Documents the dashboard's architecture, framework choice rationale, data-fetching strategies (static loaders + live polling), component library, page inventory, and key features including the Workstream Health Index and entity modals. Also registers the new page in the Reference nav and adds runbook section for node overload / runaway agent process (INC-002) with hardening checklist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
8.4 KiB
title, tags, created, updated
| title | tags | created | updated | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Runbook — Gitea on COULOMBCORE |
|
2026-03-25 | 2026-03-26 |
Runbook: Gitea on COULOMBCORE
Gitea runs on the single-node k3s cluster at COULOMBCORE (92.205.130.254, user tegwick).
It uses Bitnami postgresql-ha (PGPool + 3-node Patroni) and Valkey cluster for caching.
Access
# SSH (requires ~/.ssh/id_ops)
ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ops tegwick@92.205.130.254
# Web UI
http://92.205.130.254:32166 # NodePort 32166 → gitea svc → pod :3000
# Check all Gitea pods
kubectl get pods -l 'app.kubernetes.io/instance=gitea'
Helm Release
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Release name | gitea |
| Namespace | default |
| Chart | gitea/gitea |
| Current version | 12.5.0 (Gitea 1.25.4) |
helm list -n default
helm history gitea -n default
helm get values gitea -n default
Known Issues
1. PGPool CrashLoopBackOff — containerd StartError: cannot start a stopped process
Symptom: gitea-postgresql-ha-pgpool-* pod is in CrashLoopBackOff. Describe shows:
Last State: Terminated
Reason: StartError
Message: failed to start containerd task "...": cannot start a stopped process: unknown
Exit Code: 128
Root cause: Containerd state corruption on the k3s node — the container task is recorded as "stopped" in containerd's internal state but the process never actually ran. This causes every restart attempt to fail immediately with exit code 128. Not a config or auth issue.
Fix: Delete the pod. The ReplicaSet controller recreates it with a fresh containerd task.
kubectl delete pod $(kubectl get pod -l 'app.kubernetes.io/component=pgpool' -o name)
Wait 30s then confirm it comes up 1/1 Running.
Cascade effect: PGPool down → gitea-postgresql-ha-pgpool ClusterIP (10.43.242.51:5432)
unreachable → Gitea app pod exhausts 10 DB connection attempts → exits → CrashLoopBackOff.
Fixing PGPool automatically unblocks Gitea.
2. Gitea pods Pending — Insufficient CPU
Symptom: New pod stuck in Pending with scheduler event:
0/1 nodes are available: 1 Insufficient cpu.
Root cause: The single-node cluster has ~2 vCPUs. CPU requests routinely approach 98% allocation. PGPool defaults to 250m CPU request; combined with 3x PostgreSQL at 250m each, Valkey, SSO stack, and monitoring, the budget is nearly exhausted.
Check:
kubectl describe node | grep -A6 "Allocated resources"
Fix: Reduce PGPool CPU request via Helm upgrade, then delete any stale crashing pods:
# Reduce pgpool from 250m to 100m (safe — pgpool is a lightweight connection pooler)
helm upgrade gitea gitea/gitea --version <current> -n default \
--reuse-values \
--set 'postgresql-ha.pgpool.resources.requests.cpu=100m' \
--set 'postgresql-ha.pgpool.resources.limits.cpu=200m'
# Delete the stuck old Gitea pod if it's crashlooping
kubectl delete pod <old-gitea-pod-name>
This frees ~250m (old pgpool, if crashing) + 100m (old gitea) = 350m, which is enough to schedule the new PGPool (100m) + new Gitea (100m via init containers).
After-fix: The rolling update from the blocked deployment should self-complete once both pods can schedule and Gitea can reach PGPool.
Recovery Checklist
When Gitea is down, work through this in order:
-
Check PGPool — most common root cause
kubectl get pod -l 'app.kubernetes.io/component=pgpool'CrashLoopBackOff→ delete the pod (see issue #1 above)Pending→ check CPU budget (see issue #2)
-
Check PostgreSQL — should be 3/3 Running; if not, this is a deeper issue
kubectl get pod -l 'app.kubernetes.io/component=postgresql' -
Check Gitea app pod
kubectl get pod -l 'app.kubernetes.io/component=gitea' kubectl logs <gitea-pod> --tail=20- DB connect errors → PGPool issue (go to step 1)
- Init container crash → check
kubectl logs <pod> -c configure-gitea
-
Verify end-to-end
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://92.205.130.254:32166/ # expect: 200
3. Node overload — runaway agent process (SSH dies, k3s unresponsive)
Symptom: SSH connections time out during banner exchange. k3s API returns TLS handshake
timeout. top (via console) shows load average >100, 99.8% sy CPU, many running tasks,
kswapd0 at high CPU. State-hub reverse tunnel may still be alive (it was established
before the overload and requires no new connections).
Root cause: A runaway process (typically a Claude Code agent spawning subprocesses) exhausts the process/memory budget. With no swap, the kernel thrashes continuously.
Triage (workstation):
# Check if node is alive despite SSH being down
curl -s --max-time 5 http://127.0.0.1:8000/state/health # via reverse tunnel
# k3s API — will timeout if node is thrashing
kubectl get nodes # expect TLS timeout
Fix (requires console/VNC access):
# 1. Identify runaway: look for high VIRT, many children, 99.8% sy in top
# Runaway claude agents: massive VIRT (>50GB), user tegwick
# 2. Kill the offenders
kill -9 <runaway-pid>
kill -9 <apport-pid-if-in-D-state> # apport in D-state amplifies load
# 3. Wait ~60s for load to drop; SSH will start accepting connections
# 4. Check PostgreSQL HA pods — may need 2-3 min to resync after OOM restarts
kubectl get pods -l 'app.kubernetes.io/name=postgresql-ha'
Gitea does NOT need to be restarted — it survives node overload. Once load drops and PostgreSQL HA resyncs, Gitea serves requests again.
Prevention: See "Robustness" section below.
Node Resource Budget (approximate)
| Component | CPU Request |
|---|---|
| postgresql-ha-postgresql × 3 | 750m |
| pgpool | 100m (after 2026-03-25 fix, was 250m) |
| valkey-cluster × 3 | 300m |
| gitea app | ~100m (init containers) |
| SSO stack (authelia, lldap, privacyidea, keycape) | ~225m |
| System (coredns, metrics-server, traefik) | ~200m |
| Total | ~1675m |
Node capacity: ~2000m. Headroom is tight (~325m). Avoid adding workloads without reviewing resource requests first.
Robustness — Hardening Checklist
These changes reduce blast radius from process/memory overload (INC-002, 2026-03-26):
1. Add swap (not yet done — highest priority)
fallocate -l 4G /swapfile
chmod 600 /swapfile
mkswap /swapfile
swapon /swapfile
echo '/swapfile none swap sw 0 0' >> /etc/fstab
Without swap, any memory spike causes immediate kernel thrash. 4GB swapfile = buffer time.
2. Cap tegwick user nproc (not yet done)
# /etc/security/limits.conf
tegwick hard nproc 512
tegwick soft nproc 256
Prevents a single agent from spawning 500+ processes. Claude Code agents survive fine within 256 soft / 512 hard.
3. Cap tegwick systemd user session memory (not yet done)
# Create override for the tegwick user slice
mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/user-$(id -u tegwick).slice.d/
cat > /etc/systemd/system/user-$(id -u tegwick).slice.d/limits.conf <<EOF
[Slice]
MemoryMax=1500M
MemorySwapMax=512M
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
Prevents a rogue user process from consuming all 3.9GB.
4. Always-on agent guardrails (process hygiene)
- Never run
/ralph-loopdirectly on COULOMBCORE — use/ralph-workplanwhich self-terminates when the workplan is complete (HEUREKA stop condition). - Set
--max-iterationsexplicitly on any Ralph invocation. - Avoid large parallel agent fans (e.g., spawning 20 sub-agents simultaneously) on this resource-constrained node.
5. Add cluster health alerting (not yet done)
A per-service tunnel adds passive visibility but no alerting. A single cron covering the whole cluster is more useful — it catches Gitea, PGPool, and any other crashlooping pod.
# /etc/cron.d/k3s-pod-health (on CoulombCore, run as tegwick)
*/5 * * * * tegwick kubectl get pods -A 2>/dev/null | awk '$4 ~ /CrashLoop|OOMKill|Error/ && $5+0 > 3 {print}' | grep . && curl -s -X POST <notify-webhook> -d "k3s pod unhealthy on COULOMBCORE" || true
Or via a state-hub progress event so it surfaces in the dashboard. Threshold: any pod with restart count > 3 and status not Running/Completed warrants a notification.
This single check covers the failure mode from INC-001 (PGPool crashlooping 13 days undetected) without adding tunnel infrastructure that can't help under node overload.