generated from coulomb/repo-seed
Deploy privacyIDEA (MFA core) in the mfa namespace: - pvc.yaml: privacyidea-data (5Gi) and privacyidea-logs (2Gi) - configmap.yaml: pi.cfg reading secrets from env vars - deployment.yaml: Deployment + ClusterIP Service (port 8080) - middleware.yaml: Traefik RateLimit + admin IP AllowList - ingress.yaml: pink.coulomb.social (portal + admin), pink-account.coulomb.social (self-service) - create-secrets.sh: creates privacyidea-config Secret - enckey-bootstrap.sh: post-deploy key extraction + DR Secrets - bootstrap-admin.sh: pi-admin, trigger-admin, privacyidea-trigger-admin Secret - verify-t04.sh: 8-section done-criteria checker Config points CP-NK-002 (pink.coulomb.social) and CP-NK-003 (pink-account.coulomb.social) registered in CONFIG.md. pink = PrivacyIDEA Net Knights (project mnemonic). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
86 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# Config Point Registry
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## Philosophy
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net-kingdom is opinionated: defaults, conventions, and automation are preferred at every
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level. A config point in this file is a **conscious exception** — a value that cannot be
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derived from the system's topology, naming conventions, component defaults, or available
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automation.
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**Minimizing this list is a design goal.** Before adding a config point, ask:
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- Can the value be derived from a naming convention or topology fact?
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- Can it be auto-generated (e.g. from the Linux user identity, like Local Identity does)?
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- Is the default provided by the upstream component safe to accept?
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If yes to any of the above, don't add it here.
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---
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## Summary
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| ID | Name | Value | Location(s) |
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|----|------|-------|-------------|
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| CP-NK-001 | ACME contact email | `bernd.worsch+netkingdom@gmail.com` | `sso-mfa/k8s/cert-manager/issuers.yaml:38` |
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| CP-NK-002 | privacyIDEA portal hostname | `pink.coulomb.social` | `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` |
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| CP-NK-003 | privacyIDEA self-service hostname | `pink-account.coulomb.social` | `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` |
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---
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## CP-NK-002 — privacyIDEA portal hostname
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**Value:** `pink.coulomb.social`
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**Set:** 2026-03-19
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**Set by:** worsch
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**Location(s):**
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- `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` — all three Ingress `host` fields
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**Why non-default:** Subdomain prefix must be chosen by the operator; no naming
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convention existed in the repo before T04. `pink` = **P**rivacy**I**DEA
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**N**et **K**nights (project-specific mnemonic).
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**Scope:** TLS certificate, Traefik routing, and all references to the
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privacyIDEA public URL (including Keycloak Provider config in T05/T06).
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---
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## CP-NK-003 — privacyIDEA self-service portal hostname
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**Value:** `pink-account.coulomb.social`
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**Set:** 2026-03-19
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**Set by:** worsch
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**Location(s):**
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- `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/ingress.yaml` — `privacyidea-account` Ingress `host` field
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**Why non-default:** Separate hostname for the self-service portal allows
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different firewall/allowlist rules from the admin portal. Follows the
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`<service>-account` naming convention used in the workplan design.
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**Scope:** TLS certificate and Traefik routing for the user-facing
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self-service token enrolment portal.
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---
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## CP-NK-001 — ACME contact email
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**Value:** `bernd.worsch+netkingdom@gmail.com`
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**Set:** 2026-03-02
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**Set by:** worsch
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**Location(s):**
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- `sso-mfa/k8s/cert-manager/issuers.yaml:38` — `spec.acme.email` on the
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`letsencrypt-prod` ClusterIssuer
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**Why non-default:** ACME (Let's Encrypt) requires a contact address for certificate
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lifecycle notifications — expiry warnings, rate-limit alerts, policy announcements.
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There is no system-level default that qualifies: this must be a real, monitored inbox.
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**Why not automated:** The Linux user GECOS email (via Local Identity) would be a
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natural source. However, that introduces a runtime dependency between cluster
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provisioning and the local-identity tool. Deferred; revisit when Local Identity
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gains a structured "operator contact" concept.
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**Scope:** All TLS certificates issued by the `letsencrypt-prod` ClusterIssuer across
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the entire cluster.
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