generated from coulomb/repo-seed
tegwick
46b340f45f
WP-0014 made ops-warden the operator access front door (warden access --fetch/--exec proxies an exec_capable secret as the caller), but every discovery surface still told the pre-WP-0014 "SSH certs only, pointer not key" story — so agents like whynot-design never found the proxy and concluded they had to message ops-warden for a token value. Messaging/discoverability only; the conduit security model is unchanged (no custody, no broker). T1 — CLI: `warden route` table warden column is now three-valued (issue/assist/route); route + access JSON gain warden_role + exec_capable and a proxy-aware next_action; `warden access` closing line leads with "ops-warden can fetch this for you as the caller" for exec_capable lanes (route-only lanes keep "owner vends"). T2 — .claude/rules/credential-routing.md reframed (lead + routing table role column); SCOPE one-liner + a second capability block for the access front door. T3 — registered the State Hub capability "Operator access front door (caller-identity fetch proxy)" (the hub had no ops-warden security capability at all); messaged whynot-design the corrected `warden access "npm auth token" --fetch/--exec` path. 210 tests pass, lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# Credential and access routing
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**Audience:** Codex, Claude Code, Grok, and custodian agents that call **llm-connect**
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for inference. Run this check **before** requesting secrets, API keys, SSH access,
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login tokens, or database passwords — in any repo, not only `ops-warden`.
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ops-warden **issues SSH certificates** (`warden sign`, `cert_command`) **and is the
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operator access front door** for every other credential need. For `exec_capable` lanes
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(OpenBao reads, key-cape login) `warden access <need> --fetch/--exec` **proxies the fetch
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as you** — it runs the owner's tool with your identity and streams the value to you;
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ops-warden holds, caches, and logs nothing. For non-exec lanes it points you at the owner.
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**Do not** `POST /messages/` to `ops-warden` expecting a secret *value* — a State Hub
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reply is always a pointer. The **value comes from the CLI front door** (`warden access`),
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run with **your** identity, never from the inbox.
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### Lookup (do this first)
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```bash
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warden route find "<describe your need>" --json # who owns it (pointer)
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warden access "<describe your need>" --json # how to get it (handoff)
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```
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`warden access` is the operator front door (WARDEN-WP-0014): it renders the owner,
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auth method, path template, command skeleton, and policy-gate status for any need.
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For `exec_capable` lanes it can **proxy the fetch as you** (`--fetch`/`--exec`) — it
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runs the owner's tool with **your** identity and streams the value to you; ops-warden
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never holds, caches, or logs the value. See `wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md`.
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Requires the `warden` CLI from `~/ops-warden` (`uv tool install .` or `uv run warden`).
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| Agent runtime | How to orient |
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| --- | --- |
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| **Codex / Grok** (shell, HTTP State Hub) | `warden route` commands above; inbox `to_agent=ops-warden` is for coordination, not secret vending |
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| **Claude Code** (MCP when available) | `get_domain_summary("custodian")` for workstreams; **still** use `warden route` for credential ownership |
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| **llm-connect** (inference service) | Never put secret retrieval in prompts; route custody to OpenBao/operator paths surfaced by `warden route` |
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### Quick routing table
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| I need… | Owner | ops-warden role |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| SSH cert (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`) | ops-warden | **Issue** — `warden sign` |
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| API key, DB password, provider token | OpenBao (`railiance-platform`) | **Assist** — `warden access <need> --fetch/--exec` proxies as you; OpenBao keeps custody |
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| Login / OIDC / MFA | key-cape / Keycloak | **Assist** — `warden access <need> --fetch` runs the login as you |
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| Authorization decision | flex-auth | Route only |
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| activity-core → issue-core emission | activity-core + issue-core | Route — `warden route show activity-core-issue-sink` |
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| SSH tunnel | ops-bridge (+ `cert_command` from warden) | Route only |
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### Anti-patterns (do not do these)
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- `POST /messages/` to `ops-warden` asking for `ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY`, `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, etc.
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- Inventing `warden secret`, `warden login`, `warden bao`, `warden tunnel` — they do not exist
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- Pasting secrets into Git, State Hub, workplans, logs, or chat
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- Treating `warden access --fetch` as a *secret store*. It is a transparent conduit
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using **your** identity — it holds nothing. ops-warden as a **standing broker**
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(its own secret-read token, a cache of fetched values) is forbidden; runtime secret
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custody stays in OpenBao, authorization in flex-auth.
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### Other capabilities (reuse-surface)
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Non-credential capabilities are usually discovered through **reuse-surface** federation
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(`reuse-surface` registry / `capability.*` indexes). Credential routing is inlined in
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every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and easy to
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get wrong.
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**Canon:** `~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md` · catalog `~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml` |