tegwick
a9ca0adfcf
Batch evaluation of all 988 entities via OpenRouter. 984 succeeded on first pass; 3 failed (network errors). eval-summary --update-metrics written with per_entity_mean=3.9556. Viability dashboard: 6/6 PASS redundancy_ratio 0.0061 (max 0.10) coverage_ratio 0.6190 (min 0.40) coherence_comps 0.0000 (max 3) consistency_cycles 0.0000 (max 0) granularity_entropy 2.6748 (min 1.0) per_entity_mean 3.9556 (min 3.5) Dimension breakdown (mean across 985 entities): definition_precision 3.62 source_grounding 4.36 domain_placement 4.56 vsm_relevance 3.31 explanatory_value 3.94 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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entity_slug: tonnage_bounty
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T06:32:05.933208'
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overall_score: 4.2
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types
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of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual
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fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition
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that captures a distinct policy mechanism.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book
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IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing
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industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects
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Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 5.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties
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represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies.
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This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and
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their economic effects.
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 3.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a
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control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental
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systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or
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illuminating for this concept.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: "This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of\
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\ government intervention\u2014how the structure of incentives (capacity-based\
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\ vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates\
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\ a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes."
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---
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# Evaluation: Tonnage Bounty
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## definition_precision — 4.0 / 5.0
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The definition clearly distinguishes tonnage bounties from other types of subsidies by specifying they are based on vessel capacity rather than actual fishing productivity or success. This creates a precise, non-circular definition that captures a distinct policy mechanism.
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## source_grounding — 5.0 / 5.0
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This entity is directly grounded in Smith's actual discussion in Book IV, Chapter 5, where he specifically analyzes tonnage bounties in the fishing industry and critiques their perverse incentives. The definition accurately reflects Smith's concerns about subsidizing capacity rather than results.
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## domain_placement — 5.0 / 5.0
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The "Regulation" domain is perfectly appropriate, as tonnage bounties represent a specific form of government intervention in markets through subsidies. This fits squarely within Smith's broader analysis of regulatory policies and their economic effects.
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## vsm_relevance — 3.0 / 5.0
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While tonnage bounties could relate to S3 (internal regulation) as a control mechanism, they represent a specific policy tool rather than a fundamental systemic function. The VSM mapping is possible but not particularly natural or illuminating for this concept.
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## explanatory_value — 4.0 / 5.0
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This entity illuminates an important mechanism in Smith's critique of government intervention—how the structure of incentives (capacity-based vs. performance-based) affects economic behavior and efficiency. It demonstrates a concrete example of how well-intentioned policies can create perverse outcomes.
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