+Expected non-secret evidence: effect deny, reason ttl_out_of_bounds, no
+certificate issued. With fail_closed true, unreachable flex-auth must also block
+signing.
+
+OpenBao-backed signing remains an operator smoke because it requires a scoped
+VAULT_TOKEN. The previous session returned HTTP 403 on 2026-06-23; retry with:
+
+    SMOKE_VAULT=1 ~/ops-warden/scripts/policy_gate_production_smoke.sh
+
+## References
+
+- docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md
+- examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+- ~/ops-warden/wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md
+- ~/ops-warden/history/2026-06-23-flex-auth-policy-gate-production-smoke.md
--- a/docs/workplan-planning-map.md
+++ b/docs/workplan-planning-map.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Flex-Auth Workplan Planning Map

-Date: 2026-05-17
+Date: 2026-06-30

 ## Purpose

@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ This document captures the current sequencing view for flex-auth workplans.
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | `FLEX-WP-0001` | complete | done | none | Repo intent, boundaries, and authorization landscape research are complete. |
 | `FLEX-WP-0005` | complete | done | `FLEX-WP-0001` | Foundations and Topaz alignment are complete: ADR-001/002/003, Go skeleton, `FlexAuthResourceManifest` schema pin, Topaz mapping spike, IAM Profile citation, ops-warden boundary clarification. |
-| `FLEX-WP-0002` | P0 | ready | `FLEX-WP-0001`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Standalone policy-as-code core: schemas, local registry, CARING profile/descriptors, Rego-in-Markdown policy packages, check APIs, explanations, decision log, CLI/service skeleton, tests. |
-| `FLEX-WP-0003` | P1 | blocked | `FLEX-WP-0002` | Markitect consumer integration and first CARING benchmark: resource namespace, manifest import, action vocabulary, descriptor fixtures, decision fixtures, integration docs. |
-| `FLEX-WP-0004` | P2 | blocked | `FLEX-WP-0002`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Delegated PDP and directory adapters: Topaz adapter implementation (evaluation already done in `0005`), OpenFGA/SpiceDB, OPA/Cedar, Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra/Graph/SCIM, CARING envelope preservation. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0002` | complete | completed | `FLEX-WP-0001`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Standalone policy-as-code core is complete: schemas, local registry, CARING profile/descriptors, Rego-in-Markdown policy packages, check APIs, explanations, decision log, CLI/service skeleton, tests. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0003` | complete | completed | `FLEX-WP-0002` | Markitect consumer integration and first CARING benchmark are complete: resource namespace, manifest import, action vocabulary, descriptor fixtures, decision fixtures, integration docs. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0004` | complete | completed | `FLEX-WP-0002`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Delegated PDP and directory adapter boundary work is complete: Topaz adapter shape, OpenFGA/SpiceDB, OPA/Cedar, Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra/Graph/SCIM, CARING envelope preservation. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0006` | complete | finished | `FLEX-WP-0002`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Ops-warden unblocker is complete: flex-auth publishes `ssh-certificate` / `sign` policies, fixtures, and `/v1/check` smoke evidence for the opt-in pre-sign gate shipped in ops-warden `WARDEN-WP-0007` and tracked for production in `WARDEN-WP-0009`. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0007` | complete | finished | `FLEX-WP-0006` | Production registry fixture, sync contract, runtime command, healthz coverage, real actor/IAM tests, operator tunnel reachability, and vault-backed joint smoke are complete. `policy.enabled` remains off by maturity decision until testing/production posture calls for live enforcement. |

 ## Dependency Notes

@@ -58,6 +60,14 @@ now implements the Topaz adapter against the spike's output.
 Delegated adapters must preserve flex-auth's CARING descriptor and
 conformance fields even when backend-native role semantics differ.

+`FLEX-WP-0006` was the cross-repo integration unblocker for
+ops-warden. ops-warden already implements the opt-in policy call
+(`policy.enabled: true`) and production OpenBao signing works without the
+gate. flex-auth now publishes the protected-system manifest,
+`ssh-certificate` / `sign` policy package, allow/deny fixtures, and
+`POST /v1/check` evidence that ops-warden can use before enabling
+`policy.enabled` in production.
+
 ## State Hub Mirror

 Native State Hub dependency edges:
@@ -68,3 +78,9 @@ Native State Hub dependency edges:
 - `FLEX-WP-0003 -> FLEX-WP-0002`
 - `FLEX-WP-0004 -> FLEX-WP-0002`
 - `FLEX-WP-0004 -> FLEX-WP-0005` (Topaz adapter consumes the spike)
+- `FLEX-WP-0006 -> FLEX-WP-0002`
+- `FLEX-WP-0006 -> FLEX-WP-0005`
+- ops-warden: `WARDEN-WP-0009` finished (caller + registry smoke). FLEX-WP-0007
+  is also finished; production `policy.enabled: true` waits for a later
+  maturity/posture decision, not for repo-side flex-auth artifacts.
+- `FLEX-WP-0007 -> FLEX-WP-0006`
--- a/examples/README.md
+++ b/examples/README.md
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ examples/
                           # decision, registry, and audit fixtures (P2.1)
  markitect/               # FlexAuthResourceManifest fixtures, decision
                           # fixtures, and Rego-in-Markdown policy packages
+  ops-warden/              # SSH certificate signing policy-gate fixtures
+                           # for ops-warden policy.enabled smoke checks
  topaz/                   # docker-compose + sample directory and policy
                           # for the Topaz alignment spike (P5.4)
  policies/                # generic Rego-in-Markdown packages used by
--- a/examples/ops-warden/README.md
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Ops-Warden SSH Signing Policy Gate
+
+This example is the flex-auth side of ops-warden's opt-in pre-sign gate.
+When `policy.enabled: true`, ops-warden calls `POST /v1/check` before signing
+or issuing an SSH certificate.
+
+Files:
+
+- `protected_system_manifest.yaml` declares the `ops-warden` protected system,
+  `ssh-certificate` resource type, and `sign` action.
+- `resource_manifest.yaml` declares fixture SSH certificate actor resources and
+  non-secret policy attributes such as allowed principals and TTL maxima.
+- `subject_manifest.yaml` declares non-secret fixture actors for `adm`, `agt`,
+  and `atm` signing paths.
+- `registry_snapshot.json` is the combined local registry used by the CLI and
+  service examples.
+- `policy_package.md` is the Rego-in-Markdown policy package.
+- `policy_fixtures.yaml` contains allow and deny expectations for package
+  validation.
+- `check_request_*.json` files are ops-warden-shaped `/v1/check` requests.
+
+Run locally:
+
+```bash
+flex-auth validate --kind protected-system --file examples/ops-warden/protected_system_manifest.yaml
+flex-auth validate --kind resource-manifest --file examples/ops-warden/resource_manifest.yaml
+flex-auth validate --kind subject-manifest --file examples/ops-warden/subject_manifest.yaml
+flex-auth load-registry --file examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json
+flex-auth test-policy --file examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
+flex-auth check --registry examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json --policy examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md --request examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_adm.json
+```
+
+The fixture public-key fingerprints are examples only. Do not put real keys,
+OpenBao tokens, or private signing material in these files.
+
+
+## Production Registry Fixture
+
+production_registry_snapshot.json is a non-secret fixture generated by
+ops-warden for FLEX-WP-0007 coverage. It mirrors the current production actor
+names used by ops-warden inventory and should be refreshed when that inventory
+changes.
+
+Validate both registries locally:
+
+    flex-auth load-registry --file examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json
+    flex-auth load-registry --file examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+
+The production sync contract is documented in docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md.
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_adm.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_adm.json
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "platform-steward",
+    "type": "adm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "platform",
+      "root"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "adm",
+    "ttl_hours": 4,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_agt.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_agt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "agt"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "deploy"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "agt",
+    "ttl_hours": 1,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_atm.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_atm.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-backup-automation-atm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "backup-automation",
+    "type": "atm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "backup"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "atm",
+    "ttl_hours": 1,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-atm-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_actor_type_mismatch.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_actor_type_mismatch.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "adm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "deploy"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "agt",
+    "ttl_hours": 1,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_disallowed_principal.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_disallowed_principal.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "agt"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "root"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "agt",
+    "ttl_hours": 1,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_missing_fingerprint.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_missing_fingerprint.json
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "platform-steward",
+    "type": "adm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "platform"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "adm",
+    "ttl_hours": 4
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_ttl_above_max.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_ttl_above_max.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "platform-steward",
+    "type": "adm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "platform"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "adm",
+    "ttl_hours": 12,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {
+    "id": "unknown-actor",
+    "type": "adm"
+  },
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "principals": [
+      "platform"
+    ],
+    "actor_type": "adm",
+    "ttl_hours": 4,
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+  }
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/policy_fixtures.yaml
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/policy_fixtures.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-adm-sign-allow",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "platform-steward",
+        "type": "adm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+          "actor_type": "adm",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "platform-steward",
+            "iam:platform-steward"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "platform",
+            "root"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 8
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "platform",
+          "root"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "adm",
+        "ttl_hours": 4,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "allow",
+      "reason": "signing_policy_matched"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-agt-sign-allow",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "agt"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+          "actor_type": "agt",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "ci-deploy-agent",
+            "iam:ci-deploy-agent"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "deploy",
+            "git"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 2
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "deploy"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "agt",
+        "ttl_hours": 1,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "allow",
+      "reason": "signing_policy_matched"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-atm-sign-allow",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-backup-automation-atm",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "backup-automation",
+        "type": "atm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "backup-automation",
+          "actor_type": "atm",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "backup-automation",
+            "iam:backup-automation"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "backup"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 1
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "backup"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "atm",
+        "ttl_hours": 1,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-atm-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "allow",
+      "reason": "signing_policy_matched"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-unknown-subject-deny",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "unknown-actor",
+        "type": "adm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+          "actor_type": "adm",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "platform-steward",
+            "iam:platform-steward"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "platform",
+            "root"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 8
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "platform"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "adm",
+        "ttl_hours": 4,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "deny",
+      "reason": "unknown_subject"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-actor-type-mismatch-deny",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "adm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+          "actor_type": "agt",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "ci-deploy-agent",
+            "iam:ci-deploy-agent"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "deploy",
+            "git"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 2
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "deploy"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "agt",
+        "ttl_hours": 1,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "deny",
+      "reason": "actor_type_mismatch"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-ttl-above-max-deny",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "platform-steward",
+        "type": "adm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+          "actor_type": "adm",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "platform-steward",
+            "iam:platform-steward"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "platform",
+            "root"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 8
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "platform"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "adm",
+        "ttl_hours": 12,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "deny",
+      "reason": "ttl_out_of_bounds"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-disallowed-principal-deny",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-ci-deploy-agent-agt",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "agt"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+          "actor_type": "agt",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "ci-deploy-agent",
+            "iam:ci-deploy-agent"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "deploy",
+            "git"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 2
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "root"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "agt",
+        "ttl_hours": 1,
+        "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-agt-fingerprint"
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "deny",
+      "reason": "disallowed_principal"
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fixture:ops-warden-missing-fingerprint-deny",
+    "request": {
+      "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "subject": {
+        "id": "platform-steward",
+        "type": "adm"
+      },
+      "action": "sign",
+      "resource": {
+        "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+        "type": "ssh-certificate",
+        "system": "ops-warden",
+        "attributes": {
+          "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+          "actor_type": "adm",
+          "allowed_subjects": [
+            "platform-steward",
+            "iam:platform-steward"
+          ],
+          "allowed_principals": [
+            "platform",
+            "root"
+          ],
+          "max_ttl_hours": 8
+        }
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "principals": [
+          "platform"
+        ],
+        "actor_type": "adm",
+        "ttl_hours": 4
+      }
+    },
+    "expect": {
+      "effect": "deny",
+      "reason": "missing_pubkey_fingerprint"
+    }
+  }
+]
--- a/examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+---
+id: ops-warden.ssh-certificate.sign
+name: Ops-Warden SSH certificate signing
+namespace: ops-warden:ssh-certificate
+version: v1
+status: ready
+package: flexauth.ops_warden.ssh_signing
+actions:
+  - sign
+owner: team:platform-security
+fixtures:
+  - policy_fixtures.yaml
+caring:
+  profile: caring-0.4.0-rc2
+  enforce: false
+  canonical_roles:
+    - Operator
+  organization_relations:
+    - ServiceProvider
+  scopes:
+    - level: Platform
+      id: platform:ssh-signing
+      tenant: tenant:platform
+  planes:
+    - Identity
+    - Secret
+    - Audit
+  capabilities:
+    - Use
+    - Operate
+    - Audit
+  exposure_modes:
+    - Metadata
+  conditions:
+    - TimeLimited
+    - Logged
+  restrictions:
+    - PrivilegeEscalationBlocked
+    - SecretAccessBlocked
+activation:
+  mode: local
+metadata:
+  source: examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
+  ops_warden_policy_gate: v2
+---
+
+# Ops-Warden SSH Certificate Signing
+
+This package authorizes ops-warden's opt-in pre-sign policy gate. The caller
+keeps SSH CA custody, actor inventory, and OpenBao signing; flex-auth decides
+whether a specific `sign` request is allowed now.
+
+## Rules
+
+```rego
+import future.keywords.contains
+import future.keywords.if
+import future.keywords.in
+
+actor_types := {"adm", "agt", "atm"}
+
+decision := {"effect": "allow", "reason": "signing_policy_matched"} if {
+  allowed
+} else := {"effect": "deny", "reason": first_denial} if {
+  true
+}
+
+allowed if {
+  input.action == "sign"
+  input.resource.system == "ops-warden"
+  input.resource.type == "ssh-certificate"
+  effective_tenant == "tenant:platform"
+  valid_actor_type
+  subject_type_matches_context
+  actor_type_matches_resource
+  resource_id_matches_actor
+  subject_id_allowed
+  valid_ttl
+  has_pubkey_fingerprint
+  principals_allowed
+}
+
+default effective_tenant := ""
+
+effective_tenant := input.tenant if {
+  is_string(input.tenant)
+  input.tenant != ""
+} else := input.resource.tenant if {
+  is_string(input.resource.tenant)
+  input.resource.tenant != ""
+} else := input.subject.tenant if {
+  is_string(input.subject.tenant)
+  input.subject.tenant != ""
+}
+
+default first_denial := "no_matching_rule"
+
+first_denial := "wrong_action" if {
+  input.action != "sign"
+} else := "wrong_system" if {
+  input.resource.system != "ops-warden"
+} else := "wrong_resource_type" if {
+  input.resource.type != "ssh-certificate"
+} else := "wrong_tenant" if {
+  effective_tenant != "tenant:platform"
+} else := "unknown_actor_resource" if {
+  not has_actor_resource
+} else := "unknown_subject" if {
+  not subject_id_allowed
+} else := "actor_type_mismatch" if {
+  not valid_actor_type
+} else := "actor_type_mismatch" if {
+  not subject_type_matches_context
+} else := "actor_type_mismatch" if {
+  not actor_type_matches_resource
+} else := "actor_resource_mismatch" if {
+  not resource_id_matches_actor
+} else := "ttl_out_of_bounds" if {
+  not valid_ttl
+} else := "missing_pubkey_fingerprint" if {
+  not has_pubkey_fingerprint
+} else := "missing_principal" if {
+  not has_principals
+} else := "disallowed_principal" if {
+  count(disallowed_principals) > 0
+}
+
+has_actor_resource if {
+  is_string(input.resource.attributes.actor_id)
+  input.resource.attributes.actor_id != ""
+}
+
+valid_actor_type if {
+  is_string(input.context.actor_type)
+  input.context.actor_type in actor_types
+}
+
+subject_type_matches_context if {
+  input.subject.type == input.context.actor_type
+}
+
+subject_type_matches_context if {
+  input.subject.attributes.actor_type == input.context.actor_type
+}
+
+actor_type_matches_resource if {
+  input.context.actor_type == input.resource.attributes.actor_type
+}
+
+resource_id_matches_actor if {
+  input.resource.id == sprintf("ssh-cert:actor/%s", [input.resource.attributes.actor_id])
+}
+
+subject_id_allowed if {
+  input.subject.id in input.resource.attributes.allowed_subjects
+}
+
+has_ttl if {
+  is_number(input.context.ttl_hours)
+}
+
+valid_ttl if {
+  has_ttl
+  input.context.ttl_hours > 0
+  input.context.ttl_hours <= input.resource.attributes.max_ttl_hours
+}
+
+has_pubkey_fingerprint if {
+  is_string(input.context.pubkey_fingerprint)
+  input.context.pubkey_fingerprint != ""
+}
+
+has_principals if {
+  count(input.context.principals) > 0
+}
+
+principals_allowed if {
+  has_principals
+  count(disallowed_principals) == 0
+}
+
+allowed_principal(principal) if {
+  principal in input.resource.attributes.allowed_principals
+}
+
+disallowed_principals contains principal if {
+  principal := input.context.principals[_]
+  not allowed_principal(principal)
+}
+```
+
+## Tests
+
+```rego test
+package flexauth.ops_warden.ssh_signing_test
+
+import future.keywords.if
+import data.flexauth.ops_warden.ssh_signing
+
+adm_request := {
+  "id": "check:ops-warden-platform-steward-adm",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+  "subject": {"id": "platform-steward", "type": "adm"},
+  "action": "sign",
+  "resource": {
+    "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+    "type": "ssh-certificate",
+    "system": "ops-warden",
+    "attributes": {
+      "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+      "actor_type": "adm",
+      "allowed_subjects": ["platform-steward", "iam:platform-steward"],
+      "allowed_principals": ["platform", "root"],
+      "max_ttl_hours": 8
+    }
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "actor_type": "adm",
+    "principals": ["platform"],
+    "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint",
+    "ttl_hours": 4
+  }
+}
+
+test_adm_sign_allowed if {
+  ssh_signing.decision.effect == "allow" with input as adm_request
+}
+
+test_high_ttl_denied if {
+  ssh_signing.decision.reason == "ttl_out_of_bounds" with input as {
+    "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+    "subject": {"id": "platform-steward", "type": "adm"},
+    "action": "sign",
+    "resource": adm_request.resource,
+    "context": {
+      "actor_type": "adm",
+      "principals": ["platform"],
+      "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:example-adm-fingerprint",
+      "ttl_hours": 12
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+test_missing_fingerprint_denied if {
+  ssh_signing.decision.reason == "missing_pubkey_fingerprint" with input as {
+    "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+    "subject": {"id": "platform-steward", "type": "adm"},
+    "action": "sign",
+    "resource": adm_request.resource,
+    "context": {
+      "actor_type": "adm",
+      "principals": ["platform"],
+      "ttl_hours": 4
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
--- a/examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+{
+  "systems": [
+    {
+      "id": "ops-warden",
+      "name": "Ops Warden",
+      "resource_types": [
+        {
+          "name": "ssh-certificate",
+          "scope_level": "Resource",
+          "planes": [
+            "Identity",
+            "Secret",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "metadata": {
+            "description": "Short-lived SSH certificate signing request."
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "actions": [
+        {
+          "name": "sign",
+          "capabilities": [
+            "Use",
+            "Operate",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "planes": [
+            "Identity",
+            "Secret",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "exposure_modes": [
+            "Metadata"
+          ],
+          "metadata": {
+            "required_context": [
+              "principals",
+              "actor_type",
+              "pubkey_fingerprint",
+              "ttl_hours"
+            ]
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "caring_profiles": [
+        "caring-0.4.0-rc2"
+      ],
+      "metadata": {
+        "flex_auth_contract": "protected-system-v0",
+        "ops_warden_policy_gate": "v2",
+        "policy_enabled_config": "policy.enabled",
+        "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "resource_manifests": [
+    {
+      "id": "ops-warden-ssh-certificates",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "resources": [
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/adm-example",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "adm"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "adm-example",
+            "actor_type": "adm",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "adm-example",
+              "iam:adm-example"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "adm-full"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 48
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "agt"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+            "actor_type": "agt",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+              "iam:agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "agt-interhub-bootstrap"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 2
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-state-hub-bridge",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "agt"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+            "actor_type": "agt",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+              "iam:agt-state-hub-bridge"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "agt-task-bridge"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 24
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/atm-backup-daily",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "atm"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "atm-backup-daily",
+            "actor_type": "atm",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "atm-backup-daily",
+              "iam:atm-backup-daily"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "atm-backup-daily"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 8
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "actions": [
+        "sign"
+      ],
+      "caring_profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+      "metadata": {
+        "flex_auth_contract": "resource-registration-v0",
+        "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "tenants": [
+    {
+      "id": "tenant:platform",
+      "name": "Platform Tenant"
+    }
+  ],
+  "subjects": [
+    {
+      "id": "adm-example",
+      "type": "Agent",
+      "display_name": "Example human operator \u2014 replace with per-person adm-* actors",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-admins"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "adm"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+      "type": "Agent",
+      "display_name": "Short-lived agent access for attended Inter-Hub bootstrap",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-agents"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "agt"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "agt-state-hub-bridge",
+      "type": "Agent",
+      "display_name": "ops-bridge tunnel agent for state-hub",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-agents"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "agt"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "atm-backup-daily",
+      "type": "Automation",
+      "display_name": "Example nightly automation actor",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-automations"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "atm"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "groups": [
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-admins",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Admins",
+      "members": [
+        "adm-example"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-agents",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Agents",
+      "members": [
+        "agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+        "agt-state-hub-bridge"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-automations",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Automations",
+      "members": [
+        "atm-backup-daily"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    }
+  ],
+  "relationships": [
+    {
+      "id": "rel:adm-example-sign-adm-example",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-admins",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/adm-example",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-adm-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/adm-example",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/adm-example"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rel:agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap-sign-agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-agents",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-agt-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rel:agt-state-hub-bridge-sign-agt-state-hub-bridge",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-agents",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-state-hub-bridge",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-agt-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-state-hub-bridge",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/agt-state-hub-bridge"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rel:atm-backup-daily-sign-atm-backup-daily",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-automations",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/atm-backup-daily",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-atm-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/atm-backup-daily",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/atm-backup-daily"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/protected_system_manifest.yaml
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/protected_system_manifest.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+id: ops-warden
+name: Ops Warden
+resource_types:
+  - name: ssh-certificate
+    scope_level: Resource
+    planes:
+      - Identity
+      - Secret
+      - Audit
+    metadata:
+      description: Short-lived SSH certificate signing request.
+actions:
+  - name: sign
+    capabilities:
+      - Use
+      - Operate
+      - Audit
+    planes:
+      - Identity
+      - Secret
+      - Audit
+    exposure_modes:
+      - Metadata
+    metadata:
+      required_context:
+        - principals
+        - actor_type
+        - pubkey_fingerprint
+        - ttl_hours
+caring_profiles:
+  - caring-0.4.0-rc2
+metadata:
+  flex_auth_contract: protected-system-v0
+  ops_warden_policy_gate: v2
+  policy_enabled_config: policy.enabled
+  tenant: tenant:platform
--- a/examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+{
+  "systems": [
+    {
+      "id": "ops-warden",
+      "name": "Ops Warden",
+      "resource_types": [
+        {
+          "name": "ssh-certificate",
+          "scope_level": "Resource",
+          "planes": [
+            "Identity",
+            "Secret",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "metadata": {
+            "description": "Short-lived SSH certificate signing request."
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "actions": [
+        {
+          "name": "sign",
+          "capabilities": [
+            "Use",
+            "Operate",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "planes": [
+            "Identity",
+            "Secret",
+            "Audit"
+          ],
+          "exposure_modes": [
+            "Metadata"
+          ],
+          "metadata": {
+            "required_context": [
+              "principals",
+              "actor_type",
+              "pubkey_fingerprint",
+              "ttl_hours"
+            ]
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "caring_profiles": [
+        "caring-0.4.0-rc2"
+      ],
+      "metadata": {
+        "flex_auth_contract": "protected-system-v0",
+        "ops_warden_policy_gate": "v2",
+        "policy_enabled_config": "policy.enabled",
+        "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "resource_manifests": [
+    {
+      "id": "ops-warden-ssh-certificates",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "resources": [
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "adm"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "platform-steward",
+            "actor_type": "adm",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "platform-steward",
+              "iam:platform-steward"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "platform",
+              "root"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 8
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "agt"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+            "actor_type": "agt",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "ci-deploy-agent",
+              "iam:ci-deploy-agent"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "deploy",
+              "git"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 2
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation",
+          "type": "ssh-certificate",
+          "labels": [
+            "ssh-signing",
+            "atm"
+          ],
+          "trust_zone": "platform",
+          "owner": "team:platform-security",
+          "attributes": {
+            "actor_id": "backup-automation",
+            "actor_type": "atm",
+            "allowed_subjects": [
+              "backup-automation",
+              "iam:backup-automation"
+            ],
+            "allowed_principals": [
+              "backup"
+            ],
+            "max_ttl_hours": 1
+          }
+        }
+      ],
+      "actions": [
+        "sign"
+      ],
+      "caring_profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+      "metadata": {
+        "flex_auth_contract": "resource-registration-v0",
+        "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "tenants": [
+    {
+      "id": "tenant:platform",
+      "name": "Platform Tenant"
+    }
+  ],
+  "subjects": [
+    {
+      "id": "platform-steward",
+      "type": "Agent",
+      "display_name": "Platform Steward",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-admins"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "adm"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "ci-deploy-agent",
+      "type": "Agent",
+      "display_name": "CI Deploy Agent",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-agents"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "agt"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "backup-automation",
+      "type": "Automation",
+      "display_name": "Backup Automation",
+      "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+      "roles": [
+        "Operator"
+      ],
+      "groups": [
+        "group:ops-warden-automations"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "metadata": {
+        "actor_type": "atm"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "groups": [
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-admins",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Admin Actors",
+      "members": [
+        "platform-steward"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-agents",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Agent Actors",
+      "members": [
+        "ci-deploy-agent"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "group:ops-warden-automations",
+      "display_name": "Ops Warden Automation Actors",
+      "members": [
+        "backup-automation"
+      ],
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform"
+    }
+  ],
+  "relationships": [
+    {
+      "id": "rel:platform-steward-sign-platform-steward",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-admins",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-adm-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rel:ci-deploy-agent-sign-ci-deploy-agent",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-agents",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-agt-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rel:backup-automation-sign-backup-automation",
+      "system": "ops-warden",
+      "subject": "group:ops-warden-automations",
+      "relation": "signer",
+      "object": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation",
+      "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+      "conditions": [
+        "TimeLimited",
+        "Logged"
+      ],
+      "caring": {
+        "id": "descriptor:ops-warden-atm-signer",
+        "profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
+        "subject_type": "Group",
+        "organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
+        "canonical_role": "Operator",
+        "scope": {
+          "level": "Resource",
+          "id": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation",
+          "tenant": "tenant:platform",
+          "resource": "ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation"
+        },
+        "planes": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Secret",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "capabilities": [
+          "Use",
+          "Operate",
+          "Audit"
+        ],
+        "exposure_modes": [
+          "Metadata"
+        ],
+        "conditions": [
+          "TimeLimited",
+          "Logged"
+        ],
+        "restrictions": [
+          "PrivilegeEscalationBlocked",
+          "SecretAccessBlocked"
+        ],
+        "access_path": "mediated"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
--- a/examples/ops-warden/resource_manifest.yaml
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/resource_manifest.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+id: ops-warden-ssh-certificates
+system: ops-warden
+resources:
+  - id: ssh-cert:actor/platform-steward
+    type: ssh-certificate
+    labels:
+      - ssh-signing
+      - adm
+    trust_zone: platform
+    owner: team:platform-security
+    attributes:
+      actor_id: platform-steward
+      actor_type: adm
+      allowed_subjects:
+        - platform-steward
+        - iam:platform-steward
+      allowed_principals:
+        - platform
+        - root
+      max_ttl_hours: 8
+  - id: ssh-cert:actor/ci-deploy-agent
+    type: ssh-certificate
+    labels:
+      - ssh-signing
+      - agt
+    trust_zone: platform
+    owner: team:platform-security
+    attributes:
+      actor_id: ci-deploy-agent
+      actor_type: agt
+      allowed_subjects:
+        - ci-deploy-agent
+        - iam:ci-deploy-agent
+      allowed_principals:
+        - deploy
+        - git
+      max_ttl_hours: 2
+  - id: ssh-cert:actor/backup-automation
+    type: ssh-certificate
+    labels:
+      - ssh-signing
+      - atm
+    trust_zone: platform
+    owner: team:platform-security
+    attributes:
+      actor_id: backup-automation
+      actor_type: atm
+      allowed_subjects:
+        - backup-automation
+        - iam:backup-automation
+      allowed_principals:
+        - backup
+      max_ttl_hours: 1
+actions:
+  - sign
+caring_profile: caring-0.4.0-rc2
+metadata:
+  flex_auth_contract: resource-registration-v0
+  tenant: tenant:platform
--- a/examples/ops-warden/subject_manifest.yaml
+++ b/examples/ops-warden/subject_manifest.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+id: subjects:ops-warden-platform
+tenants:
+  - id: tenant:platform
+    name: Platform Tenant
+subjects:
+  - id: platform-steward
+    type: Agent
+    display_name: Platform Steward
+    organization_relation: ServiceProvider
+    roles:
+      - Operator
+    groups:
+      - group:ops-warden-admins
+    tenant: tenant:platform
+    metadata:
+      actor_type: adm
+  - id: ci-deploy-agent
+    type: Agent
+    display_name: CI Deploy Agent
+    organization_relation: ServiceProvider
+    roles:
+      - Operator
+    groups:
+      - group:ops-warden-agents
+    tenant: tenant:platform
+    metadata:
+      actor_type: agt
+  - id: backup-automation
+    type: Automation
+    display_name: Backup Automation
+    organization_relation: ServiceProvider
+    roles:
+      - Operator
+    groups:
+      - group:ops-warden-automations
+    tenant: tenant:platform
+    metadata:
+      actor_type: atm
+groups:
+  - id: group:ops-warden-admins
+    display_name: Ops Warden Admin Actors
+    members:
+      - platform-steward
+    tenant: tenant:platform
+  - id: group:ops-warden-agents
+    display_name: Ops Warden Agent Actors
+    members:
+      - ci-deploy-agent
+    tenant: tenant:platform
+  - id: group:ops-warden-automations
+    display_name: Ops Warden Automation Actors
+    members:
+      - backup-automation
+    tenant: tenant:platform
--- a/internal/decision/engine.go
+++ b/internal/decision/engine.go
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ func (e *Engine) BatchCheck(ctx context.Context, request api.BatchCheckRequest)
 	for _, resource := range request.Resources {
 		decision, err := e.Check(ctx, api.CheckRequest{
 			ID:            request.ID,
+			Tenant:        request.Tenant,
 			Subject:       request.Subject,
 			Action:        request.Action,
 			Resource:      resource,
@@ -188,6 +189,15 @@ func (e *Engine) normalizeRequest(request api.CheckRequest) (api.CheckRequest, r
 	normalized := request
 	facts := registryFacts{}

+	if normalized.Tenant != "" {
+		if normalized.Subject.Tenant == "" {
+			normalized.Subject.Tenant = normalized.Tenant
+		}
+		if normalized.Resource.Tenant == "" {
+			normalized.Resource.Tenant = normalized.Tenant
+		}
+	}
+
 	if subject, ok := e.store.Subject(request.Subject.ID); ok {
 		facts.subjectFound = true
 		facts.subject = subject
--- a/internal/policy/package_test.go
+++ b/internal/policy/package_test.go
@@ -74,6 +74,28 @@ func TestRedactPolicyPackageMarkdownValidates(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestOpsWardenPolicyPackageMarkdownValidates(t *testing.T) {
+	pkg, err := policy.LoadAndValidateFile(context.Background(), filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "ops-warden", "policy_package.md"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadAndValidateFile: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if !pkg.Valid {
+		t.Fatalf("pkg.Valid = false\n%s", formatValidation(pkg.Validation))
+	}
+	if pkg.Metadata.Namespace != "ops-warden:ssh-certificate" {
+		t.Fatalf("metadata.Namespace = %q; want ops-warden:ssh-certificate", pkg.Metadata.Namespace)
+	}
+	if len(pkg.Validation.Fixtures) != 8 {
+		t.Fatalf("Validation.Fixtures len = %d; want 8", len(pkg.Validation.Fixtures))
+	}
+	for _, fixture := range pkg.Validation.Fixtures {
+		if !fixture.Passed {
+			t.Fatalf("fixture %s failed: %s\nactual: %+v", fixture.ID, fixture.Error, fixture.Actual)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCaringFindingsAreAdvisoryUntilEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 	doc := inlinePolicy(false, "allow")
 	pkg, err := policy.Load([]byte(doc), "inline-policy.md")
--- a/pkg/api/canonical.go
+++ b/pkg/api/canonical.go
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ type DecisionExpectation struct {
 // CheckRequest is the stable protected-system-facing decision request.
 type CheckRequest struct {
 	ID            string                  `json:"id,omitempty"             yaml:"id,omitempty"`
+	Tenant        string                  `json:"tenant,omitempty"         yaml:"tenant,omitempty"`
 	Subject       SubjectRef              `json:"subject"                  yaml:"subject"`
 	Action        string                  `json:"action"                   yaml:"action"`
 	Resource      ResourceRef             `json:"resource"                 yaml:"resource"`
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ type CheckRequest struct {
 // BatchCheckRequest evaluates one subject/action against multiple resources.
 type BatchCheckRequest struct {
 	ID            string         `json:"id,omitempty"             yaml:"id,omitempty"`
+	Tenant        string         `json:"tenant,omitempty"         yaml:"tenant,omitempty"`
 	Subject       SubjectRef     `json:"subject"                  yaml:"subject"`
 	Action        string         `json:"action"                   yaml:"action"`
 	Resources     []ResourceRef  `json:"resources"                yaml:"resources"`
--- a/schemas/check_request.schema.json
+++ b/schemas/check_request.schema.json
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  "required": ["subject", "action", "resource"],
  "properties": {
    "id": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
+    "tenant": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
    "subject": {"$ref": "#/$defs/subject_ref"},
    "action": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
    "resource": {"$ref": "#/$defs/resource_ref"},
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0001-repo-intent-and-architecture-baseline.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0001-repo-intent-and-architecture-baseline.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: FLEX-WP-0001
 type: workplan
 title: "Repo Intent and Authorization Architecture Baseline"
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 status: done
 owner: flex-auth
 topic_slug: flex-auth
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0002-standalone-policy-as-code-core.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0002-standalone-policy-as-code-core.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: FLEX-WP-0002
 type: workplan
 title: "Standalone Policy-as-Code Core"
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 status: completed
 owner: flex-auth
 topic_slug: flex-auth
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0003-markitect-consumer-integration.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0003-markitect-consumer-integration.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: FLEX-WP-0003
 type: workplan
 title: "Markitect Consumer Integration"
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 status: completed
 owner: flex-auth
 topic_slug: flex-auth
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0004-delegated-pdp-and-directory-adapters.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0004-delegated-pdp-and-directory-adapters.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: FLEX-WP-0004
 type: workplan
 title: "Delegated PDP and Directory Adapters"
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 status: completed
 owner: flex-auth
 topic_slug: flex-auth
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0005-foundations-and-topaz-alignment.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0005-foundations-and-topaz-alignment.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: FLEX-WP-0005
 type: workplan
 title: "Foundations and Topaz Alignment"
-domain: netkingdom
+domain: infotech
 status: done
 owner: flex-auth
 topic_slug: flex-auth
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0006-ops-warden-ssh-signing-policy-gate.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0006-ops-warden-ssh-signing-policy-gate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+id: FLEX-WP-0006
+type: workplan
+title: "Ops-Warden SSH Signing Policy Gate"
+domain: infotech
+repo: flex-auth
+status: finished
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: flex-auth
+planning_priority: P0
+planning_order: 60
+depends_on_workplans:
+  - FLEX-WP-0002
+  - FLEX-WP-0005
+related_workplans:
+  - WARDEN-WP-0009
+created: "2026-06-23"
+updated: "2026-06-23"
+state_hub_workstream_id: "bbea4049-8acc-4d7c-8cf5-3106c6b93f7f"
+---
+
+# FLEX-WP-0006: Ops-Warden SSH Signing Policy Gate
+
+## Purpose
+
+Publish the flex-auth policy package, registry fixtures, and service contract
+evidence needed for ops-warden's opt-in pre-sign gate.
+
+Ops-warden already shipped the caller side in `WARDEN-WP-0007`:
+`policy.enabled: true` makes `warden sign` and local-backend `warden issue`
+call `POST /v1/check` before signing. Production OpenBao-backed signing was
+verified in `WARDEN-WP-0008`. The remaining blocked work is flex-auth-owned:
+policies for `resource.type: ssh-certificate` and `action: sign`.
+
+This workplan unblocks `ops-warden/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0009-flex-auth-policy-gate-production.md`.
+
+## Gate Contract
+
+The shipped ops-warden gate sends this flex-auth decision request:
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `subject.id` | `WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT` when set, otherwise actor name |
+| `subject.type` | Actor type: `adm`, `agt`, or `atm` |
+| `tenant` | `policy.tenant`, default `tenant:platform` |
+| `resource.id` | `ssh-cert:actor/<actor-name>` |
+| `resource.type` | `ssh-certificate` |
+| `resource.system` | `ops-warden` |
+| `action` | `sign` |
+| `context.principals` | Requested SSH certificate principals from inventory |
+| `context.actor_type` | Actor type: `adm`, `agt`, or `atm` |
+| `context.pubkey_fingerprint` | SHA256 fingerprint of the submitted public key text |
+| `context.ttl_hours` | Requested certificate TTL |
+
+Allow responses must return `effect: allow` plus a decision `id` or
+`request_id`; ops-warden records that value as `policy_decision_id` in
+`signatures.log`. Deny responses must include a human-readable `reason` that
+the ops-warden CLI can surface.
+
+## Policy Boundary
+
+flex-auth decides whether this specific signing request is allowed now.
+ops-warden remains responsible for SSH CA operation, OpenBao integration, actor
+inventory, host documentation, and local scorecard checks.
+
+The flex-auth policy must not request or store SSH private keys, OpenBao
+tokens, database credentials, or other secrets. Acceptance evidence should use
+fixtures, non-secret request bodies, decision ids, and sanitized logs only.
+
+## T1 - Pin the ops-warden protected-system contract
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0006-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "8831b904-dbef-4d55-8eb5-053c939c86b3"
+```
+
+Add an ops-warden protected-system manifest and registry fixture slice that
+declares:
+
+- protected system `ops-warden`
+- resource type `ssh-certificate`
+- action `sign`
+- tenant `tenant:platform`
+- supported actor subject types `adm`, `agt`, and `atm`
+- required context fields: `principals`, `actor_type`,
+  `pubkey_fingerprint`, and `ttl_hours`
+
+Output should live under `examples/ops-warden/` unless implementation reveals a
+more idiomatic local path. The manifest and fixture must validate with the
+existing `flex-auth validate` and `flex-auth load-registry` commands.
+
+## T2 - Author the ssh-certificate sign policy package
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0006-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "9ea206fa-f93d-46b6-8b8e-e8669dd502d4"
+```
+
+Create the Rego-in-Markdown policy package for ops-warden signing decisions.
+
+Minimum allow criteria:
+
+- request action is `sign`
+- resource system is `ops-warden`
+- resource type is `ssh-certificate`
+- tenant is `tenant:platform` unless the fixture explicitly tests another
+  configured tenant
+- subject and `context.actor_type` are aligned with the actor resource
+- requested TTL is positive and within the policy's configured maximum for the
+  actor type
+- requested principals are non-empty and allowed for the actor fixture
+- `context.pubkey_fingerprint` is present
+
+Minimum deny criteria:
+
+- unknown subject or actor resource
+- mismatched `subject.type`, `context.actor_type`, or
+  `resource.id: ssh-cert:actor/<actor>`
+- TTL outside policy bounds
+- missing fingerprint
+- disallowed or empty principals
+- wrong action, system, resource type, or tenant
+
+The package should produce clear deny reasons and preserve the standard
+decision envelope so ops-warden can surface `reason` without special casing.
+
+## T3 - Add allow and deny fixtures
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0006-T03
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "6bf5cb9b-d46c-49cf-aec0-12f6e864a1f8"
+```
+
+Add fixture requests and expected decisions for the gate.
+
+Required fixtures:
+
+- allow: valid `adm` sign request
+- allow: valid `agt` sign request, if an agent actor fixture exists
+- deny: unknown subject
+- deny: actor type mismatch
+- deny: TTL above policy max
+- deny: missing or disallowed principal
+- deny: missing `pubkey_fingerprint`
+
+Wire the fixtures into Go tests or the existing policy fixture runner so
+`make test` proves the package behavior. Fixture data must remain non-secret.
+
+## T4 - Verify the `/v1/check` service contract
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0006-T04
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "077d29db-30e0-4447-90fd-620c0884306c"
+```
+
+Run `flex-auth serve` with the ops-warden registry and policy package, then
+exercise `POST /v1/check` with ops-warden-shaped JSON.
+
+Acceptance evidence:
+
+- allow response includes `effect: allow` and a stable decision `id`
+- deny response includes `effect: deny` and a useful `reason`
+- decision log records the allow and deny decisions without secrets
+- method mismatch and malformed JSON fail predictably
+- the documented behavior is compatible with ops-warden `fail_closed: true`
+
+If the current service shape needs a small compatibility adjustment, keep it
+inside the stable v1 API instead of adding an ops-warden-specific route.
+
+## T5 - Hand off production-readiness evidence to ops-warden
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0006-T05
+status: done
+priority: medium
+state_hub_task_id: "06cac0b1-51c0-4ae0-b605-c940f7821ac7"
+```
+
+Publish the handoff notes ops-warden needs to close `WARDEN-WP-0009 T01` and
+start its production enablement smoke.
+
+Include:
+
+- policy package path and version
+- registry fixture path
+- local service command
+- allow and deny fixture names
+- non-secret decision ids from local smoke
+- expected `policy.enabled` production sequence
+- reminder that OpenBao SSH signing and SSH CA custody remain ops-warden-owned
+
+Record progress in State Hub and ask the custodian operator to run
+`make fix-consistency REPO=flex-auth` from `~/state-hub` after this workplan is
+merged or otherwise accepted.
+
+
+## Implementation Summary
+
+Implemented on 2026-06-23.
+
+- Added examples/ops-warden/ with the protected-system manifest, subject and
+  resource manifests, combined registry snapshot, policy package, check
+  requests, and allow/deny fixtures.
+- Added top-level tenant support to CheckRequest and BatchCheckRequest so the
+  shipped ops-warden policy gate request shape is accepted by /v1/check.
+- Added CLI and HTTP service tests for the ops-warden allow path, deny path,
+  malformed JSON, method mismatch, and decision-log recording.
+- Added docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md with non-secret smoke evidence
+  and the ops-warden production enablement sequence.
+
+## Exit Criteria
+
+- flex-auth contains a validated ops-warden protected-system manifest and
+  registry fixture.
+- flex-auth contains an `ssh-certificate` / `sign` policy package with allow
+  and deny fixtures for `adm`, `agt`, and `atm`-style actors where applicable.
+- `make test` passes.
+- `POST /v1/check` accepts the shipped ops-warden request shape and returns
+  decision envelopes compatible with `policy.enabled: true`.
+- A sanitized handoff note exists for ops-warden `WARDEN-WP-0009`.
+- State Hub progress is logged and the operator is told to run
+  `make fix-consistency REPO=flex-auth`.
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0007-ops-warden-policy-gate-production-deployment.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0007-ops-warden-policy-gate-production-deployment.md
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+---
+id: FLEX-WP-0007
+type: workplan
+title: "Ops-Warden Policy Gate Production Deployment"
+domain: infotech
+repo: flex-auth
+status: finished
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: flex-auth
+planning_priority: P0
+planning_order: 70
+depends_on_workplans:
+  - FLEX-WP-0006
+related_workplans:
+  - WARDEN-WP-0009
+created: "2026-06-23"
+updated: "2026-06-30"
+state_hub_workstream_id: "358ce697-2611-4fe9-89ab-63e86ceb00fa"
+---
+
+# FLEX-WP-0007: Ops-Warden Policy Gate Production Deployment
+
+## Purpose
+
+Deploy flex-auth as a reachable production runtime for ops-warden's opt-in SSH
+signing policy gate, load a production registry aligned with real inventory
+actors, and complete joint smoke evidence so operators can set policy.enabled:
+true in warden.yaml when the ecosystem maturity stage calls for live enforcement.
+
+Review update: repo-side production readiness is now separated from
+operator-only work. flex-auth can publish the production fixture, tests,
+runtime command, and sync contract in this repo. The actual stable URL
+deployment and OpenBao smoke were completed through the operator tunnel and a
+scoped warden-sign OpenBao lane. The final `policy.enabled` production flip is
+explicitly deferred until the ecosystem reaches testing/production maturity.
+
+## Background
+
+ops-warden finished WARDEN-WP-0009 on the caller side: local and
+production-registry smoke passed, and the production registry generator exists.
+The remaining risk is operational, not policy shape: warden workstations need a
+reachable flex-auth URL and a vault-backed joint smoke before the gate can be
+banked for later enforcement.
+
+Production registry artifacts:
+
+- flex-auth fixture: examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+- ops-warden source artifact: ~/ops-warden/registry/flex-auth/production_registry_snapshot.json
+- ops-warden generator: ~/ops-warden/scripts/build_flex_auth_registry.py
+
+## Ownership Boundary
+
+| Concern | Owner |
+| --- | --- |
+| Policy package and PDP decision | flex-auth |
+| Actor inventory and TTL/principal defaults | ops-warden |
+| SSH CA and OpenBao signing | ops-warden |
+| Production registry content for SSH actors | Joint: ops-warden generates, flex-auth hosts |
+| policy.enabled flip | ops-warden operator after flex-auth is reachable |
+
+No SSH private keys, OpenBao tokens, or other secrets belong in fixtures, docs,
+State Hub messages, or smoke evidence.
+
+## T1 - Deploy production flex-auth runtime
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0007-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "727573fc-86a3-4f5a-abd7-40b0ccb01e68"
+```
+
+Deploy flex-auth serve, or equivalent, to a stable URL reachable from
+workstations that run warden sign.
+
+- [x] Choose preferred target: in-cluster Service at http://flex-auth.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080 when reachable; otherwise approved operator tunnel or ingress with the same base path
+- [x] Document canonical policy.flex_auth_url selection in docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+- [x] Document healthz pre-flight: GET /healthz returns HTTP 200
+- [x] Add service test coverage for /healthz
+- [x] Operator tunnel deployed as flex-auth-coulombcore and confirmed POST /v1/check is reachable from CoulombCore
+
+Acceptance: operator runs curl <flex_auth_url>/healthz from the warden
+workstation and receives HTTP 200. Verified from CoulombCore on 2026-06-24 with
+flex_auth_url http://127.0.0.1:18090.
+
+## T2 - Load production registry and verify real actors
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0007-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "6ec1e00c-4a3a-475b-aefb-af3961de7070"
+```
+
+Load the production registry snapshot derived from ops-warden inventory, not
+only the template actors in examples/ops-warden/registry_snapshot.json.
+
+- [x] Add examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json from the ops-warden generated artifact
+- [x] Document regenerate and load procedure in docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+- [x] Verify allow for agt-state-hub-bridge / sign
+- [x] Verify deny for ttl_out_of_bounds
+- [x] Verify deny for unregistered actors with unknown_actor_resource
+- [x] Add CI tests using production actor names: agt-state-hub-bridge, agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap, adm-example, atm-backup-daily
+
+Acceptance: local flex-auth coverage allows agt-state-hub-bridge without
+ops-warden-local registry patching. Deployed runtime verification remains part
+of T1.
+
+## T3 - Publish registry sync contract with ops-warden
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0007-T03
+status: done
+priority: medium
+state_hub_task_id: "afa09ec3-516c-433d-87a7-330cb79845a8"
+```
+
+Document the two-repo workflow when inventory or policy boundaries change.
+
+- [x] Publish docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+- [x] Cover ops-warden ownership of actor names, actor types, principals, and TTL defaults
+- [x] Cover flex-auth ownership of hosted registry, relationships, and policy package evaluation
+- [x] Document trigger: inventory add/change -> regenerate snapshot -> flex-auth reload
+- [x] Cross-link from docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md
+- [x] Confirm ops-warden wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md already points to the flex-auth handoff; flex-auth now points back from the sync runbook
+
+Acceptance: a new agt-* actor addition has an unambiguous procedure across both
+repos.
+
+## T4 - Joint OpenBao + policy gate production smoke
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0007-T04
+status: done
+priority: medium
+state_hub_task_id: "32a96f1c-e0e8-4e27-baa6-7b8c445cf7a1"
+```
+
+Coordinate with ops-warden for vault-backed signing through the deployed
+flex-auth runtime.
+
+- [x] flex-auth deployed with production registry via operator tunnel, completing T1
+- [x] policy.flex_auth_url validated against deployed URL http://127.0.0.1:18090 on CoulombCore; `policy.enabled` intentionally remains off until testing/production maturity
+- [x] Scoped warden-sign OpenBao lane available for the smoke; no token value recorded here
+- [x] Allow smoke: `warden sign agt-state-hub-bridge` recorded backend `vault` and policy_decision_id `decision:032b096c433ad80c`
+- [x] Deny smoke: TTL above registry max was denied by flex-auth before OpenBao with reason `ttl_out_of_bounds`
+- [x] Record non-secret evidence: decision ids, reasons, actor names only
+
+Closed on 2026-06-30 from ops-warden non-secret smoke evidence received
+2026-06-29. The operator deliberately keeps `policy.enabled` off for now because
+the ecosystem is still build-stage/pre-testing; the gate is verified and banked
+for later live enforcement rather than forced into premature production rigor.
+
+Smoke runner when token is valid:
+
+    SMOKE_VAULT=1 ~/ops-warden/scripts/policy_gate_production_smoke.sh
+
+## T5 - IAM subject binding for production
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0007-T05
+status: done
+priority: low
+state_hub_task_id: "65dc3c59-1e4b-4335-b6a0-db492ea9b2b5"
+```
+
+Clarify how WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT maps to flex-auth allowed_subjects in
+production.
+
+- [x] Document production default: actor name as subject.id unless WARDEN_POLICY_SUBJECT supplies the IAM subject
+- [x] Confirm production registry allowed_subjects includes iam:<actor> entries
+- [x] Add test coverage for iam:agt-state-hub-bridge allow path
+
+Acceptance: documented subject-id strategy; no ops-warden special-casing is
+required beyond existing policy behavior.
+
+## Exit Criteria
+
+- flex-auth production runtime reachable from CoulombCore warden path: done via flex-auth-coulombcore operator tunnel
+- Production registry loaded and real inventory actors covered locally: done
+- Registry sync contract published and cross-linked: done
+- Joint vault-backed smoke evidence recorded: done, decision:032b096c433ad80c
+- ops-warden operator has the repo-side artifacts needed to set policy.enabled: true later, when maturity posture calls for live enforcement
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+2026-06-23 repo-side implementation:
+
+- Added examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json from the ops-warden generated production registry artifact.
+- Added Go coverage for production actor allows, IAM subject allow, ttl_out_of_bounds, unknown_actor_resource, production registry counts, and /healthz.
+- Published docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md and cross-linked it from the handoff and examples docs.
+
+Closeout note:
+
+- The OpenBao-backed smoke passed through ops-warden with the scoped warden-sign lane.
+- The `policy.enabled` flip is intentionally deferred by operator/maturity decision, not treated as an open repo-side blocker.
+- After workplan file changes, run make fix-consistency REPO=flex-auth from ~/state-hub to mirror these statuses into State Hub.
+
+## See Also
+
+- docs/ops-warden-policy-gate-handoff.md
+- docs/ops-warden-registry-sync.md
+- workplans/FLEX-WP-0006-ops-warden-ssh-signing-policy-gate.md
+- ~/ops-warden/wiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md
+- ~/ops-warden/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0009-flex-auth-policy-gate-production.md
+- ~/ops-warden/history/2026-06-23-flex-auth-production-pickup-suggestion.md
+
+
+2026-06-24 operator tunnel update:
+
+- Built /tmp/flex-auth and started the production registry runtime on local 127.0.0.1:18090.
+- Added local ops-bridge tunnel flex-auth-coulombcore, forwarding CoulombCore 127.0.0.1:18090 to the local runtime.
+- Verified remote health from CoulombCore: GET /healthz returned HTTP 200.
+- Verified remote POST /v1/check from CoulombCore allowed agt-state-hub-bridge with decision:873c6c682a52bebc.
+- VAULT_TOKEN is absent, so OpenBao-backed smoke remains blocked on operator credential refresh.
+
+2026-06-30 closeout from ops-warden smoke handoff:
+
+- Mode: `FLEX_AUTH_EXTERNAL` against deployed runtime `127.0.0.1:18090` via the CoulombCore operator path.
+- Allow: `warden sign agt-state-hub-bridge` returned policy_decision_id `decision:032b096c433ad80c`.
+- Deny: `--ttl 999` was rejected with `ttl_out_of_bounds` before OpenBao signing.
+- Vault-backed allow: backend `vault` produced the same policy_decision_id through the scoped warden-sign OpenBao lane.
+- Operator decision: keep `policy.enabled` off during build-stage/pre-testing and flip it later when the ecosystem reaches the appropriate maturity posture.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
tegwick	339c35e876	Close ops-warden policy gate deployment Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details	2026-06-30 00:52:56 +02:00
tegwick	8124367e1d	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-30: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-30 00:51:58 +02:00
tegwick	b4520bd731	docs(intent/scope): align with ops-warden as first shipped consumer Some checks failed CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details ops-warden's SSH signing policy gate (FLEX-WP-0006 finished, FLEX-WP-0007 deploying) makes it flex-auth's first shipped protected-system consumer. Update the intent baseline to match the implemented reality: - SCOPE Current State: standalone Go core + /v1/check is implemented; FLEX-WP-0001/0005/0006 complete, 0007 blocked only on T4 VAULT_TOKEN. - SCOPE Related/Overlapping + Disjoint From: ops-warden is now a consumer, not merely disjoint; the once-hypothetical "agt as flex-auth subject" flow is realized through the signing gate. Disjointness narrowed to the identity surface (warden issues certs, flex-auth never does). - INTENT Consumer Patterns: lead with the shipped action-gate shape (ops-warden), keep Markitect as the planned knowledge-pipeline consumer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-27 20:37:07 +02:00
tegwick	941501c590	FLEX-WP-0007: production registry fixture, tests, and sync runbook Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Add production_registry_snapshot.json from ops-warden inventory with CI coverage for real actors, IAM subject binding, ttl_out_of_bounds, and unknown_actor_resource. Extend serve contract tests with /healthz and publish the registry sync contract for operator deployment.	2026-06-24 14:52:35 +02:00
tegwick	fae0f00a69	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-24: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-24 13:11:03 +02:00
tegwick	77bcd55ddb	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-24: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-24 01:45:33 +02:00
tegwick	f0d1afa237	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-23: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-23 21:19:00 +02:00
tegwick	0fde95a87c	FLEX-WP-0006: implement ops-warden signing gate policy Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details	2026-06-23 21:17:42 +02:00
tegwick	53e0d055c9	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-23: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-23 17:35:12 +02:00
tegwick	e1c141234a	chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-06-22: - update .custodian-brief.md for flex-auth	2026-06-22 23:21:50 +02:00
tegwick	8a913d6163	Normalize agent instructions and workplan frontmatter (STATE-WP-0067) Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details - Align agent files with on-disk workplan prefixes (infer from workplan ids) - Set workplan domain to registered domain_slug; add topic_slug where applicable - Repair frontmatter delimiter formatting; migrate legacy task status literals - Regenerate AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from State Hub templates	2026-06-22 23:16:25 +02:00
tegwick	1be449dae8	Human-review .repo-classification.yaml (CUST-WP-0050 follow-up) Some checks failed CI / Build and Test (push) Has been cancelled Details CI / Lint (push) Has been cancelled Details	2026-06-22 17:56:17 +02:00
tegwick	1b899cd41c	Add .repo-classification.yaml (CUST-WP-0050 T11 agent first-pass)	2026-06-22 17:47:36 +02:00