tegwick
574bb11db6
Demonstrates infospace composition: the Wealth of Nations infospace is used as a discipline, applying Smith's economic framework as a lens to analyse modern supply chain management concepts. New example: examples/supply-chain-vsm/ - infospace.yaml binding WoN as discipline (../infospace-with-history) - 3 source documents: coordination mechanisms, capital & inventory, market structure (~400 words each, original content) - supply-chain-entity-schema-v1.0.md with WoN Concept required section - won-mapping-schema-v1.0.md with Conceptual Continuity rating - artifacts/won-reference/core-entities.md — 12 curated WoN entities for injection as discipline context - 8 hand-crafted entity files demonstrating LLM output format - 3 mapping files with full rationale and VSM inheritance chains - Viable: YES (5/5 thresholds) Key mappings demonstrated: Demand Signal → Effectual Demand (Strong, S2) Vendor-Managed Inventory → Division of Labour (Strong, S1/S2) Just-in-Time Inventory → Circulating Capital (Strong, S1/S3) Bullwhip Effect → Natural Price (Moderate, S2) Platform Intermediary → Merchant Capital (Strong, S2/S4) Monopsony Power → Combination of Masters (Strong, S3*) Platform fix: entity_parser.py now recognises ## Supply Chain Domain as a domain alias for ## Economic Domain, enabling composed infospaces to use their own domain section name. Tutorial §13 rewritten with real commands, real output, and the full mapping table from the demo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
127 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# WoN Mappings — Market Structure
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Generated from: `artifacts/sources/market-structure.md`
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---
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# Platform Intermediary → Merchant Capital
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## Supply Chain Entity
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Platform Intermediary
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## WoN Entity
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Merchant Capital
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## Mapping Rationale
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Smith analyses merchant capital as capital employed to buy in one market
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and sell in another, earning profit from controlling access to exchange
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rather than from production. He notes that merchants are mobile — they
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have no necessary attachment to any productive system — which gives them
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structural leverage over producers who are geographically fixed. Platform
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intermediaries are a high-leverage form of the same structure: they control
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access to exchange (the matching infrastructure) without bearing inventory
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risk, earning profit from transaction fees and data rather than from
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buying and reselling. The merchant's physical mobility translates into
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the platform's structural mobility — the platform has no fixed attachment
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to any producer's fate, yet producers cannot exit without losing network
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access.
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## Conceptual Continuity
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Strong — Platform intermediaries are the modern form of merchant capital:
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the mechanism (control of exchange access, leverage over producers,
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profit from intermediation rather than production) is identical. The
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innovation is eliminating inventory risk while retaining coordination
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power, which makes platforms a more concentrated and profitable form of
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merchant capital than Smith could have envisioned.
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## VSM Inheritance
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Platform Intermediary inherits S2/S4 via Merchant Capital (coordination
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infrastructure with intelligence function — aggregating market data while
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intermediating transactions).
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---
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# Monopsony Power → Combination of Masters
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## Supply Chain Entity
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Monopsony Power
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## WoN Entity
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Combination of Masters
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## Mapping Rationale
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Smith describes the combination of masters as the coordinated exercise of
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employer power to suppress wages below the competitive level. He notes
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these combinations are common, rarely discussed publicly, and facilitated
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by the smaller number of employers relative to workers. Modern supply chain
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monopsony operates through the same structural mechanism: a concentrated
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buyer (or industry norm among buyers) facing atomistic suppliers
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systematically extracts terms — lower prices, extended payment, cost
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absorption — that suppliers cannot individually refuse without losing the
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customer. The power asymmetry (concentrated vs. atomistic; each party's
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outside options) is identical. Smith's analysis predicts the modern
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outcome: margin compression, underinvestment, and fragility on the supplier
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side.
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## Conceptual Continuity
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Strong — Monopsony power in supply chains is Smith's combination of masters
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applied to the buyer–supplier relationship rather than the employer–worker
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relationship. The market structure (concentrated power facing fragmented
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supply of a factor) and the mechanism (systematic extraction below
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competitive returns) are the same.
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## VSM Inheritance
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Monopsony Power inherits S3* via Combination of Masters (distortion of
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the S2 coordination signal through coordinated anti-competitive behaviour
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at the management boundary).
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---
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# Single-Source Dependency → Monopoly in Trade
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## Supply Chain Entity
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Single-Source Dependency
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## WoN Entity
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Monopoly in Trade
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## Mapping Rationale
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Smith argues that monopolists always charge the highest price buyers will
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bear, because no competitive alternative disciplines them. A single-source
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supplier during a supply disruption is a temporary monopolist: the buyer
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has no immediate alternative, demand for the component is inelastic in
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the short run, and the supplier can extract above-natural prices. Smith's
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account of monopoly — restricted supply, elevated price, distorted resource
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allocation — applies precisely to the disrupted single-source scenario.
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The difference is that single-source dependency produces episodic monopoly
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power (during disruptions) rather than Smith's continuous monopoly; but
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the mechanism and the welfare consequences are the same.
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## Conceptual Continuity
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Moderate — The monopoly pricing mechanism is shared, but Smith's monopoly
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is a stable market structure while single-source dependency produces
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temporary monopoly only during disruptions. The strategic implications
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also differ: Smith focuses on restricting supply to maintain high prices,
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while single-source power is an inadvertent consequence of concentrated
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specialisation rather than deliberate supply restriction.
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## VSM Inheritance
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Single-Source Dependency inherits S4/S5 via Monopoly in Trade (intelligence
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failure creating conditions for policy-level market distortion when
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disruption occurs).
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