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tegwick a9ca0adfcf feat(example): add per-entity LLM evaluations for 985 WoN entities (S3.3)

Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on
first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics
written with per_entity_mean=3.9556.

Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS
  redundancy_ratio   0.0061  (max 0.10)
  coverage_ratio     0.6190  (min 0.40)
  coherence_comps    0.0000  (max 3)
  consistency_cycles 0.0000  (max 0)
  granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0)
  per_entity_mean    3.9556  (min 3.5)

Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities):
  definition_precision  3.62
  source_grounding      4.36
  domain_placement      4.56
  vsm_relevance         3.31
  explanatory_value     3.94

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-02-23 09:36:46 +01:00

3.5 KiB

Raw Blame History

entity_slug, evaluator, evaluated_at, overall_score, scores

entity_slug

evaluator

evaluated_at

overall_score

scores

tonnage_bounty

null

2026-02-23T06:32:05.933208

4.2

name	value	max_value	rationale
definition_precision	4.0	5.0	The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition that captures a distinct policy mechanism.

name	value	max_value	rationale
source_grounding	5.0	5.0	This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.

name	value	max_value	rationale
domain_placement	5.0	5.0	The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies. This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.

name	value	max_value	rationale
vsm_relevance	3.0	5.0	While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or illuminating for this concept.

name	value	max_value	rationale
explanatory_value	4.0	5.0	This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of government intervention—how the structure of incentives (capacity-based vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes.

Evaluation: Tonnage Bounty

definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0

The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition that captures a distinct policy mechanism.

source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0

This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.

domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0

The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies. This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.

vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0

While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or illuminating for this concept.

explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0

This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of government intervention—how the structure of incentives (capacity-based vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes.

3.5 KiB Raw Blame History