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tegwick a9ca0adfcf feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-02-23 09:36:46 +01:00

3.7 KiB

Raw Blame History

entity_slug, evaluator, evaluated_at, overall_score, scores

entity_slug

evaluator

evaluated_at

overall_score

scores

tax_farming

null

2026-02-23T06:29:32.689038

4.8

name	value	max_value	rationale
definition_precision	5.0	5.0	The definition is highly precise and non-circular, clearly distinguishing tax farming from direct government collection by specifying the key mechanism (leasing collection rights for fixed rent with profit incentive). It captures a distinct institutional arrangement rather than a vague concept.

name	value	max_value	rationale
source_grounding	5.0	5.0	Tax farming is explicitly discussed by Smith in Book V, Chapter 2, where he provides detailed criticism of this practice as used in various European countries. The definition accurately reflects Smith's analysis of the mechanism and its problems.

name	value	max_value	rationale
domain_placement	5.0	5.0	"General Theory" is the appropriate domain placement as tax farming represents a fundamental institutional mechanism for revenue collection that Smith analyzes as part of his broader theoretical framework on public finance. It's not specific to any particular economic sector but rather a general governmental practice.

name	value	max_value	rationale
vsm_relevance	4.0	5.0	Tax farming maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as it represents an alternative mechanism for the state to monitor and extract resources from its economic environment. The delegation of collection authority and the resulting control problems are classic S3 concerns about internal regulation and oversight.

name	value	max_value	rationale
explanatory_value	5.0	5.0	This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the structural relationship between incentive design and administrative outcomes in public finance. It reveals how institutional arrangements can create systematic distortions and oppression, making it a key mechanism in Smith's analysis of effective governance.

Evaluation: Tax Farming

definition_precision — 5.0 / 5.0

The definition is highly precise and non-circular, clearly distinguishing tax farming from direct government collection by specifying the key mechanism (leasing collection rights for fixed rent with profit incentive). It captures a distinct institutional arrangement rather than a vague concept.

source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

Tax farming is explicitly discussed by Smith in Book V, Chapter 2, where he provides detailed criticism of this practice as used in various European countries. The definition accurately reflects Smith's analysis of the mechanism and its problems.

domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

"General Theory" is the appropriate domain placement as tax farming represents a fundamental institutional mechanism for revenue collection that Smith analyzes as part of his broader theoretical framework on public finance. It's not specific to any particular economic sector but rather a general governmental practice.

vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0

Tax farming maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as it represents an alternative mechanism for the state to monitor and extract resources from its economic environment. The delegation of collection authority and the resulting control problems are classic S3 concerns about internal regulation and oversight.

explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the structural relationship between incentive design and administrative outcomes in public finance. It reveals how institutional arrangements can create systematic distortions and oppression, making it a key mechanism in Smith's analysis of effective governance.

3.7 KiB Raw Blame History