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railiance-platform/docs/workload-kv-access-lanes.md

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# Workload KV Access Lanes
This document records concrete OpenBao workload KV paths that external access
front doors can reference without storing or vending secret values themselves.
The first lane is for ops-warden `warden access --fetch` / `--exec`.
## Safety Rules
- Do not put secret values in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, workplans, or logs.
- Store only non-secret pointers here: path, field name, policy name, auth role,
flex-auth reference, and verification status.
- ops-warden may proxy a read as the caller, but it must not hold the returned
value beyond the caller-requested fetch/exec process.
- Live writes require an approved OpenBao/operator path and attended handling
of the secret value.
## whynot-design npm Publish Token
Ops-warden original request:
`551031d1-335e-4db8-9535-820fea52d0a3`
Ops-warden batch follow-up:
`fe5b1696-8956-4bd5-9d6f-dbde1901a076`
| Item | Value |
| --- | --- |
| ops-warden catalog id | `whynot-design-npm-publish` |
| KV mount | `platform` |
| OpenBao CLI path | `platform/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish` |
| Secret field | `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` |
| Front-door readiness | `template`, `resolvable=false` until CCR verification |
| Read policy | `workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish` |
| Policy file | `openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish.hcl` |
| OIDC auth mount | `netkingdom` |
| OIDC role | `whynot-design-workload-kv-read` |
| Kubernetes auth role | `whynot-design-workload-kv-read` if an in-cluster service account consumes this lane |
| flex-auth ref | `secret.read:whynot-design` if tenant policy requires pre-approval |
Expected caller login shape:
```bash
bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read
```
Expected OpenBao fetch shape:
```bash
bao kv get -field=NPM_AUTH_TOKEN platform/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
```
Expected ops-warden exec shape after activation:
```bash
warden access whynot-design-npm-publish --exec -- npm publish
```
The fetch command returns the secret value to the authenticated caller. Run it
only in an attended shell or through a process that consumes the value without
logging it.
## OpenBao Policy
The source policy grants only:
```text
read platform/data/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
read platform/metadata/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
```
It does not grant write, delete, patch, sudo, auth, sibling workload, or parent
list capabilities.
Dry-run the policy apply path:
```bash
make openbao-workload-kv-lanes-dry-run
```
Apply the policy with an approved platform-admin/operator token:
```bash
OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE=~/.local/openbao/platform-admin.token \
make openbao-configure-workload-kv-lanes
```
If the OpenBao pod has an approved token-helper session, use:
```bash
make openbao-configure-workload-kv-lanes OPENBAO_WORKLOAD_KV_ARGS=--use-token-helper
```
Do not paste the token into shell history or logs. The helper reads a token
from `OPENBAO_TOKEN_FILE` or an interactive hidden prompt unless
`--use-token-helper` is set, and passes it to OpenBao through stdin.
## Auth Role
The intended OpenBao OIDC role is:
```text
auth/netkingdom/role/whynot-design-workload-kv-read
```
The role must attach only:
```text
workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
```
The whynot-design pilot claim is confirmed as `groups=whynot-design`. Before
applying any changed role, re-confirm the KeyCape/NetKingdom claim that
identifies the whynot-design caller. The role must bind to that claim; do not
create an unbounded OIDC role that grants this policy to every OIDC user.
If the consumer is an in-cluster service account instead of an OIDC caller, use
Kubernetes auth with the same role name and bind only the approved namespace
and service account.
## Secret Provisioning
An approved operator must create or confirm the secret with:
```text
path: platform/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
field: NPM_AUTH_TOKEN
```
The value must be entered directly through OpenBao/operator custody. Record only
non-secret evidence: actor, timestamp, path, field name, policy name, and
verification result.
## Verification
Positive verification:
1. Authenticate as the whynot-design caller using the approved OIDC or
Kubernetes auth role.
2. Fetch the field in an attended session or through `warden access --fetch`.
3. Record only that the fetch succeeded; do not record the value.
Negative verification:
1. Authenticate as a non-whynot identity.
2. Confirm the same field read is denied.
3. Record the non-secret OpenBao audit request ids or timestamps for the
allowed and denied attempts.
## ops-warden Handoff
Send ops-warden only these pointers:
```text
catalog id: whynot-design-npm-publish
mount: platform
path: platform/workloads/whynot-design/whynot-design/npm-publish
field: NPM_AUTH_TOKEN
oidc login: bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read
policy: workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish
policy file: openbao/policies/workload-kv-read-whynot-design-npm-publish.hcl
flex-auth ref: secret.read:whynot-design, if tenant policy requires it
runbook: docs/workload-kv-access-lanes.md
```
Until live provisioning and verification are complete, ops-warden should keep
the catalog entry in `template`/`draft` or equivalent non-active state with
`resolvable=false`.