tegwick
a9ca0adfcf
Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics written with per_entity_mean=3.9556. Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS redundancy_ratio 0.0061 (max 0.10) coverage_ratio 0.6190 (min 0.40) coherence_comps 0.0000 (max 3) consistency_cycles 0.0000 (max 0) granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0) per_entity_mean 3.9556 (min 3.5) Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities): definition_precision 3.62 source_grounding 4.36 domain_placement 4.56 vsm_relevance 3.31 explanatory_value 3.94 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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entity_slug: tax_farming
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T06:29:32.689038'
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overall_score: 4.8
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The definition is highly precise and non-circular, clearly distinguishing
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tax farming from direct government collection by specifying the key mechanism
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(leasing collection rights for fixed rent with profit incentive). It captures
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a distinct institutional arrangement rather than a vague concept.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: Tax farming is explicitly discussed by Smith in Book V, Chapter 2, where
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he provides detailed criticism of this practice as used in various European countries.
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The definition accurately reflects Smith's analysis of the mechanism and its problems.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: '"General Theory" is the appropriate domain placement as tax farming
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represents a fundamental institutional mechanism for revenue collection that Smith
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analyzes as part of his broader theoretical framework on public finance. It''s
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not specific to any particular economic sector but rather a general governmental
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practice.'
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: Tax farming maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as it represents
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an alternative mechanism for the state to monitor and extract resources from its
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economic environment. The delegation of collection authority and the resulting
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control problems are classic S3 concerns about internal regulation and oversight.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the
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structural relationship between incentive design and administrative outcomes in
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public finance. It reveals how institutional arrangements can create systematic
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distortions and oppression, making it a key mechanism in Smith's analysis of effective
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governance.
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---
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# Evaluation: Tax Farming
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## definition_precision — 5.0 / 5.0
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The definition is highly precise and non-circular, clearly distinguishing tax farming from direct government collection by specifying the key mechanism (leasing collection rights for fixed rent with profit incentive). It captures a distinct institutional arrangement rather than a vague concept.
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## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
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Tax farming is explicitly discussed by Smith in Book V, Chapter 2, where he provides detailed criticism of this practice as used in various European countries. The definition accurately reflects Smith's analysis of the mechanism and its problems.
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## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
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"General Theory" is the appropriate domain placement as tax farming represents a fundamental institutional mechanism for revenue collection that Smith analyzes as part of his broader theoretical framework on public finance. It's not specific to any particular economic sector but rather a general governmental practice.
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## vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0
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Tax farming maps well to S3 (internal regulation/audit) as it represents an alternative mechanism for the state to monitor and extract resources from its economic environment. The delegation of collection authority and the resulting control problems are classic S3 concerns about internal regulation and oversight.
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## explanatory_value — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity provides significant explanatory power by illuminating the structural relationship between incentive design and administrative outcomes in public finance. It reveals how institutional arrangements can create systematic distortions and oppression, making it a key mechanism in Smith's analysis of effective governance.
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