generated from coulomb/repo-seed
tegwick
859beed07f
llm-connect is operational (operator set OPENROUTER_API_KEY). Contract discovered from
the running service: POST /execute {"prompt":...} -> {"content":...}.
LlmConnectBrain embeds the fixed charter + the inbox message as untrusted data, calls
/execute, and parses a JSON action plan (_extract_json tolerates fences/prose), escalating
defensively on malformed/empty/transport errors. The build_plans guardrail still enforces
the allowlist + no-secret invariant on whatever the model returns — the LLM cannot widen
ops-warden's authority. `warden worker run --brain rule|llm` selects the planner.
Live-verified on the real inbox: the LLM brain planned a sensible reply+mark_read for a
secrets-engine coordination message and correctly escalated a secret-custody request as
out-of-lane — better classification than the deterministic RuleBrain.
6 new tests, 236 pass, lint clean. T3 (guarded executor) and T4 (scheduling) remain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
152 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
152 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020
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type: workplan
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title: "ops-warden worker — autonomous coordination via llm-connect"
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domain: infotech
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repo: ops-warden
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status: active
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owner: claude
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topic_slug: custodian
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planning_priority: high
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planning_order: 20
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created: "2026-06-29"
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updated: "2026-06-29"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "c906ba1d-f991-4fb0-b113-59432ddf87c0"
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---
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# WARDEN-WP-0020 — ops-warden worker (`warden worker`)
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**Problem:** ops-warden's coordination lane (State Hub inbox `to_agent=ops-warden`) is
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handled only when a human spins up an ops-warden session and relays instructions. That
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doesn't scale — Bernd is hand-relaying between flex-auth ↔ secrets-engine ↔ ops-warden
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across sessions.
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**Goal:** a `warden worker` CLI that pulls ops-warden's unread coordination requests and,
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using **llm-connect** for inference, drives each to an ops-warden action (answer a routing
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question, draft+send a reply, mark read, propose/commit a catalog diff, or escalate) — so
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the inbox is handled without a human starting a session.
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**Decisions (Bernd, 2026-06-29):** **full-auto in-scope** (worker executes any in-scope
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action; escalates only secrets/prod/out-of-scope) and **scheduled/unattended** (cron or
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activity-core). Because there is no human in the loop for in-scope actions, the guardrails
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are load-bearing and the rollout is staged: **dry-run → manual → scheduled**.
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**Build vs reuse:** inference = llm-connect (`/execute`); trigger = cron or activity-core
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(reuse the durable task factory, don't reinvent scheduling). Worker logic lives in warden.
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## Guardrails (non-negotiable — full-auto rests on these)
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1. **Fixed charter, non-overridable.** The boundary (issue SSH; route everything else;
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conduit-not-broker; never hold/print a secret value) is a fixed system policy. Message
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content is **untrusted data**, never instructions that can relax it (prompt-injection
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containment).
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2. **Action allowlist.** Every action is validated against an allowlist before execution;
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off-list → escalate. No secret handling, no prod-config writes, no irreversible/outward
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actions without an explicit human ack.
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3. **No-secret invariant.** Refuse any task requiring a secret value in hand or in a prompt.
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4. **Full audit + dry-run.** Every action emits a progress event; `--dry-run` shows the
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plan without executing. Scheduled mode only after a clean dry-run shakedown.
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## Hard dependency
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llm-connect must be operational — it needs its provider key (`OPENROUTER_API_KEY`,
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CCR-2026-0003, currently deferred by railiance-platform/secrets-engine). The worker is
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built against llm-connect's contract; it cannot run the brain until that lands.
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---
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## Tasks
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### T1 — Worker scaffold (llm-connect-independent, safe)
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "979c2d9b-0803-442f-aa2e-acb02bac07e9"
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```
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- [x] `src/warden/worker.py`: State Hub inbox client (`HubClient.unread`), a `Brain`
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protocol, a deterministic `RuleBrain` default (answers clear routing questions;
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escalates the rest), the `PlannedAction`/`WorkerPlan` model, the guardrail allowlist +
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`validate_action` (enforced brain-agnostically in `build_plans`), and a `render_plans`
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dry-run renderer (plan only, no execution).
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- [x] `warden worker run [--once] [--dry-run]` CLI; `--dry-run` is the default and
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`--execute` is refused (exit 2) until the guarded executor lands (T3).
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- [x] `tests/test_worker.py` (RuleBrain routing/secret/prod/unknown, guardrail downgrades a
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reckless brain on secret/prod, off-allowlist rejection, render, CLI). 18 cases.
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- [x] Live dry-run against the real hub verified — read the inbox and produced a guardrailed
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plan (it surfaced secrets-engine's OIDC-role reply, demonstrating the value).
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### T2 — llm-connect brain
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "52d281b2-7d48-44f5-b77e-80e3ed500b5f"
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```
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- [x] llm-connect brought operational (operator set OPENROUTER_API_KEY k8s secret + restart).
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Contract discovered empirically from the running service: `POST /execute {"prompt":...}`
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→ `{"content": "<text>", ...}` (no OpenAPI; custom JSON API). End-to-end verified (pong).
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- [x] `LlmConnectBrain` (src/warden/worker.py): embeds the fixed charter + the message as
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untrusted data into the prompt, calls `/execute`, parses a JSON action plan
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(`_extract_json` tolerates fences/prose), and defensively escalates on malformed/empty/
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transport-error. Configurable `LLM_CONNECT_URL`. The guardrail pass still enforces the
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allowlist + no-secret invariant on whatever the model returns.
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- [x] `warden worker run --brain rule|llm` selector (dry-run default). Tests:
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`tests/test_worker.py` (extract_json, parse, escalate-on-flag/malformed/transport,
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guardrail-catches-unsafe-LLM-action). **Live verified** against the real inbox: the LLM
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brain produced a sensible reply+mark_read for the secrets-engine message and correctly
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escalated the llm-connect secret-custody request. 236 tests, lint clean.
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### T3 — Action dispatch + guardrails (full-auto in-scope)
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020-T03
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "3a71965e-42d5-4258-9761-aced804c88e7"
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```
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- [ ] Execute in-scope actions: `warden route/access` answers, drafted replies, mark-read,
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catalog/playbook diffs (commit + sync). Enforce the allowlist + no-secret invariant in
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code; per-action progress-event audit; escalation path to a human queue.
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### T4 — Scheduled trigger
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020-T04
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "7f77ea6d-c281-42c5-ad25-2a0bb9fd68de"
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```
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- [ ] Wire cron or activity-core to `warden worker run --once`. Ships **disabled**; enabled
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only after a clean dry-run shakedown. Concurrency guard (no overlapping runs).
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### T5 — Docs / SCOPE / INTENT
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0020-T05
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "6e7ae317-7f8b-468a-bb5c-b08093ed43a0"
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```
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- [ ] Record the scope expansion: ops-warden gains an autonomous coordination worker.
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Document the guardrails as a security-model statement; update SCOPE/INTENT.
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---
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## Acceptance
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- `warden worker run --dry-run` reads the real inbox and prints a guardrailed plan.
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- Full-auto execution runs only in-scope, allowlisted actions; secrets/prod/out-of-scope
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escalate; every action is audited. No secret value ever enters a prompt, log, or commit.
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- Scheduled mode is enabled only after a dry-run shakedown.
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## See also
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- llm-connect (inference), activity-core (durable trigger), kaizen-agentic (personas)
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- `.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` (the boundary the worker enforces)
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