generated from coulomb/repo-seed
140 lines
7.5 KiB
Markdown
140 lines
7.5 KiB
Markdown
# Workload Security Posture — NetKingdom standard (draft)
|
||
|
||
> **Status:** ops-warden-authored draft, WARDEN-WP-0015 T1. **Pending promotion to
|
||
> canon** along two homes (see *Canon layering*). Until landed, this file is the
|
||
> authoritative working draft; the canon copies supersede it once merged.
|
||
>
|
||
> **ops-warden's role:** *author + conformance*. ops-warden does **not** enforce this
|
||
> standard at runtime (flex-auth) and does **not** hold the secrets (OpenBao). It
|
||
> authors the ops-security slice and ships conformance checks + dev-tier doubles.
|
||
|
||
NetKingdom IT-security posture is defined along **two orthogonal axes**. A workload's
|
||
right to receive a secret depends on **both**, unified by a secret-flow lattice.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Axis A — Environment posture (how the secret store is secured)
|
||
|
||
The lifecycle tier of the *secret store backing a workload*. Contracts are identical at
|
||
every tier (so automation and the `warden access` proxy run unchanged); only the
|
||
backend's security posture changes.
|
||
|
||
**R1 — Contract parity, posture divergence.** Identical interface at every tier; only
|
||
posture changes. This is why dev-tier contract doubles ("fake bao") work.
|
||
**R2 — Promote topology, regenerate material.** Secret *values* are never promoted up
|
||
the ladder; only *structure* (paths, policy shape, names). Values are generated fresh
|
||
per tier. Test conveniences (reuse, single-unseal) stay quarantined in test.
|
||
**R3 — Dev touches no real data, ever.** An insecure personal mock store in dev is
|
||
sanctioned *iff* dev uses only synthetic data. Absolute invariant.
|
||
**R4 — Phase-changes are ceremonies, not copies.** `test → prod` is a gated checklist
|
||
(regenerate secrets, switch unseal model, enable break-glass, human sign-off),
|
||
referencing the existing net-kingdom `security-bootstrap-*` and unseal-custody docs —
|
||
not duplicating them.
|
||
|
||
| | dev | test | prod |
|
||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||
| backend | mock / contract double | OpenBao `-dev` (single-unseal) | OpenBao sealed (Shamir 3-of-5) |
|
||
| real values | forbidden (synthetic) | generated, reuse allowed | generated fresh, reuse forbidden |
|
||
| unseal | n/a | single key / auto | 3-of-5 + break-glass |
|
||
| real user/business data | never | never | allowed |
|
||
| audit | optional | on | full, tamper-evident |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Axis B — Workload maturity (how trusted a workload is)
|
||
|
||
**Production is a posture, not a maturity.** A workload can run in prod posture yet be
|
||
low maturity (alpha with friendly customers). Maturity gates *which secrets and data
|
||
classes* a prod workload may touch. Levels are a total order `M0 < M1 < M2 < M3`.
|
||
|
||
| Level | Phase | Max `DataClassification` it may handle | Promotion gate (into this level) |
|
||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||
| **M0** | Experimental / PoC | synthetic only | — (entry level) |
|
||
| **M1** | Alpha / early-access | low-criticality, loss-acceptable; **no** `confidential`/`restricted` | friendly-customer scope agreed, basic SLO, data-handling note |
|
||
| **M2** | Beta / GA | up to `confidential`; SLOs; audited | security review, SLO history, on-call, incident runbooks |
|
||
| **M3** | Critical / regulated | `restricted`; break-glass; compliance | pen-test, 3-of-5 custody, human-in-loop ops, compliance audit |
|
||
|
||
`DataClassification` (`confidential`, `restricted`, …) is **reused** from the
|
||
info-tech-canon Data Model — not redefined here. Promotion gates **reuse** the
|
||
info-tech-canon DevSecOps Model's quality/policy gates and `DeploymentVerification`
|
||
(SLOs / smoke / canary / operator confirmation), applied to maturity advancement.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## The combined rule — secret-flow lattice
|
||
|
||
A secret carries a `required_maturity` (and implicitly the `required_maturity` of its
|
||
`DataClassification`). Delivery is **no-write-down**:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
deliver(secret → workload) is permitted only if
|
||
workload.env_posture == prod # Axis A
|
||
AND workload.maturity >= secret.required_maturity # Axis B
|
||
AND workload.maturity >= required_maturity(dataclass(secret)) # data class floor
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**"Critical-infrastructure secrets must not be transferred to workloads below maturity
|
||
M"** is exactly the second clause. The lattice is **checkable** by ops-warden
|
||
(conformance) and **enforceable** at runtime by flex-auth. Access *semantics* (who, on
|
||
behalf of whom) remain governed by the CARING Access Governance Standard.
|
||
|
||
Worked example: an `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` used only by a build pipeline → `required_maturity:
|
||
M1`, dataclass `internal`. A production database password for regulated user data →
|
||
`required_maturity: M3`, dataclass `restricted`; it may be delivered only to a
|
||
prod-posture, M3 workload.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Using this to refine blockers
|
||
|
||
When a workstream says "blocked on security", classify it before escalating. The
|
||
classification decides whether the blocker is real, belongs to an owning subsystem, or
|
||
can be removed by a dev/test double.
|
||
|
||
| Question | Result |
|
||
| --- | --- |
|
||
| Is the work **dev** or **test** posture only? | Use synthetic contract doubles or generated test values. Do not wait on real production secrets. |
|
||
| Is the work **prod** posture with real values? | Require owner custody (usually OpenBao), flex-auth policy where applicable, and non-secret evidence only. |
|
||
| Is workload maturity below the secret's `required_maturity` or data-class floor? | This is a real IT-security blocker until the workload advances, the secret is reclassified, or the design avoids the secret. |
|
||
| Does a route exist and the lane is `exec_capable`? | `warden access --fetch/--exec` may remove operator copy/paste as a blocker by proxying the owner's tool as the caller. |
|
||
| Is unseal, break-glass, or issuer custody unresolved? | Keep it as an operator ceremony/design blocker; do not paper it over with agent-visible values. |
|
||
|
||
The evidence to record is route id, owner, env posture, workload maturity,
|
||
`required_maturity`, policy decision id, OpenBao path/version, populated-key count,
|
||
smoke id, or token accessor. Never record the secret value.
|
||
|
||
This is the practical bridge from WARDEN-WP-0014 (`warden access`) to WP-0015: access
|
||
assist can remove manual secret handling friction, while posture/maturity decides
|
||
whether the secret may flow at all.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Canon layering (where each part lands)
|
||
|
||
| Part | Canonical home | ops-warden role |
|
||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||
| Generic `WorkloadMaturityLevel` concept + the secret-flow lattice | **info-tech-canon** (DevSecOps / Landscape; reuses Data Model `DataClassification`, Security Model criticality) | Contribute; do not fork |
|
||
| NetKingdom M0–M3 security **requirements** + env-posture ceremonies | **net-kingdom canon** (beside `openbao-unseal-custody-models.md`, `responsibility-map.md`) | Author the ops-security slice |
|
||
| Machine-readable descriptors + conformance checker + dev doubles | **ops-warden** (`registry/policy/`, `scripts/`) | Own (WP-0015 T2–T4) |
|
||
| Runtime enforcement of the lattice | **flex-auth** | Route; do not enforce here |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Boundaries preserved
|
||
|
||
- **OpenBao** holds secret values. ops-warden never custodies them.
|
||
- **flex-auth** decides allow/deny (incl. enforcing this lattice at runtime).
|
||
- **CARING / Access Control** governs access semantics and delegation.
|
||
- **key-cape** establishes identity. ops-warden authors the standard and *checks
|
||
conformance* — it does not become a broker, PDP, or IdP (responsibility-map).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## See also
|
||
|
||
- `wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md` — the posture-aware `warden access` fetch surface
|
||
- `net-kingdom/docs/openbao-unseal-custody-models.md`, `responsibility-map.md`,
|
||
`platform-root-custody.md`, `security-bootstrap-*`
|
||
- info-tech-canon: Security Model, DevSecOps Model, Data Model, CARING Access Governance
|
||
- `workplans/WARDEN-WP-0015-secret-lifecycle-tiering.md`
|