sand-boxer/docs/meta-framework.md

# sand-boxer meta-framework specification

Version 0.1 — derived from `research/03-meta-framework-synthesis.md` and `INTENT.md`.

sand-boxer is the **sandbox establishment service**: one API for consumers, many
extension backends. It provisions *where and how* code runs; sibling projects own
agent harnessing, validation, and code generation.

---

## Resource model

| Resource | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| **Profile** | Named, versioned sandbox recipe: extension binding, isolation, network, TTL, placement |
| **Extension** | Backend adapter implementing provision / wait_ready / teardown |
| **Host** | Registered placement target for self-hosted extensions; read-only telemetry via `profile.sandbox-canary` (see `docs/host-telemetry.md`) |
| **Sandbox** | Running instance of a profile |
| **Snapshot** | Point-in-time workspace checkpoint (`sandboxer snapshot` / `restore`) |
| **Route** | Extension selection policy when multiple backends qualify |
| **Meter** | Usage record for payments layer (SaaS extensions — SAND-WP-0006) |

---

## Lifecycle states

```
requested → provisioning → ready → active → { expired | failed } → destroying → destroyed
```

| State | Meaning |
|-------|---------|
| `requested` | Create accepted; not yet handed to extension |
| `provisioning` | Extension running provision + wait_ready |
| `ready` | Reachability confirmed; consumer may attach |
| `active` | Consumer has marked sandbox in use (optional transition) |
| `expired` | TTL elapsed before explicit destroy |
| `failed` | Provision or readiness failed |
| `destroying` | Teardown in progress |
| `destroyed` | Resources released; record retained for audit |

### State Hub event mapping

Each transition emits a State Hub progress event (or dedicated registration API
when available):

| Transition | `event_type` | Required fields |
|------------|--------------|-----------------|
| → `requested` | `note` | `sandbox_id`, `profile_id`, `consumer` |
| → `provisioning` | `note` | `extension_id`, `host` |
| → `ready` | `milestone` | `reachability` descriptor |
| → `active` | `note` | `actor_type`, timestamps |
| → `failed` | `note` | `error` summary |
| → `destroying` | `note` | — |
| → `destroyed` | `milestone` | `duration_s`, cleanup report |

Event `detail` payload (JSON):

```json
{
  "sandbox_id": "abc12345",
  "profile_id": "profile.compose-e2e",
  "extension_id": "ext.compose-ssh",
  "host": "coulombcore",
  "consumer": {"actor": "atm", "project": "wise-validator", "run_id": "..."},
  "actor_type": "atm",
  "state": "ready",
  "reachability": {"ssh": "root@coulombcore", "remote_dir": "/tmp/sandboxer/abc12345"},
  "timestamps": {"created_at": "...", "ready_at": "..."}
}
```

Extends the `build-agent` self-register pattern: generic sandbox identities carry
`profile_id` + `extension_id` instead of build-machine metadata.

---

## Core API operations (v0)

| Operation | Description | v0 scope |
|-----------|-------------|----------|
| `create` | Provision from profile + inputs | **Yes** |
| `get` | Inspect sandbox status | **Yes** |
| `list` | List sandboxes (filter by consumer optional) | **Yes** |
| `extend_ttl` | Extend time-to-live | **Yes** |
| `recreate` | Destroy and reprovision from stored seed | **Yes** |
| `destroy` | Idempotent teardown | **Yes** |
| `snapshot` / `restore` | Checkpoint workspace | **Yes** (compose-ssh, saas-stub) |
| `exec` | Run command in sandbox | Harness-owned via SSH (glas-harness) |

HTTP surface (optional v0; CLI calls core library directly):

- `POST /v1/sandboxes` — create
- `GET /v1/sandboxes/{id}` — get
- `GET /v1/sandboxes` — list
- `DELETE /v1/sandboxes/{id}` — destroy
- `POST /v1/sandboxes/{id}/snapshot` — checkpoint
- `POST /v1/snapshots/{id}/restore` — restore
- `GET /v1/snapshots` — list checkpoints
- `POST /v1/sandboxes/{id}/recreate` — recreate
- `PATCH /v1/sandboxes/{id}/ttl` — extend TTL
- `POST /v1/sandboxes/expire` — TTL reap (query `apply=true`)

---

## Consumer attribution

Every create request carries a **consumer** block:

```yaml
consumer:
  actor: adm | agt | atm
  project: <calling-repo-or-service>   # e.g. wise-validator, glas-harness
  session_id: <optional>
  run_id: <optional>
```

| Actor | Typical caller |
|-------|----------------|
| `adm` | Human operator via CLI |
| `agt` | LLM agent session |
| `atm` | Deterministic automation (CI, activity-core, wise-validator) |

sand-boxer records attribution on every lifecycle event. It does not interpret
agent intent or authorize the caller — flex-auth owns authorization when enforced.

---

## Extension interface

Each extension implements:

```text
provision(profile, inputs, placement) → SandboxHandle
wait_ready(handle) → Reachability
teardown(handle) → CleanupReport
estimate_cost?(profile, duration) → MeterQuote   # optional; SaaS only
```

Registration requirements (validated at load time):

- `id` — unique extension identifier (`ext.<name>`)
- `capabilities` — isolation levels, regions, persistence, pricing model
- `handler` — Python entry point or built-in registry binding

Extensions are discovered from `extensions/*.yaml` at repo root and loaded via
`sandboxer.extensions.registry`.

---

## Routing policy vocabulary

When multiple extensions satisfy a profile capability:

| Strategy | Behavior |
|----------|----------|
| `prefer-self-hosted` | Self-hosted extensions first; SaaS fallback (default Coulomb posture) |
| `lowest-cost` | Cheapest `estimate_cost` quote wins |
| `lowest-latency` | Closest region / host wins |
| `explicit` | Profile names a single `extension`; no auto-routing |

Routing engine v0: `sandboxer.routing.resolver` — see `docs/routing.md`.

---

## Security limits

sand-boxer commits to:

1. **Default-deny network** unless profile explicitly allows egress
2. **Secrets at provision boundary** — `secret_refs` resolved via ops-warden /
   OpenBao; never returned to agent context
3. **Blast-radius isolation** — dedicated hosts (sandboxer01, CoulombCore) away
   from Railiance01 production
4. **Observable lifecycle** — every transition attributed to `adm` / `agt` / `atm`
5. **Honest limits** — allowed tool paths can be abused by compromised agents

sand-boxer does **not** provide intent-aware egress filtering in v1.

---

## Out of scope (sibling ownership)

| Concern | Owner |
|---------|-------|
| Agent gateway, tools, memory | glas-harness |
| e2e.yml semantics, health checks, test pass/fail | wise-validator |
| Code generation, setup instructions content | snuggle-inventor |
| SSH tunnels | ops-bridge |
| SSH certificates | ops-warden |
| Workstream / task state | state-hub |

See `docs/integrations/` for per-sibling contracts.