Confirm whynot credential binding

This commit is contained in:
2026-06-27 23:45:31 +02:00
parent aee0dcefad
commit 52687d8b3e
6 changed files with 115 additions and 41 deletions

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@@ -2,30 +2,36 @@ id: CCR-2026-0001
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: "whynot-design npm publish token lane"
title: whynot-design npm publish token lane
status: proposed
created: "2026-06-27"
updated: "2026-06-27"
created: '2026-06-27'
updated: '2026-06-27'
requester:
agent: ops-warden
message_id: "fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076"
reason: "Allow ops-warden to proxy caller-scoped access to whynot-design's npm publish token."
message_id: fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076
reason: Allow ops-warden to proxy caller-scoped access to whynot-design's npm publish
token.
review:
required: true
required_approvers:
- platform-operator
comments: []
- platform-operator
comments:
- at: '2026-06-27T21:40:22+00:00'
reviewer: bernd.worsch
decision: binding_confirmed
comment: 'Confirmed in chat: groups=whynot-design is the intended KeyCape/NetKingdom
binding for the whynot-design npm publish lane.'
target:
domain: financials
tenant: whynot-design
workload: whynot-design
environment: production
purpose: "npm package publishing through ops-warden caller-scoped fetch/exec"
purpose: npm package publishing through ops-warden caller-scoped fetch/exec
openbao:
mount: platform
kv_path: platform/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
fields:
- NPM_AUTH_TOKEN
- NPM_AUTH_TOKEN
policy_name: workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish.hcl
auth:
@@ -36,42 +42,46 @@ openbao:
groups_claim: groups
bound_claims:
groups:
- whynot-design
bound_claims_confirmed: false
- whynot-design
bound_claims_confirmed: true
policies:
- workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
- workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
type: ops-warden
catalog_id: whynot-design-npm-publish
selector: "npm publish token"
command: "warden access whynot-design-npm-publish --exec -- npm publish"
selector: npm publish token
command: warden access whynot-design-npm-publish --exec -- npm publish
resolvable: false
readiness: template
activation: "draft-until-ccr-verified"
activation: draft-until-ccr-verified
risk:
classification: high
notes:
- "Grants read access to the credential used to publish npm packages."
- "Uses a publish-specific catalog id; a future read-only npm token must use a separate catalog id."
- "The proposed OIDC bound claim must be confirmed before apply."
- "ops-warden must proxy the read as the caller and must not retain the token value."
- Grants read access to the credential used to publish npm packages.
- Uses a publish-specific catalog id; a future read-only npm token must use a separate
catalog id.
- The OIDC bound claim was confirmed in review; re-confirm if the claim changes.
- ops-warden must proxy the read as the caller and must not retain the token value.
verification:
positive:
- "Approved whynot-design identity can fetch field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN through OpenBao or ops-warden."
- Approved whynot-design identity can fetch field NPM_AUTH_TOKEN through OpenBao
or ops-warden.
negative:
- "Non-whynot identity cannot read the path or field."
- Non-whynot identity cannot read the path or field.
activation_conditions:
- "Policy applied with platform-admin/operator authority."
- "OIDC role bound to confirmed whynot-design claim or approved service account."
- "Secret value provisioned directly in OpenBao through approved operator custody."
- "Positive and negative verification recorded with non-secret audit ids or timestamps."
- Policy applied with platform-admin/operator authority.
- OIDC role bound to confirmed whynot-design claim or approved service account.
- Secret value provisioned directly in OpenBao through approved operator custody.
- Positive and negative verification recorded with non-secret audit ids or timestamps.
lifecycle:
deactivate: "Disable ops-warden catalog entry and remove or detach auth role policy."
rotate: "Replace NPM_AUTH_TOKEN value directly in OpenBao and record non-secret rotation evidence."
compromised: "Immediately deactivate access front door, rotate npm token, record blast-radius notes, and open incident follow-up tasks."
deactivate: Disable ops-warden catalog entry and remove or detach auth role policy.
rotate: Replace NPM_AUTH_TOKEN value directly in OpenBao and record non-secret rotation
evidence.
compromised: Immediately deactivate access front door, rotate npm token, record
blast-radius notes, and open incident follow-up tasks.
state_hub:
workplan_id: RAILIANCE-WP-0007
related_workplan_id: RAILIANCE-WP-0006
ops_warden_reply_message_id: "b175c561-7858-43f5-a309-949b0dede1b4"
ops_warden_batch_message_id: "fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076"
ops_warden_reply_message_id: b175c561-7858-43f5-a309-949b0dede1b4
ops_warden_batch_message_id: fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076

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@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ make credential-change-render CREDENTIAL_CHANGE=CCR-2026-0001
make credential-change-plan CREDENTIAL_CHANGE=CCR-2026-0001
make credential-change-status CREDENTIAL_CHANGE=CCR-2026-0001
make credential-change-status-json CREDENTIAL_CHANGE=CCR-2026-0001
scripts/credential-change.py confirm-binding CCR-2026-0001 --reviewer <name> --comment "..."
scripts/credential-change.py approve CCR-2026-0001 --reviewer <name> --comment "..."
scripts/credential-change.py deny CCR-2026-0001 --reviewer <name> --comment "..."
scripts/credential-change.py needs-changes CCR-2026-0001 --reviewer <name> --comment "..."

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@@ -107,9 +107,10 @@ The role must attach only:
workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
```
Before applying the role, confirm the KeyCape/NetKingdom claim that identifies
the whynot-design caller. The role must bind to that claim; do not create an
unbounded OIDC role that grants this policy to every OIDC user.
The whynot-design pilot claim is confirmed as `groups=whynot-design`. Before
applying any changed role, re-confirm the KeyCape/NetKingdom claim that
identifies the whynot-design caller. The role must bind to that claim; do not
create an unbounded OIDC role that grants this policy to every OIDC user.
If the consumer is an in-cluster service account instead of an OIDC caller, use
Kubernetes auth with the same role name and bind only the approved namespace

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@@ -487,6 +487,29 @@ def append_decision(path: Path, status: str, reviewer: str, comment: str) -> Non
dump_yaml(path, ccr)
def confirm_binding(path: Path, reviewer: str, comment: str) -> None:
ccr, errors, _warnings = validate_ccr(path)
if errors:
for error in errors:
print(f"[FAIL] {path.name}: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
ccr["openbao"]["auth"]["bound_claims_confirmed"] = True
review = ccr.setdefault("review", {})
comments = review.setdefault("comments", [])
if not isinstance(comments, list):
fail("review.comments must be a list")
comments.append(
{
"at": utc_now(),
"reviewer": reviewer,
"decision": "binding_confirmed",
"comment": comment,
}
)
ccr["updated"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date().isoformat()
dump_yaml(path, ccr)
def command_validate(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
refs = args.refs or [str(path) for path in sorted(ccr_dir().glob("*.y*ml"))]
if not refs:
@@ -554,6 +577,13 @@ def command_decision(args: argparse.Namespace, status: str) -> int:
return 0
def command_confirm_binding(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
path = resolve_ccr(args.ref)
confirm_binding(path, args.reviewer, args.comment)
print(f"[OK] {path.name} -> binding_confirmed")
return 0
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Validate, render, and review non-secret credential change requests."
@@ -594,6 +624,15 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
decision.add_argument("--comment", required=True)
decision.set_defaults(func=lambda args, status=status: command_decision(args, status))
binding = sub.add_parser(
"confirm-binding",
help="Record that the non-secret OpenBao auth binding was confirmed",
)
binding.add_argument("ref")
binding.add_argument("--reviewer", required=True)
binding.add_argument("--comment", required=True)
binding.set_defaults(func=command_confirm_binding)
return parser

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@@ -29,8 +29,14 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
/ "credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0002-issue-core-ingestion-api-key.yaml"
)
def test_sample_ccr_validates_with_bound_claim_warning(self) -> None:
_ccr, errors, warnings = credential_change.validate_ccr(self.sample)
def test_sample_ccr_validates_without_bound_claim_warning(self) -> None:
ccr, errors, warnings = credential_change.validate_ccr(self.sample)
self.assertEqual(errors, [])
self.assertEqual(warnings, [])
self.assertTrue(ccr["openbao"]["auth"]["bound_claims_confirmed"])
def test_unconfirmed_sibling_ccr_keeps_bound_claim_warning(self) -> None:
_ccr, errors, warnings = credential_change.validate_ccr(self.issue_core)
self.assertEqual(errors, [])
self.assertIn("bound claim is not confirmed", warnings[0])
@@ -56,6 +62,8 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertFalse(payload["frontdoor_resolvable"])
self.assertEqual(payload["access_frontdoor"]["readiness"], "template")
self.assertEqual(payload["access_frontdoor"]["catalog_id"], "whynot-design-npm-publish")
self.assertEqual(payload["apply_blockers"], ["apply requires status approved, got proposed"])
self.assertEqual(payload["warnings"], [])
self.assertIn("front door is marked resolvable=false", payload["frontdoor_blockers"])
def test_kubernetes_auth_payload_uses_service_account_bounds(self) -> None:
@@ -75,8 +83,8 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
tmp_path = Path(tmp)
ccr_dir = tmp_path / "ccrs"
ccr_dir.mkdir()
copied = ccr_dir / self.sample.name
shutil.copy2(self.sample, copied)
copied = ccr_dir / self.issue_core.name
shutil.copy2(self.issue_core, copied)
old_ccr_dir = os.environ.get("CCR_DIR")
os.environ["CCR_DIR"] = str(ccr_dir)
try:
@@ -89,7 +97,7 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(ccr["review"]["comments"][-1]["comment"], "looks right")
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
credential_change.command_apply_plan(
type("Args", (), {"ref": "CCR-2026-0001"})()
type("Args", (), {"ref": "CCR-2026-0002"})()
)
finally:
if old_ccr_dir is None:
@@ -97,6 +105,19 @@ class CredentialChangeTests(unittest.TestCase):
else:
os.environ["CCR_DIR"] = old_ccr_dir
def test_confirm_binding_records_comment_and_clears_warning(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
copied = Path(tmp) / self.issue_core.name
shutil.copy2(self.issue_core, copied)
credential_change.confirm_binding(
copied, "unit-test", "service account binding confirmed"
)
ccr, errors, warnings = credential_change.validate_ccr(copied)
self.assertEqual(errors, [])
self.assertEqual(warnings, [])
self.assertTrue(ccr["openbao"]["auth"]["bound_claims_confirmed"])
self.assertEqual(ccr["review"]["comments"][-1]["decision"], "binding_confirmed")
def test_generated_policy_is_narrow(self) -> None:
ccr, _errors, _warnings = credential_change.validate_ccr(self.sample)
policy = credential_change.generated_policy_hcl(ccr)

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@@ -203,7 +203,8 @@ Acceptance:
**2026-06-27:** Added file-backed `approve`, `deny`, and `needs-changes`
commands that require reviewer and comment text and append non-secret review
comments to the CCR. Added `status` plus Make targets
comments to the CCR. Added `confirm-binding` for explicit non-secret auth
binding confirmation. Added `status` plus Make targets
`credential-change-status` and `credential-change-status-json` so ops-warden can
consume `readiness`/`resolvable` without scraping prose. Remaining T05 work is
State Hub decision-event emission and tighter chat integration.
@@ -249,8 +250,9 @@ Acceptance:
- ops-warden activates its catalog entry only after CCR verification.
**2026-06-27:** The whynot-design lane is represented as `CCR-2026-0001` and
can be rendered for review. It remains proposed/unapproved with unconfirmed
bound claims, so live apply and ops-warden activation are correctly blocked.
can be rendered for review. The whynot-design bound claim was confirmed from
operator chat context and recorded in the CCR, but it remains proposed/unapproved,
so live apply and ops-warden activation are correctly blocked.
**2026-06-27:** Converted the ops-warden batch follow-up
`fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076` into three proposed CCRs: