railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0002-issue-core-ingestion-api-key.yaml

id: CCR-2026-0002
kind: credential-change-request
schema_version: 1
request_type: workload-kv-read
title: issue-core runtime ingestion key lane
status: active
created: '2026-06-27'
updated: '2026-07-02'
requester:
  agent: ops-warden
  message_id: fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076
  reason: Confirm and provision the issue-core workload KV lane requested in the ops-warden
    batch.
review:
  required: true
  required_approvers:
  - platform-operator
  - issue-core-owner
  comments:
  - at: '2026-06-29T22:53:03+00:00'
    reviewer: codex
    decision: metadata_review_binding_confirmed
    comment: Live cluster metadata on 2026-06-30 confirms ExternalSecret issue-core/issue-core-runtime
      is Ready=True (SecretSynced) and maps ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY plus GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN
      from platform/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime. The workload
      Deployment uses the default service account; OpenBao auth for this delivery
      path is the platform ClusterSecretStore/openbao role external-secrets-issue-core
      bound to service account external-secrets/external-secrets. Keep CCR status
      proposed until platform/operator and issue-core-owner approval.
  - at: '2026-07-02T09:59:54+00:00'
    reviewer: bernd.worsch
    decision: approved
    comment: 'Approved in chat (Claude Code coached-approvals session, 2026-07-02)
      acting as all required approvers: platform-operator, issue-core-owner. Field-set
      decision: keep both ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY and GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN, matching the
      live ExternalSecret mapping.'
target:
  domain: financials
  tenant: issue-core
  workload: issue-core
  environment: production
  purpose: issue-core runtime ingestion through OpenBao workload KV and External Secrets
openbao:
  mount: platform
  kv_path: platform/workloads/issue-core/issue-core/issue-core-runtime
  fields:
  - ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY
  - GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN
  policy_name: workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime
  policy_file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime.hcl
  auth:
    method: kubernetes
    mount: kubernetes
    role: external-secrets-issue-core
    bound_claims:
      service_account_names:
      - external-secrets
      service_account_namespaces:
      - external-secrets
    bound_claims_confirmed: true
    policies:
    - workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime
    ttl: 15m
access_frontdoor:
  type: ops-warden
  catalog_id: issue-core-ingestion-api-key
  selector: issue-core ingestion API key
  command: warden access issue-core-ingestion-api-key --fetch ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY
  resolvable: true
  readiness: ready
  activation: verified-positive-and-negative-access-frontdoor-active-2026-07-02
delivery:
  surface: external-secrets
  target: ExternalSecret issue-core/issue-core-runtime -> Secret issue-core-runtime
    in the issue-core namespace
risk:
  classification: high
  notes:
  - Grants read access to issue-core runtime ingestion credentials through the platform
    External Secrets path.
  - GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN remains included because the live issue-core ExternalSecret
    maps it alongside ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY; remove it before approval only if the issue-core
    owner confirms it is no longer required.
  - The Kubernetes auth subject is the External Secrets operator service account external-secrets/external-secrets,
    with ClusterSecretStore usage limited to the issue-core namespace.
  - ops-warden must proxy reads as the caller and must not retain token values.
verification:
  positive:
  - ExternalSecret issue-core/issue-core-runtime is Ready=True and syncs the configured
    fields without printing values.
  - Approved issue-core runtime can consume the resulting Kubernetes Secret without
    exposing values.
  negative:
  - A namespace outside the approved ClusterSecretStore condition cannot use this
    store to read the path.
  - A service account outside external-secrets/external-secrets cannot authenticate
    through the External Secrets OpenBao role.
  activation_conditions:
  - Policy applied with platform-admin/operator authority.
  - Kubernetes auth role bound to external-secrets/external-secrets for the issue-core
    External Secrets delivery path.
  - Secret values provisioned directly in OpenBao through approved operator custody.
  - Positive and negative verification recorded with non-secret audit ids or timestamps.
  evidence:
  - at: '2026-07-02T10:08:00+00:00'
    actor: bernd.worsch
    kind: delegated_metadata_apply
    result: passed
    details:
    - Delegated metadata applier ran as bernd.worsch using local bao CLI ambient authority.
    - 'Policy metadata write: sys/policies/acl/workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime'
    - 'Auth role metadata write: auth/kubernetes/role/external-secrets-issue-core'
    - No secret values were read, written, printed, or accepted in argv.
  - at: '2026-07-02T18:49:04+00:00'
    actor: railiance-platform
    kind: frontdoor_activation
    result: passed
    details:
    - 'ops-warden promoted catalog id issue-core-ingestion-api-key to status active
      (ops-warden commit 364eb7d, reviewed 2026-07-02): entry is exec_capable and
      resolvable with zero-placeholder handoff; ops-warden proxies reads as the caller
      and holds no secret value. Promotion followed positive/negative verification
      recorded 2026-07-02.'
lifecycle:
  deactivate: Disable ops-warden catalog entry and remove or detach auth role policy.
  rotate: Replace issue-core runtime secret values directly in OpenBao and record
    non-secret rotation evidence.
  compromised: Immediately deactivate access front door, rotate affected values, record
    blast-radius notes, and open incident follow-up tasks.
state_hub:
  workplan_id: RAILIANCE-WP-0007
  ops_warden_batch_message_id: fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076