tegwick
a9ca0adfcf
Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics written with per_entity_mean=3.9556. Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS redundancy_ratio 0.0061 (max 0.10) coverage_ratio 0.6190 (min 0.40) coherence_comps 0.0000 (max 3) consistency_cycles 0.0000 (max 0) granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0) per_entity_mean 3.9556 (min 3.5) Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities): definition_precision 3.62 source_grounding 4.36 domain_placement 4.56 vsm_relevance 3.31 explanatory_value 3.94 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
67 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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entity_slug: bye_laws
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T04:39:41.155139'
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overall_score: 4.6
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes bye-laws as local municipal regulations
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with specific autonomous authority, avoiding circularity and providing concrete
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examples of their scope (market regulations, trade standards, commercial practices).
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It could be slightly more precise about the enforcement mechanisms, but overall
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captures a distinct regulatory concept.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion of medieval
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town development in Book III, Chapter 3, where he explicitly examines how towns
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gained autonomous regulatory powers. The concept directly reflects Smith's analysis
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of how bye-law authority was crucial for urban economic independence from feudal
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control.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: '"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as bye-laws represent
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a specific form of local regulatory authority that governs economic activities.
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This fits perfectly within the regulatory framework that Smith discusses as essential
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to town development and commercial growth.'
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: Bye-laws map naturally to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as they represent
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the town's capacity for self-regulation and internal control of economic activities.
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They also have elements of S2 (coordination) in managing local commercial disputes
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and standardizing practices within the municipal jurisdiction.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity illuminates a crucial structural mechanism in Smith's analysis
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- how autonomous regulatory authority enabled towns to create favorable economic
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conditions independent of external feudal control. It explains a key institutional
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innovation that facilitated the rise of commercial urban centers.
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---
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# Evaluation: Bye Laws
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## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
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The definition clearly distinguishes bye-laws as local municipal regulations with specific autonomous authority, avoiding circularity and providing concrete examples of their scope (market regulations, trade standards, commercial practices). It could be slightly more precise about the enforcement mechanisms, but overall captures a distinct regulatory concept.
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## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity is well-grounded in Smith's actual discussion of medieval town development in Book III, Chapter 3, where he explicitly examines how towns gained autonomous regulatory powers. The concept directly reflects Smith's analysis of how bye-law authority was crucial for urban economic independence from feudal control.
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## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
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"Regulation" is the correct domain placement, as bye-laws represent a specific form of local regulatory authority that governs economic activities. This fits perfectly within the regulatory framework that Smith discusses as essential to town development and commercial growth.
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## vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0
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Bye-laws map naturally to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as they represent the town's capacity for self-regulation and internal control of economic activities. They also have elements of S2 (coordination) in managing local commercial disputes and standardizing practices within the municipal jurisdiction.
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## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity illuminates a crucial structural mechanism in Smith's analysis - how autonomous regulatory authority enabled towns to create favorable economic conditions independent of external feudal control. It explains a key institutional innovation that facilitated the rise of commercial urban centers.
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